The Forum

NOVEMBER, 1898.

THE DREYFUS AFFAIR.

The Origin and Development of my Belief.

While belonging to the Ministry of February, 1889, which settled the accounts of Boulangism, I had good reason to believe that the Jesuits were constantly plotting against all the liberal institutions of France, and were seeking by every means to change it to a military republic of which they should have the inspiration and the mastery. The administrator of their establishment from 1882 to 1890 was M. Odelin, who had desperately contested my election to the legislature in 1889. When the "Libre Parole" was founded in 1892, M. Odelin was "president of the committee of parties in interest." The Jesuits took no trouble to conceal the fact that this journal was their journal, and that M. Drumont, who a dozen years before had begun the Anti-Semitic campaign, was their man.

Now on October 29, 1894, the "Libre Parole" asked "if proceedings had not been begun, looking to an important arrest for the crime of high treason."

The "Éclair"—a journal which had gone from the extreme of reaction to the extreme of socialism, and whose political leader, M. Alphonse Humbert, had been condemned to prison after the Commune for the odious articles of the "Père Duchêne"—replied the next morning that the fact was so.

On November 1 the "Libre Parole" published an article under the sensational title, "ARREST OF A JEWISH OFFICER."

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The "Petit Journal" and the "Intransigeant,"—the latter the journal of Henri Rochefort, one of Boulanger's accomplices,—accused the Minister of War of desiring to stifle the affair because the officer was a Jew.

On November 5, 1894, M. Edouard Drumont published an article from which I take the following passage:

"Look at this Ministry of War, which ought to be the sanctuary of patriotism, and which is a cavern, the home of perpetual scandals, a *cloaca* which cannot be compared to the Augean stables, because no Hercules has as yet undertaken to clean it. Such a house should be perfumed with honor and virtue: instead it gives forth a constant stench."

The article concluded with threats to the deputies:

"To-morrow, doubtless, they will applaud the Minister of War when he boasts of the measures that he has taken to save Dreyfus."

The same day in the "Intransigeant" Rochefort published an article in which, after having heaped insults upon Gen. Mercier, he contrasted him with his "honest colleagues in the Ministry" who were forcing him to prosecute Dreyfus. On November 6 there was a new attack against Gen. Mercier. The next day Rochefort reported that

"an attaché of the Ministry of War, temporarily at Brussels, had described to him the stupefaction in which the entire *personnel* of the Ministry was plunged by the suspicious attitude of Gen. Mercier."

Who gave this information to the "Libre Parole," to the "Éclair," to the "Intransigeant"? Plainly well-informed men,—men, therefore, connected with the Staff.

Why? Gen. Mercier, Minister of War, was hesitating, had doubts. It was necessary to compel him by threats to advance. In civil life this is known as blackmail. Gen. Mercier saw that he had everything to lose, save honor, in resisting; and that, in yielding, he had everything, save honor, to gain. He surrendered. We have the exact date of this capitulation. It was November 7, 1894. It is shown by an article of Rochefort, in the "Intransigeant" of November 8. Gen. Mercier becomes, along with Gen. Boisdeffre, the patriot, the great man, "determined to go to the very end to cause Dreyfus to be shot." Those who checked him are "his colleagues of the Ministry and the President of the Republic, Casimir Périer." He is a new Boulanger.

Gen. Mercier, in an interview published on November 28 in the "Figaro," gives pledges in which he says:

"I have crying proofs of the treason of Dreyfus, and have submitted them to my colleagues of the Ministry. It is not permissible for me to say more, since the investigation is not closed. All that can now be repeated is that the guilt of this officer is absolutely certain, and that he had civilian accomplices."

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These proceedings, this brusque change of attitude by the "Libre Parole" and the "Intransigeant," this inaccurate interview with Gen. Mercier, filled my mind with doubts, which were not dissipated by what the public was permitted to know of the discussions at the trial.

The trial commenced on December 19, under the presidency of Col. Maurel, of the 129th Regiment of the line. The interrogation of the accused took place in public. He declared that his name was Alfred Dreyfus; that he was thirty-five years of age, born at Mulhouse, and was Brevet Captain of Artillery, detailed as advocate in the First Bureau of the General Staff. Immediately after the summons of witnesses the Government commissary demanded an executive session. Maître Demange asked permission to submit certain conclusions.

"Since the single document——"

The President brutally interrupted him.

"There are other interests involved here than those of the accusation and the defence," said the commissary of the Government. Maître Demange insisted. The President rose abruptly and ordered the Council to withdraw. After a quarter of an hour of deliberation the Council ordered an executive session. On December 22 Dreyfus was condemned. It was thus established that he had been condemned upon *a single document.*

The next day I published in the "Siècle" an article entitled "Espionage," in which I pointed out the doubts which must weigh upon every impartial mind. In the "Siècle" of December 26 I returned to the subject; saying that in this whole affair it was felt, as the commissary of the Government had naïvely remarked, that there were "other interests involved than those of the accusation and the defence." There were others also than those of the country and of the truth.

I learned that, before going to the trial, Maître Demange, an advocate of high position in Paris, had said to one of his *confrères:*

"Even if the trial took place before the correctional police, which is a terrible condemning-machine, I should be sure of an acquittal."

Maître Demange, although he entertained exaggerated scruples as to professional discretion, remarked:

"A padlock has been put upon our lips. In the eyes of everybody, Dreyfus is guilty. But as for me, in my inmost heart, *I am still persuaded, in the most absolute manner, that he is innocent.*"

On January 5, 1895, occurred the frightful ceremony of the degradation of Dreyfus. He protested his innocence with energy, as was reported in all the journals, however prejudiced. To the crowd, which

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cried, "Death, death to the traitor!" he replied, "I swear that I am innocent."

On the following morning appeared in the "Figaro" the conversation which Capt. Lebrun-Renault, who accompanied Dreyfus, had had with him. It was reported by M. Clisson, who, returning from a fifteen months' voyage in America, had met the Captain by chance at the Moulin Rouge. There was no reference in it to any confession. Some journals spoke of such reference; but they were those only which were bent upon the ruin of Dreyfus.

The Government then undertook an odious measure with reference to Dreyfus. It proposed, and the Parliament adopted, the law of February 9, 1895,—a special law for a single individual, relating to a crime already committed,—by virtue of which Dreyfus was deported to the Île du Diable, in the fatal climate of Guiana, instead of being sent to New Caledonia.

The Government violated the law of 1873, with reference to transportation, by refusing to permit his wife to join him. The "Libre Parole" and the "Intransigeant" danced a scalp-dance around the unfortunate wretch. That was their understanding of patriotism. Their words betrayed the most furious animosities of religion and of race.

But what could be done? Some friends had the greatest doubts in regard to the guilt of Dreyfus. A memoir which he had written was communicated to me. From beginning to end he protested his innocence, and brought forward very strong moral proofs. But I said to myself, "What is necessary is to find the real culprit. Until he is found every effort to secure the revision of the trial will be in vain."

Two years passed. On September 3, 1896, a despatch published in an English journal announced the escape of Dreyfus. Curious thing! As if the men who had secured the condemnation of Dreyfus thought that he was not sufficiently condemned, they seized the occasion of this false news to secure his condemnation a second time by public opinion and by Parliament. On September 14 there appeared in the "Éclair" an article in the course of which it was said:

"There can now be disclosed in broad daylight what could not be produced at the time of the trial, the proof—the irrefutable, the literal proof—of treason, the proof which determined the unanimous verdict of the officers composing the Council of War."

The "Éclair" gave the following description of this proof:

"It was a letter in the cipher of the German Embassy. This cipher was in the hands of the Government; and it can well be imagined that it was far too useful to

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permit the publication of such a secret. This was the reason why the letter in question was not put upon record.

About September 20, 1894, Col. Sandherr, Chief of the Statistical Section, communicated to Gen. Mercier this letter which had been deciphered: 'Decidedly that animal Dreyfus is becoming too exacting.'"

The "Éclair" closed its article with a paragraph entitled "The Proof before the Eyes of the Judges." After having stated that Dreyfus had always persisted in protesting his innocence, it added:

"It is true that Dreyfus did not know, and perhaps does not yet know, that the Ministry of War was in possession of a photograph of the letter exchanged between the military attachés of Germany and Italy, the only document in which his name figured. The letter that he wrote, and that he took good care not to sign, could be only a moral element in the case. In fact, if two experts in handwriting, Charavay and Bertillon, testified that it was indeed by Dreyfus, the three others were hesitant."

The unconscious revelation of this article was stupefying. If it was true, it proved that Dreyfus had been illegally condemned, for Article 101 of the Code of Military Justice is explicit. All the documents of the procedure must be included in the record. The minister who communicated this document to the judges, and the judges who received it and based their opinion upon it, were guilty of forfeiture and liable to civic degradation. Guilty or not, Dreyfus was the victim of illegality. M. Castelin, a deputy, the product of Boulangism, claimed the monopoly of patriotism. It was very clear in the month of November that the despatch published on September 3, announcing the escape of Dreyfus, was false. Nevertheless, M. Castelin seized upon it as a pretext to address an interpellation to the Government upon the Dreyfus Affair. The discussion was fixed for November 18.

M. Bernard Lazare, in a pamphlet entitled "The Truth About the Dreyfus Affair," had declared that the text of the *bordereau*, published by the "Éclair," had not been faithfully copied. On November 10, the "Matin" published a facsimile of the *bordereau* under the title, "The Proof. Facsimile of the Bordereau Written by Dreyfus." Here is the text:

"Being without word that you wish to see me, I address to you, sir, some interesting information.

1. A note on the hydraulic brake of 120 and the way in which it works.
2. A note on the troops at the frontier ports (*troupes de couverture*) (some fresh modifications will be made by the new plan).
3. A note on a change in artillery formations.
4. A note relating to Madagascar.
5. The project for field-artillery firing (14 March, 1894).

This last document is extremely difficult to procure. A certain number have been sent to the corps by the War Department, and the corps are responsible; after

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the manœuvres, every officer possessing one must return it. If, then, you wish me to take from it what interests you, and afterward hold it at my disposal, I will take it, unless you wish that I have it copied *in extenso* and send you the copy.

I am about to leave for the manœuvres."

Cool-headed people noticed that, while the "Éclair" acknowledged that the experts had not agreed, and that the *bordereau* was not a sufficient proof of the guilt of Dreyfus, the "Matin" cited it as decisive proof. Their doubts continued to increase. They discovered, finally, that this publication, appearing on the eve of the Castelin interpellation, was a part of those shrewd manœuvres to influence public opinion which the Staff were constantly promoting. They continued to wonder that the mysteries of the Dreyfus Affair should be published by the men who had pretended, at the time of his condemnation, that nothing could be said about it without incurring the gravest dangers for France. Following upon these indiscretions, they were surprised to hear Gen. Billot declare, on November 18, to the Chamber of Deputies:

"The investigation of the affair, the discussion, the judgment, all took place in conformity with the rules of military procedure. The Council of War was regularly composed, and its deliberations were regular. We have, then, the *chose jugée*, and no one can be permitted to go back of the trial; but motives of a higher order, which in 1894 made necessary the judgment of the affair with closed doors, have lost nothing of their gravity."

People who were not blinded by passion said to themselves, "Then the history of the secret document published by the 'Éclair,' according to information evidently furnished by the Staff, may not be true? That would indeed be astounding."

The Minister of War pretends that secrecy is still indispensable. That is plainly not the opinion of his subordinates of the Staff, since they have related in the "Éclair" all the details of the accusation, and the "Matin" was able to publish a facsimile of the *bordereau*.

In his interpellation M. Castelin had but one purpose; viz., to declare anew, in declamatory terms, the guilt of Dreyfus, by means of a story about an attempt to corrupt the chairman of the Council of War (denied instantly by M. Charles Dupuy); a pretended proposition from M. Puybaraud to the "Hon. M. Teysonnières," stricken from the list of experts of the civil tribunal; the recital of pretended and romantic attempts at escape; and accusations of espionage against M. Hadamard, the father-in-law of Dreyfus.

The Chamber of Deputies voted, with only five opposing votes, an order of the day from M. Castelin, inviting

"the Government to examine, if occasion required, the *responsabilités* which had

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been disclosed on the occasion of the condemnation of the traitor Dreyfus and since, and to persist in the repression thereof."

This was a part of those manifestations, including the articles of the "Libre Parole," the "Éclair," the "Intransigeant," and the "Petit Journal," which were intended to act upon public opinion, and to show Dreyfus surrounded by the civilian accomplices of whom Gen. Mercier spoke in his interview of November 28, 1894, and who have since vanished.

Mme. Lucie Dreyfus had addressed to the Chamber a petition protesting against the condemnation of her husband and praying for justice. This petition was rejected. In reporting it, M. Loriot said: "This lady, relying upon an article in the 'Éclair,' complains that neither her husband, nor his counsel, was allowed to become acquainted with the secret documents communicated to the Council of War," and he added: "One consideration dominates everything, that is, respect for the *chose jugée.*"

Men who had any care for the respect due to the law said to themselves, "But if there were secret documents, as the 'Éclair' has said, there could not have been respect for the *chose jugée, since the illegality committed annuls the judgment of December 22, 1894.*"

On October 29, 1897, an article appeared in the "Matin," containing this declaration by M. Scheurer-Kestner:

"I am convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus; and I am more than ever resolved to undertake his rehabilitation."

These words of M. Scheurer-Kestner produced a profound impression. The Anti-Semites could not accuse M. Scheurer-Kestner of being a Jew; for he is a Protestant. They could not say that he had any interest in taking up the Dreyfus Question. He had no need to seek notoriety. As Vice-President of the Senate, he had no ambition; and, as events have proved, he could only compromise his situation. A rich man, he could not be accused of pecuniary corruption. Finally, this Alsatian could not be suspected of indulgence for a traitor. If this man gave up his quiet life to take in hand a cause which was bound to loose against him so much fury and hatred, it must be recognized that his sole motive was the love of truth and of justice.

M. Gabriel Monod, Professor in the École des Hautes Études, and a former pupil of the École des Chartes, declared that he shared the opinion of M. Scheurer-Kestner.

M. Bernard Lazare published a new pamphlet. He rested his argument upon moral proofs, and upon the opinions of experts in writing

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who denied Dreyfus' authorship of the *bordereau*. To this the partisans of condemnation said, "What value have these opinions?"

But if these opinions had no value, how can those of the opposing experts have any more?

The "Libre Parole" and the "Intransigeant," the papers which had first been informed of the arrest of Dreyfus, and which had waged war upon Gen. Mercier until he consented to the prosecution, broke out in insult, cries of indignation, and calumnies against M. Scheurer-Kestner.

On November 14 Scheurer-Kestner wrote that on October 30, in an interview with the Minister of War, he had demonstrated, with the documents in his hand, that "the *bordereau* attributed to Capt. Dreyfus was not by him, but by another." Gen. Billot asked him for a fortnight in which to make an investigation. Instead of making it, he incited an attack in the papers upon his old friend Scheurer-Kestner, and did not produce for him a single document establishing the guilt of Dreyfus.

This was the moment at which the journals devoted to the Staff started the phrase, "Dreyfus Syndicate." In reality, Scheurer-Kestner did not know any members of the Dreyfus family. It was only on the eve of the interpellation of Le Provost de Launay in the Senate, that Mathieu Dreyfus, the brother of the prisoner, presented himself at Scheurer-Kestner's house:

"'You know the name of the real author of the *bordereau*?'

'Yes,' M. Scheurer-Kestner replied, 'but I have no authority to speak it.

'But if I should speak it, you would not deny it?'

'No.'

'Esterhazy.'

'That is the name,' replied M. Scheurer-Kestner. 'How did you know it?'

'A banker, M. de Castro, bought the facsimile of the *bordereau* on the street. He instantly recognized the handwriting as that of one of his former customers. He compared it with the letters which he had received from him. The writing was identical; and on November 7 he came to me to give me this name, and the proofs.'"

On November 15 Mathieu Dreyfus denounced Esterhazy to the Minister of War as the guilty man.

Immediately the Chief of the Staff, Gen. Mouton de Boisdeffre, sent his chief clerk, the Commandant Pauffin de Saint-Morel, "to place the flag of the army" in the hands of Rochefort, who had continually poured out upon it and upon his superiors the most disgraceful insults. There was general amazement. The Minister of War sentenced the Commandant Pauffin de Saint-Morel to thirty days' confinement. This appeared like a mere comedy. Gen. de Pellieux was charged with proceed-

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ings against Esterhazy; but this man, though accused of treason, was not arrested. He went about peddling the queer stories concerning "the veiled lady," trying to make people believe that this was a woman who, having become an enemy of Col. Picquart, formerly Chief of the Bureau of Information, had given to him (Esterhazy) a document that had been confided to her by Picquart, and which would now be proof of his (Esterhazy's) innocence.

At the same time the Government did not decide to recall from Tunis Col. Picquart, who had discovered the guilt of Esterhazy and the innocence of Dreyfus. When it finally consented to do so, Gen. de Pellieux treated him as if he were the accused, while treating Esterhazy like a *protégé*. He caused a search to be made of Picquart's apartments in his absence. No one was surprised when Gen. de Pellieux reported in favor of Esterhazy; and, although Gen. Saussier ordered that he should be prosecuted, I, with many others, was convinced that we were witnessing a shameful parody of justice.

Interpellations had been made in the Senate on November 18 and December 5 and 7, as well as in the Chamber, in the course of which M. Méline had declared that there "was no Dreyfus Affair"; that the Government rejected revision "in order not to impair the authority of the *chose jugée*"; and that Gen. Billot had repeated that "Dreyfus was condemned legally and justly."

All these facts confirmed me more and more in the convictions that Dreyfus was innocent. I made, however, one reservation; but on December 25 I became acquainted with the *acte d'accusation* which the Commandant Besson d' Ormescheville had prepared against Dreyfus. Then my conviction of the innocence of Dreyfus became absolute. This document showed the passion with which Du Paty de Clam had conducted the prosecution; and it also showed that M. Gobert, the handwriting expert of the Bank of France, had agreed with another expert, M. Pelletier,—that is, two out of five,—that there was no resemblance between the two handwritings. It undertook to establish moral proofs which completely contradicted the proposition that it was desired to prove. It established the fact that there had been only a single document introduced in the discussion—the *bordereau*. I published this in the "Siècle" of January 7 with this conclusion:

> "Either Dreyfus was condemned upon documents other than the *bordereau*, and in that case his condemnation was illegal; or he was condemned on the *bordereau*, and in that case he was condemned without proof."

Three days later came the Esterhazy trial.

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The Esterhazy Trial.

The trial commenced on January 10, 1898. Gen. de Luxer presided over the court martial. The first part of the proceedings was public. The *acte d'accusation* against Esterhazy was read by the Commandant Ravary. In reality it was a plea for the author of the *bordereau*, and a formal accusation against Col. Picquart. On January 11 Esterhazy was acquitted. Gen. de Luxer grasped him by the hand and the Anti-Semites gave him an ovation, crying: "Hail to the Martyr of the Jews!" Nevertheless, it was known that this man, a former Papal Zouave, was a detestable personage, ruined by debts, retired under pretext of temporary infirmities, but in reality because his presence had become intolerable in any regiment; that he had deserted his wife and children, after having ruined them, to live with a person of the vilest sort, the woman Marguerite Pays.

Letters were produced from Esterhazy to Mme. de Boulancy in which he breathed all his hatred against the French army and its chiefs. He described his ambition to be a "Captain of Uhlans, sabring Frenchmen in Paris—taken by assault and given over to pillage to one hundred thousand drunken soldiers. Amen!"

Then, on January 13, there appeared the letter of Émile Zola to the President of the Republic—a magnificent and powerful cry of indignation over the Dreyfus and Esterhazy trials. Amid the applause of the Chamber, the Government announced that Zola would be prosecuted. We owe to Minister Méline the happy idea of sending the Staff before the Criminal Court.

M. Méline undertook to limit discussion. He chose two paragraphs in Zola's letter. To every witness who could make any revelation whatever in regard to the Dreyfus Affair the President, Delegorgue, declared, "The question will not be put." True, he permitted the officers of the Staff to speak with entire freedom; and when Col. Henry said to Col. Picquart, "You have lied," he contented himself with saying gently, "I think you do not agree."

Never did a trial proceed under more scandalous conditions. *Cedat toga armis!* In the Hall Du Harlay (where the trial was held) M. Max Regis, President of the Anti-Jewish League of Algiers, caused the arrest of people who ventured to cry "*Vive la République!*" M. Jules Guérin, President of the French Anti-Semite League, whose name could not be admitted to any registry list of voters, was allowed without in-

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terruption to shout, "Down with the Jews!" "Death to Zola! Death to Yves Guyot! Death to Travier!" Lawyers, led by M. Jules Auffray, secretary to M. de Mackau during the Boulanger campaign, blended the cries of "Vive l'Armée!" and "Vive Esterhazy!"; and he arranged with Du Paty de Clam and Gen. Gonse to fill the audience-hall with officers "intended to sustain the Advocate-General" and to intimidate the jury.

Gen. de Pellieux had command in the Palace. A commandant of guards, Perret, was entirely willing to let loose his municipal guards against Zola and his friends. The Palace of Justice was allowed to be invaded and surrounded. Zola and his friends were exposed to peril of their lives in leaving it. The jurors were indicated by name for vengeance if they did not convict. One of them became ill in the course of the proceedings. They would indeed have been heroes had they brought in a verdict of acquittal under the threats which were rumbling about them.

Zola was found guilty without mitigating circumstances; and the Court inflicted the maximum penalty.

The "Écho de Paris," one of the Staff's newspapers, thus describes the hall of the criminal court during the proceedings:

"A flood of insults drowns the voice of the advocate. The audience rises to its feet. There is whistling, groaning; and canes are pounding the floor in cadence. If one closes one's eyes, the illusion is complete that the Palace is about to tumble to pieces. Each minute the audience becomes more excited. Finally, it breaks out. The most offensive cries and shouts mingle with hisses and whistles. One by one, under the fixed stare of the spectators, the jurors quit the hall."

This took place under the Ministry of M. Milliard, Keeper of the Seals; M. Perivier being the Chief Judge of the Court, and M. Delegorgue actually presiding. These names will go down to posterity with those bequeathed us by Tacitus and Victor Hugo.

Zola was condemned to the maximum penalty of one year in prison; and on April 2, 1898, the order of the Criminal Court was annulled by the Court of Cassation, because the Minister of War had replaced the Council of War in the prosecution. The Government reconvened the Council of War which had judged Esterhazy, but took good care not to reconvene the Council of War which had judged Dreyfus, although it had accused its members of having condemned Dreyfus illegally. Zola was sent before the Criminal Court at Versailles, but allowed himself to be condemned by default; expecting, with good reason, that new facts would justify him. They have since appeared.

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The Forgers.

I should not have believed it possible to accumulate so many proofs of the innocence of Dreyfus and of the guilt of Esterhazy; but I have been amazed and grieved to see the blind passion, the fanatical obstinacy, with which the great majority of people reject all proof, and stubbornly persist, without reason, in cynical defiance of morality, in keeping an innocent man in the Île du Diable, and the real traitor on the roll of officers of the French army. It seems as if all the old hatreds of the wars of religion of the sixteenth century had been reawakened. Politicians, who ought to enlighten public opinion, become accomplices; and even the most independent remain silent.

At the last election Joseph Reinach was defeated in his district. At Paris I could not even be a candidate. The Méline Ministry fell on June 14. M. Brisson permitted the "Libre Parole" and the "Intransigeant" to impose M. Cavaignac upon him as Minister of War. On July 7 a new interpellation occurred anent the Dreyfus Affair. M. Cavaignac had not a word to say about the *bordereau*, but cited two mysterious documents, one, the document produced by the "Éclair"—"Cette canaille de D."—and a letter dated two years later than the condemnation of Dreyfus, written by M. de Schwarzkoppen, military attaché of the German Embassy, to M. Panizzardi, military attaché of the Italian Embassy:

"I have read that a deputy is about to make an interpellation as to Dreyfus, if [here is a phrase that I cannot read] I will say that I never had any relations with this Jew. That is understood. If you are questioned, speak in this way, because it is necessary that no one shall ever know what took place with him."

Of this M. Cavaignac guaranteed "the material and moral authenticity." Moreover, he cited a pretended report of Capt. Lebrun-Renault, written to order three years after the degradation of Dreyfus, according to which Dreyfus had made a confession. The Chamber offered an ovation to M. Cavaignac. Of the five hundred and eighty-one members, the five hundred and forty-five who voted gave a unanimous vote for the "official posting" of M. Cavaignac's speech.

On July 9, Col. Picquart wrote to the President of the Council:

"As the Minister of War has cited in the tribune of the Chamber three of these documents, I hold it to be my duty to inform you that I am in a position to establish before any competent tribunal that the two documents which bear the date of 1894 cannot possibly refer to Dreyfus, and *that the one which bears the date of 1896 has all the marks of forgery.*"

The only response was a search of Col. Picquart's house, in his absence, on July 11. The next day he was arrested.

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The evening of the day when M. Cavaignac delivered his speech I took as the title of my article in the "Siècle" "The Necessity of Revision." The facts smote and carried away the dike which M. Cavaignac had sought to raise against them. His discourse had amazed everyone who expected "the crushing blow" with which Gen. Billot had constantly menaced us. They showed that the proofs of M. Cavaignac proved nothing. He had affirmed that there were a thousand documents in the record, whereas in the Criminal Court Col. Henry had said that there were only eight or nine; and of these thousand documents only three could be produced.

At the very moment when M. Cavaignac caused the arrest of Col. Picquart, M. Bertulus, *Juge d'instruction*, being presented by Col. Picquart with a complaint of forgery against Esterhazy and the woman Pays, ordered their arrest. While Picquart was at Soussa in Tunis, at the moment when Scheurer-Kestner opened communication with M. Méline and Billot, it was shown that the despatches that had been sent to him signed "Speranza" and "Blanche," for the purpose of compromising him, had been gotten up jointly by Du Paty de Clam, Esterhazy, and the woman Pays. Day after day the "Siècle" publicly charged M. Du Paty de Clam with forgery, and challenged him to prosecute it. M. Du Paty de Clam, a cousin of Cavaignac, kept silent.

On August 6 the lower Court released Esterhazy, the woman Pays, and Du Paty de Clam. By an order of September 1, the Court of Cassation decided that this act was in violation of the law. On that day the public learned the decision of M. Bertulus, which shows the relations existing between Col. Henry, Chief of the Bureau of Information, Col. Du Paty de Clam, the Commandant Esterhazy, and the woman Pays.

Two days previously a despatch of the Agence Havas had announced the arrest of Col. Henry, and his confession that the third document read by M. Cavaignac in the Chamber—"If ever I had, etc."—was a forgery, as Picquart had declared, and as had been foreseen by everybody possessing a little sense and coolness.

M. Cavaignac had said that "the moral authenticity of this document resulted from the correspondence carried on. The first wrote to the second, who responded." Now, a forgery cannot be embodied in a correspondence, unless the rest of the correspondence is also forged. Consequently there was not merely one forgery: there were several. The document avowed and exhibited by Gen. de Pellieux and by Cavaignac demonstrated that if there had been any proofs against Dreyfus

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in 1894, Col. Henry would not have been obliged to commit forgery two years after the condemnation in order to prove guilt. One rotten apple in a basket renders all the others suspect. Officers who have committed forgeries are capable of committing others. Du Paty de Clam was convicted of forgery the moment that Henry acknowledged his. What weight, then, could be allowed to the investigation against Dreyfus conducted by Du Paty de Clam? Here are two officers on the Staff who are forgers. Why may there not be others in the company? What was the part played by Gen. Boisdeffre and Gen. Gonse, who made use of the forgery confessed by Henry; of the Commandant Lauth, who had so falsely accused Picquart of forgery, and the Archivist Gribelin, who was mixed up so actively in all these manœuvres?

Public opinion was violently agitated. The deputies who had voted for the posting of M. Cavaignac's speech were subjected to the mortification of seeing on the walls of their own districts copies of the forgeries to which they had rendered that honor. From that moment a revision appeared indispensable. Nevertheless, M. Cavaignac announced that he rejected it; and he resigned with the declaration, that he was more than ever "convinced of the guilt of Dreyfus." He did not appear to suspect that his opinion was discredited. This served only to give a little courage to the adversaries of revision, who were all the more desperate because that procedure might have the most terrible consequences for Gen. Mercier, who had brought about the condemnation of Dreyfus, and for all who, before or after, had joined in that job. Gen. Zurlinden offered to take the place of Cavaignac, and almost immediately hastened by the same manœuvre to try to save the compromised officers of the Staff. It is incredible how many people there are who seem to make it a point of honor to become the champions of officers who are forgers in order to save the real traitor, and to keep the innocent man at the Île du Diable.

The President of the Republic, the former tanner, now possessed of a military establishment, and proud of being surrounded by generals and saluted by them, thought that he also ought to declare against revision. He is the more inexcusable, because he knew at least that the condemnation of Dreyfus was illegal. The President of the Council, M. Brisson, was obliged twice to recall to his attention the constitutional limit of his powers.

On September 17 the Council of Ministers finally decided to lay before the commission instituted by the Keeper of the Seals a revision of the trial. This commission has only a consultative voice. It was

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with amazement that we learned on September 24, that the commission was equally divided. The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation has full power. It can make a full inquiry, compel the submission of all documents, and hear witnesses. As soon as it is charged with the case, the Keeper of the Seals may suspend the penalty of the prisoner. The new Council of War, before which Dreyfus will be sent, cannot render its judgment behind closed doors. The revision must be loyal. Had it been held a few months ago, it might have been merely a new crime. Col. Bougon, one of the judges of the Council of War, remarked, with cool cynicism: "Revision is only a matter of two steamers, one to bring Dreyfus over, and the other to take him back."

The Innocent Man and the Traitor.

The demonstration of the innocence of Dreyfus has been complete for a year; for not only is it proved that there were not any proofs against him, but the real culprit has been found—Esterhazy.

Against the latter there are abundant charges. French law admits five methods of proof: (1) literal proof; (2) proof by testimony; (3) by presumption; (4) the confession of the party; (5) by oath. Let us rapidly apply these to Dreyfus and Esterhazy.

(1) *Literal proof—the bordereau.* First examination by experts, five in number. M. Gobert, the expert of the bank, and M. Pelletier declared that it was not in the handwriting of Dreyfus. M. Teysonnières, an expert whose name had been expunged from its list by the civil tribunal, M. Bertillon, author of the system of anthropometry, and M. Charavay agreed upon the resemblance of the handwriting.

These experts had no chance to compare the handwriting of the *bordereau* with the handwriting of Esterhazy. In the Esterhazy trial the three experts, MM. Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard, declared that the *bordereau* had been traced from the writing of Esterhazy. Now, if it was traced from the writing of Esterhazy, it was not Dreyfus' handwriting. Out of eight experts five, then, have concluded that it was not Dreyfus' handwriting.

As early as November 16, 1897, Esterhazy confessed "the frightful similarity" between his writing and that of the *bordereau.*

"That there existed between the writing of the *bordereau* and the writing of Esterhazy a resemblance, a similitude equivalent to identity," was testified not only by M. Franck, a doctor of law, an advocate, and an expert in writing at Brussels, by M. Paul Moriaud, professor of law

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at the University of Geneva, and by Dr. Héricourt, chief editor of the "Scientific Review," but by MM. Paul Meyer, Member of the Institute, Director of the École des Chartes, Giry, Member of the Institute, professor in the École des Chartes, Auguste Molinier, professor in the École des Chartes, Émile Milinier, archivist and paleograph, professor in the École du Louvre, Louis Havet, professor in the College of France, and Bourmont, archivist and paleograph. They added: "The handwriting of M. Esterhazy is absolutely individual and very characteristic. It has what may be called idioms that are peculiar to it." The method and proofs by which these conclusions were reached may be seen in the stenographic report of the Zola trial. As to MM. Bertillon, Teysonnières, Charavay, Couard, Varinard, and Belhomme, they refused to explain the origin of their opinion.

Moreover, Col. Picquart proved in his deposition before the Criminal Court "that the author of the *bordereau* must be an infantry officer like Esterhazy, and not an officer of the Staff." (Vol. ii, page 102.)

All artillery officers have noticed the incorrect terms which prove that the text could not have been written by an artilleryman. Among other things, an artilleryman never speaks of the way in which "une pièce se conduit" but in which "elle se comporte." He never speaks of a "hydraulic brake," but of a "hydropneumatic brake," etc.

There is a second literal proof against Esterhazy. In May, 1896, the same agent who had sent the *bordereau* to the Ministry of War sent to Col. Picquart—at that time Chief of the Bureau of Information—a telegram-card (*petit bleu*) torn into some sixty pieces. M. Picquart entrusted it to the Commandant Lauth to reconstruct. Of itself this little paper had no value. Here is the text:

"I am waiting before all for a more detailed explanation than you gave me the other day in regard to the question in suspense. I beg you therefore to give it to me in writing, in order that I can judge whether or not I can continue my relations with the house of R.

The Commandant ESTERHAZY,
27 Rue de La Bienfaisance, Paris."

This little paper, if it had been seized in the mail, or at Esterhazy's house, would have been without significance. What gave it its value was the fact, that it had the same origin as the *bordereau*. It was not a proof: it was an indication which prompted Col. Picquart to make an investigation.

An agent declared that a superior officer about fifty years of age was furnishing to a foreign Power such and such documents. "Now

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these documents," said Col. Picquart, "were precisely those which had been mentioned to me by the comrade to whom I addressed myself when I discovered the *petit bleu.*" Col. Picquart requested the colonel of the regiment in which Esterhazy was serving to furnish him with certain letters. Compared with the *bordereau*, and submitted to the inspection of M. Bertillon, the latter instantly said to Col. Picquart: "It is the handwriting of the *bordereau.*"

The discovery of the *petit bleu* was regarded as so serious by all the officers who were determined to save Esterhazy,—Col. Henry, Du Paty de Clam, Gen. de Pellieux, Commandant Ravary,—that, in order to weaken its effect, they accused Col. Picquart of forgery. As Chief of the Bureau of Information, Col. Picquart was prefect of police for the army; and this is the way they treated him. Commandant Ravary, at the hearing on February 11, said: "There are many other charges." At the same time, Gen. Zurlinden, feeling that Picquart would be acquitted of the ridiculous charge of revealing documents to M. Lellois, and being Minister of War, gave an order, against the judgment of his colleagues, to the Governor-General of Paris, to lodge a complaint against Picquart; and when Minister Brisson weakly reappointed Gen. Zurlinden Governor of Paris, the latter hastened to execute the order which, as Minister of War, he had issued.

Is this the way that they would protect the honor of the army and advance its *prestige?*

They use two arguments which are mutually destructive. On the one hand, they say that Picquart forged a document to ruin Esterhazy. In that case the document must have some force. On the other hand, they say that the telegram is a matter of no significance whatever. This argument then destroys the former. But, if this telegram is of no consequence, how comes it that, up to the very day when Henry confessed that he was its author, they cited as proof against Dreyfus the pretended letter of Schwarzkoppen to Panizzardi of November 16, 1896?

(2) *Proof by testimony.* There were twenty-seven witnesses against Dreyfus, including the five experts in handwriting. Their testimony was so insignificant that the commissary of the Government brushed them aside; saying to Maître Demange, "Nothing remains but the *bordereau:* that is sufficient." But, outside of the hearing of the Court, there is testimony of the first importance.

At the time the Dreyfus Affair first arose, the Emperor of Germany demanded that he should be told the exact truth. After examination, the German Staff assured him that Dreyfus had never been, directly or

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indirectly, in communication with any German agent. This information was conveyed to Count Münster, who transmitted it to M. Casimir-Périer, then President of the Republic, and to M. Charles Dupuy, President of the Council. M. Hanotaux, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, was absent; but he could not have been ignorant of this communication, since on November 12, 1894, Col. Schwarzkoppen declared that he had never had direct or indirect relations with Dreyfus. On November 13 there was a denial not less categorical from Italy; and on the following day one not less formal from Austria.

On January 24, 1898, a despatch from Berlin reported the following words used by Von Bülow to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag:

"I shall confine myself to declaring in the most formal and categorical fashion, that between Ex-Captain Dreyfus, at present confined on the Île du Diable, and any German organ whatsoever, there has never existed any relation or connection of any kind. As to the story about a letter of a mysterious agent, said to have been found in a waste-paper-basket, it might perhaps show well in a romance. Naturally, it is wholly imaginary, and never took place in reality."

A despatch of January 31 reported the following declaration of Count Bonin Longare, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Italian Chamber of Deputies:

"I can affirm in the most explicit manner that neither our military attaché nor any agent or representative of the Italian Government has ever had any relation, direct or indirect, with Dreyfus."

In his interviews with Count Casella, Col. Schwarzkoppen, the German military attaché, declared in the most distinct manner that "Dreyfus was not guilty."

On the contrary, these interviews and the "Letter of a Diplomat," published in the "Siècle" of April 4, give precise details as to the relations between Esterhazy and Col. Schwarzkoppen. These relations continued up to the publication of the facsimile in the "Matin" on November 10, 1896.

Col. Schwarzkoppen discovered at that time, with dismay, that the *bordereau* was by Esterhazy, who did not dare to continue his relations with him any longer. He returned only on October 16, 1897, to demand—a revolver in his hand—of the Colonel that he should go and declare to Mme. Dreyfus that he had had relations with Dreyfus.

Col. Schwarzkoppen was recalled to Berlin before the name of Esterhazy had been mentioned. In the conversation with Count Casella, he declared in the plainest manner that "Dreyfus is not guilty." He said of Esterhazy: "He is capable of anything." The account of "The Diplomat" was confirmed by a German official note. This, as

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well as the deposition of Count Casella, was published by all the foreign papers without being disputed.

When Von Bülow made his declaration, he confined himself to saying that he had known the name of Esterhazy for only a few weeks.

(3) *Presumptions.* Those that are contained in the *acte d'accusation* of D'Ormescheville show only a disposition to turn against the accused even his good qualities. He is reproached with being "curious"; and it is added "that this attitude has seriously counted against him." The successive reports made in regard to Capt. Dreyfus are generally good, sometimes even "excellent," with the exception of those of Col. Fabre:

"He speaks several languages, notably German. He is extremely well informed. He is gifted with a very supple character. Capt. Dreyfus was therefore a most suitable agent for the wretched and shameful mission."

In reality, there was only one grave presumption against Dreyfus. *He was a Jew, and the first Jew officer to enter the Staff.* The Ravary report confesses that the information as to Esterhazy is deplorable: "Commandant Esterhazy lived with great difficulty, and in great need of money." It is known that he was accustomed to gamble on the Bourse; that he did not pay his differences; and that he used to threaten his creditors with sword or revolver.

Col. Dubach informed Col. Picquart that

"Commandant Esterhazy in 1882 was involved in a matter of malversation, which should have sent him before a council of inquiry, if not a court martial."

This was confirmed by Commandants Sainte-Chapelle and Zickel. When Col. Picquart reported the result of his preliminary investigations as to Esterhazy, the answer was: "As for Esterhazy, we know him better than you do"; but nothing was said about that in the report.[1]

(4) *The confession of the party.* Dreyfus incessantly protested his innocence before and after his condemnation. We have not only the testimony of Maître Demange, and of M. Forzinetti, Commandant of the Prison of Cherche-Midi, but here is the letter which Dreyfus himself wrote to Maître Demange the evening of his degradation:

"I have kept the promise that I made to you. Innocent as I am, I have faced the most frightful martyrdom that can be inflicted upon a soldier. I have felt about me the scorn of the crowd. I have suffered the most terrible torture that can be imagined. How happy should I be in the tomb. All would then be over; I should no longer hear talk of anything; there would be peace and oblivion of all my sufferings. But, alas! duty will not permit me that."

Since that time all his letters have been one long cry of protest against his condemnation.

[1] Stenographic report of the trial, Deposition of Col. Picquart, vol. i., p. 295.

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As for Esterhazy, he has confessed, in spite of himself, that he is the author of the *bordereau*. After the denunciation by Mathieu Dreyfus, the "Libre Parole" of November 17, and the "Écho de Paris" of November 19, announced that they had recognized in their respective offices the "terrible resemblance" between the writing of the *bordereau* and Esterhazy's. Before his name had even been mentioned he told Mlle. Pays that he was ruined, and that he was going to kill himself. After the "Récit d'un Témoin" and the deposition of M. Henri Casella, in the "Siècle," he remained silent. He did not dare to utter an audible protest.

(5) *By oath.* Dreyfus did not have to take a legal oath. Esterhazy was heard as a witness by the Criminal Court. He was sworn, but would not answer any questions which M. Albert Clémenceau put to him. Silence is an alternative to perjury.

The Dreyfusards and the Esterhazystes.

All doubt vanishes before such evident proofs of the innocence of Dreyfus and the guilt of Esterhazy. Whence, then, this obstinacy of the Staff, of the Ministers, and of the President of the Republic, with the complicity of the greater part of the Republic, in maintaining the condemnation of Dreyfus?

In the Staff, Col. Sandherr, a passionate Anti-Semite, guided and prompted by the Jesuits, who saw an opportunity to expel the Jews from the army,—and he has in great part succeeded, for the majority of Jew officers have since that time resigned,—did everything he could to secure the condemnation of Dreyfus without proof. Col. Picquart gave the solution of the enigma when he declared in the Criminal Court:

"The managers of the preceding affair intimately connected with the Esterhazy Affair, those who have worked conscientiously I believe, thinking that they were in the right,—Col. Henry and the archivist Gribelin, aided by Col. du Paty de Clam, under the directions of Gen. Gonse,—received from the lamented Col. Sandherr (who already at the time of this affair was seriously attacked by the general paralysis from which he has since died), as a sort of testament at the very moment when he quitted the service, the care of defending against all attacks this procedure which involved the 'honor of the Bureau.'"

The public are asked to take the "honor of the Bureau" for the honor of the flag; and, in order to defend it, Henry has committed forgery, Du Paty de Clam has committed forgery; and they caused forgery to be committed by Lemercier Picard, who was found a few months ago hanged in a hotel to the crossbar of a window. Commandant Lauth took peculiar steps to prove that Picquart had relations with Schwarzkoppen; and the

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parts played by Gen. Gonse, Gen. de Pellieux, and Gen. Mouton de Boisdeffre will doubtless be established in the course of a revision. They made the blunder of accusing Picquart of forgery and consigning him to secret confinement in the Prison of Cherche-Midi. And the conditions were such when he declared, "If the cord of Lemercier Picard, or the razor of Henry, is found by my body, know that it is murder. I shall not commit suicide," that the president of the tribunal before which this declaration was made did not utter a single word to protest that the prisoners referred to were not assassinated. This silence constitutes a terrible judgment on the course of the Staff.

Before the arrogance of these persons Ministers have surrendered the supremacy of the civil power. They believed that the honor of the army consisted in saving these men by clinging to a judicial error which is a judicial crime. The President of the Republic, although knowing very well that Dreyfus had been illegally condemned, thought that he owed it to his military family, to the generals among whom he loves to parade, to oppose revision with desperation. Moreover, the President of the Republic is not without fear as to the attacks of the "Intransigeant," of the "Libre Parole," and of the "Petit Journal"; and he is always ready to obey the demands of the Rocheforts, the Drumonts, and the Judets. Most politicians share this cowardice. They have been afraid of being accused of having been sold to the Jews, who in this affair have bought nobody. If they had really formed the syndicate of twelve millions which they are accused of having formed, we should have found on Dreyfus' side most of the tarnished publicists who have fought revision with the greatest energy. All the men who hoped for an overturning of the Republic thought that here was a chance to prepare the army to make a *coup d'état*. Prince Henri d'Orleans embraced Esterhazy as a hero of patriotism. The pretender, Philippe d'Orleans, on September 20 issued a most grotesque manifesto. Not a single priest has dared to let his voice be heard in favor of mere humanity and pity. Those people who prefer to become the protectors of the traitor, to cover him with their sympathy, have very properly received the name "Esterhazystes."

Among those who are called the intellectual there has been a splendid movement of generosity. Duclaus, Director of the Pasteur Institute, Friedel, and Grimaux, the chemists; the scholars, Paul Meyer, Paul Viollet, Giry, the Brothers Molinier, Georges Séailles, Louis Havet, Paul Stapfer, and many professors of the various faculties—all, with one or two exceptions, pupils of the École Normale Supérieure,—took sides in

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favor of the revision at a time when there was danger in doing so, as is shown by the measures of which Grimaux and Paul Stapfer have been the victims. In the Provinces, all the merchants, doctors, and notaries suspected of being Dreyfusards have been persecuted and denounced. These persecutions have only strengthened their convictions. I know thousands of people who have been simply heroic with love of truth and justice. It is they who have saved the honor of France; and to all men who have a moral ideal Col. Picquart appears as the hero of duty.

As to the Esterhazystes, they have not saved themselves. De Boisdeffre has resigned from the staff; Gonse will follow him; Mercier is about to quit the army. De Pellieux wished to resign: it was wise on his part. They should deem themselves very happy if their responsibilities stop there. Henry cut his throat; Du Paty de Clam has retired from active service, and feels the hand of justice always on his shoulder; Lauth has quitted the Staff, and awaits with terror the fate which he merits; Archivist Gribelin must shudder when he thinks of his own complicity; and there are still others. As to Esterhazy, he felt that the moment Dreyfus should come back to France he could no longer remain there, so he fled to England. There he confesses, among a mass of unlikely falsehoods, that the *bordereau*, on which, legally, Dreyfus was condemned, was written by himself, notwithstanding the assertions of the experts, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard.

Méline and Billot have dishonored themselves: they are nothing but wrecks. Cavaignac, who considered that the Presidency of the Republic was a part of his inheritance, is disqualified. He will never be pardoned for having covered the walls with the Henry forgery, of which he certified "the material and moral authenticity."

By laying the matter of revision before the Court of Cassation, M. Henri Brisson, despite the weaknesses and hesitancy of his Ministry, appears as the great justiciary; and the Court of Cassation, in annulling the Zola verdict, has proved that there are still magistrates whose sole care is for justice and law.

YVES GUYOT.

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SHALL WE KEEP THE PHILIPPINES?

DEWEY'S victory has changed our attitude before the world. We took no part in international questions. We had no standing in the councils of the nations. We were a *quantité négligéable*. So far did the idea that we ought to take no part in foreign questions extend, that some of my colleagues at Peking, when I undertook to make peace for China and Japan, deprecated any intervention whatever of the United States in the affairs of the Far East!

The position of absolute indifference to what is happening in the world is difficult of maintenance; and when it is maintained it is humiliating.

I recognize the existence of a national sentiment, in accordance with the supposed teaching of Washington's Farewell Address, which is against the acquisition of foreign territory; but the world has moved, and circumstances are changed. We have become a great people. We have a great commerce to take care of. We have to compete with the commercial nations of the world in far-distant markets. Commerce, not politics, is king. The manufacturer and the merchant dictate to diplomacy, and control elections. The art of arts is the extension of commercial relations,—in plain language, the selling of native products and manufactured goods.

I learned what I know of diplomacy in a severe school. I found among my colleagues not the least hesitation in proposing to their respective Governments to do anything which was supposed to be conducive to their interests. There can be no other rule for the government of all persons who are charged with the conduct of affairs than the promotion of the welfare of their respective countries. If it be ascertained, or believed, that the acquisition of the Philippines would be of advantage to this country, then mere sentiment must give way to actual benefit.

It is well known that prophecies of evil have preceded every acquisition we ever made, from the Louisiana purchase to that of Alaska; and, judging by the results of the various annexations, these prophecies have been misleading.

There is no reason whatever why we cannot administer the Philip-

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pines in a manner satisfactory to their people as well as to ourselves. We have recently annexed the Hawaiian Islands. They lie at what are called the "cross-roads of the North Pacific." They are near the centre of the great lines of commerce from the East to the West. There is little dissent from the policy of their annexation. It is not imagined that their peaceful people will require a great army to control them. If it could be ascertained to-day that no army would be necessary, or that a small body of troops at most would be sufficient, to safeguard the Philippines, opposition to their annexation would be greatly diminished. It is simply the dread of a large standing army that causes the body of the people who oppose annexation to withhold their approval. I do not believe that a large army will be necessary in the Philippines; and I am sure that, imitating the policy of England in East India, native troops would serve all purposes.

We have the right as conquerors to hold the Philippines. We have the right to hold them as part payment of a war indemnity. This policy may be characterized as unjust to Spain; but it is the result of the fortunes of war. All nations recognize that the conqueror may dictate the terms of peace. The first answer I received to a telegram sent by me, asking on the part of China that peace negotiations should be commenced, and offering to concede the independence of Korea and to pay a reasonable war indemnity, was: "Japan is willing to enter on peace negotiations; but she will dictate the terms."

I am in favor of holding the Philippines because I cannot conceive of any alternative to our doing so, except the seizure of territory in China; and I prefer to hold them rather than to oppress further the helpless Government and people of China. I want China to preserve her autonomy, to become great and prosperous; and I want these results not for the interests of China, but for our interests. I am not the agent or attorney of China; and, as an American, I do not look to the promotion of China's interests, or Spain's, or any other country's—but simply of our own.

The whole world sees in China a splendid market for our native products,—our timber, our locomotives, our rails, our coal oil, our sheetings, our mining-plants, and numberless other articles. We are closer to her than any other commercial country except Japan. There is before us a boundless future which will make the Pacific more important to us than the Atlantic. San Francisco, Seattle, and Tacoma are in their infancy. They are destined to rival New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia.

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If we give up the Philippines, we throw away the splendid opportunity to assert our influence in the Far East. We do this deliberately; and the world will laugh at us. Why did we take Manila? Why did we send 20,000 troops to Luzon? Did we do so to emulate the French king who marched his men up the hill and down again? There was no purpose in the conquest of Manila, unless we intended to hold it.

The Philippines are a foothold for us in the Far East. Their possession gives us standing and influence. It gives us also valuable trade both in exports and imports.

Should we surrender the Philippines, what will become of them? Will Spain ever conquer the insurgents, and, should she do so, will she retain the islands? To her they will be valueless; and if she sells them to any Continental Power she will, by that act, light the torches of war.

It is perfectly certain, I think, that England will not stand by, and see any other European Power take the Philippines. They are on the line to Australia and India. England has stood by, and seen Germany, Russia, and France seize portions of China. There is not an Englishman nor an American in the Far East who approves her policy. The taking of the Philippines by any European Power other than England would create an explosion in the latter country, and, if unresisted, would lead to the destruction of the Ministry and, perhaps, the Throne. By holding the Philippines we avert the partition of China, and we postpone at least a general European war.

There is, perhaps, no such thing as manifest destiny; but there is an evident fitness in the happening of events, and a logical result of human action.

Dewey's victory is an epoch in the affairs of the Far East. We hold our heads higher. We are coming to our own. We are stretching out our hands for what nature meant should be ours. We are taking our proper rank among the nations of the world. We are after markets, the greatest markets now existing in the world. Along with these markets will go our beneficent institutions; and humanity will bless us.

CHARLES DENBY.

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THE MORAL OF THE CUBAN WAR.

SETTING aside American party questions, with which a foreigner cannot presume to deal, the Cuban War has given birth to momentous questions which affect not only the American Commonwealth, but Great Britain, Canada, and humanity at large.

The American Commonwealth, as it was in the minds of its founders, as it was in the mind of Abraham Lincoln, as it is in the mind of the world in general, which intently watches the great experiment, appears to be threatened by two hostile forces; viz., Socialism, which, in different forms, more or less disguised, is the predominant element of Bryanism; and Imperialism, an access of which, combined with an access of militarism, has been brought on by the recent war with Spain. Both these forces are alien; Socialism being an importation from Europe, while Imperialism is an infection wafted from the same quarter. Socialism assails one fundamental principle of the Commonwealth, which is, that every man shall be free to do the best he can for himself under the law. Imperialism attacks another fundamental principle, formulated by Washington, which is, that America shall keep clear of Old World complications, with the wars and the military expenditure which they involve, and be dedicated to industry and peace.

Have we seen in the Cuban War and its sequel the finger of Destiny pointing to the decease of the original Commonwealth and to the opening of a new order of things? Was the mission of the Republic for herself and for humanity then for the first time revealed? Was the war made by the deep and hitherto latent instinct of the American people?

To an onlooker in the United States at the time, who did his best to ascertain the state of opinion, it did not appear that the American people showed any desire for war. They seemed to show a generous sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, about whose character a great misconception then prevailed. Probably they had also an underlying desire, which, to the present writer, appears most just and most certain of ultimate fulfilment, that all the European Governments should in course of time withdraw from this hemisphere and leave it to work out

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its own destiny. But, so far as could be seen, they neither desired nor expected war. Not even in the West, unless the writer was misinformed, was there a general demand for anything beyond diplomatic intervention.

The causes of war apparently were: the peculiar composition of the Senate, leading members of which, as Senator Platt said, were evidently bent from the outset on bringing about that result; the prospect, which party politicians would not fail to have in view, of the probable effect on their coming contests; the influence of the "Yellow Press," about which it is needless to say anything, except that its founder and principal proprietor is stated to be not an American; and, finally, the destruction of the "Maine." The publication of the De Lome letter may also have played a part, as, according to some American authorities, did the emission of Cuban bonds.

That which fired the popular heart, and at once brought on the war, beyond doubt was the destruction of the "Maine." Of this, history will have evidence perfectly decisive in the shape of editorials, odes, battle-cries, signals, badges, buttons, and stamps on Government goods; while the allusion in the President's Message, though guarded, was none the less effective. That the "Maine" was destroyed by an accidental explosion of the kind by which the "St. Paul," the "Oregon," and the "Obdam" have since narrowly escaped destruction, is the opinion of independent experts, and may yet be the verdict of history. At all events, history will assuredly acquit the Spanish authorities of a crime of which there is not a particle of evidence, and which, whatever it might have been, if committed by a Cuban desperado seeking to embroil the United States with Spain, would, if committed by the Spanish authorities, have been an act of manifest suicide. Spain offered arbitration. It would even appear that the American people themselves began to doubt the justice of the charge; for the cry, "To Hell with Spain! Remember the 'Maine'!" presently grew faint, if it did not entirely die away. Thus, in the outbreak of the war which has led to the acquisition of transmarine possessions and to the belief in the opening of an Imperial era, we seem to see, not the finger of Destiny pointing to empire, but the consequence of a popular misapprehension, largely due to the influence of the "Yellow Press," whose red extras are hardly a sufficient warrant for a total change in the character, aims, and aspirations of the American Republic.

To an onlooker it appeared that even when the war had commenced there remained opposed to it a section of American citizens, large and

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respectable enough to furnish an indication of the real interest and destiny of the country not less trustworthy than that furnished by the war party. But the advocates of peace are always muzzled. "The country, right or wrong," becomes the accepted creed; and anyone who gives pacific counsel, though his patriotism may be unquestionable, gives it at his peril.

Of the prevalence of the Imperialist sentiment there cannot be any doubt. "Expansionist" and "Contractionist" are the current terms,—the first of praise, the second of reproach. One who should propose to extend the American Commonwealth over the north of its own continent, taking in a population mainly identical in all respects with its own, might with reason style himself an Expansionist: he would really be expanding the Republic by increasing its extent without change of its substance. But it is difficult to see by what propriety of language the name can be given to one who proposes to annex distant provinces inhabited by races totally alien and incapable of assimilation. For the advocate of such extension, "Dispersionist" would seem a fitter name. In truth, the Expansionist in name is in reality a Contractionist in deed, since he renounces that which would really be expansion. No man of British race, though he were desirous of union with the American Commonwealth, would desire union with a scattered empire embracing an indefinite number of people of inferior races, Negroes, Hawaiians, Chinese, and Malays. Nor would a man of any race wish to share the burden of everlasting and ever-increasing pension-lists for wars in which he had no concern; especially when he is told that they are largely the work of fraud which the Government has no power to control. Imperialism, in short, is likely to be the death of Continental Union.

America, we are told, is at last to come out of her isolation. In what has her isolation consisted? She has been receiving the most various elements of population, with ideas ranging from those of the devout and submissive Catholic to those of the Atheist and Anarchist. She has fully shared the general march of intellect and science; appropriating and reciprocating all discoveries and all the products of human thought. The world is full of her mechanical inventions. Her political example has had its due influence; and even her political vocabulary has been adopted in Great Britain. European cities are full of Americans; too full, indeed, for the good of their own country, from which their social leadership and the performance of their social duties generally are withdrawn.

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The certain effect of Imperialism on home principles and institutions begins already to be seen. The principle of universal suffrage, hitherto deemed vital to the Republic, is being disparaged, if not openly discarded. To wean the people from allegiance to it, attention is directed to the Territories, which have not the full franchise, and to the Southern legislation, which is practically subverting the Fifteenth Amendment and withdrawing the franchise from the Negro; two precedents, of which the first is manifestly irrelevant, while the second is relevant indeed. Thus assailed in its political basis, Equality may give way at other points. We see the union which is being formed through intermarriage by American millionairism with European, and particularly with British, aristocracy, and the growing eagerness of American wealth to find admission to the courts and the court circles of Europe. Between militarism and aristocracy there is a subtle bond; and militarism may open the door through which aristocracy will find its way.

Still more open disregard is being shown for the American principle, that the necessary foundation of government is the consent of the governed. The Philippines are in some quarters treated as a piece of property which the American Republic has acquired by the sword, and which it may either retain, hand over to another Power, or perhaps barter for the West Indies, at its pleasure, without reference to the wishes of the people; and Hawaii has practically been treated on the same footing.

If you have an empire, you will have an emperor; not perhaps in the Old World form of a man crowned and sceptred, yet in the shape of centralized and practically autocratic power. War conferred upon President Lincoln, without departure from Republican forms, a virtual dictatorship, which, in his hands, was safe and which ended with the return of peace. The German Emperor owes his autocracy to leadership in war. Even in Great Britain the tendency of the present policy of aggrandizement to increase the power of the Executive begins to be observed.

Expansionism calls at once for an army of a hundred thousand men. When it had those hundred thousand, it might call for more. With the army might come militarism and a military caste. We see what the ascendancy of an army is in France. We see how military distinction is eclipsing all other distinction at this moment in the minds of the American people. To prove that any army in the United States is not dangerous, we are reminded of the ease with which the army was disbanded and fused with the general population at the end of the Civil

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War. Nothing, certainly, could be more striking or a more signal confutation of sinister predictions than that result. But the Imperial army would never be disbanded. It would probably consist largely of foreigners, as the native American would hardly be attracted by a soldier's pay and a life without scope for individual enterprise or much promise of advancement. The soldier would be apt to be a man thinking that—as one of them has just said in Europe—his conscience ought to be devoted to his commander as well as his sword. After all, is not the Grand Army of the Republic drawing a hundred and forty millions of dollars in pensions thirty-two years after the termination of the war? To an empire, however, a great standing army is indispensable. An empire is always challenging war. The British Empire is hardly ever free from wars, great or little, though it is the sincere desire of its rulers to remain at peace. What it is to enter on war with an extemporized army of volunteers has been plainly seen in the recent conflict.

The creation of a powerful navy is a different question. This may be necessary in order to place the coasts of the United States out of the reach of insult, to put an end to all the threats of bombarding New York, and to guarantee against European ironclads the independence of these Western waters. In a fleet there is no political danger; while the highly scientific character which the naval calling has now assumed might tempt and worthily employ native Americans, who, as this war has shown, are supreme in mechanical skill.

To Great Britain the maintenance of an immense navy is a matter of absolute necessity. In extending her dominions over the globe, she has resigned the advantage of her insular position. It can no longer be said that the sea is to her as a moat. She is, consequently, obliged to expend vast sums in securing to herself a complete maritime ascendancy, though at the risk of awakening the jealousy of other nations and of causing them some day to combine in vindicating against her the freedom of the seas.

In the constitutional objection to the acquisition of an empire there perhaps is not much weight. If Imperialism is desirable in itself, the forms of the Constitution may be adapted to it. But the purchase of Louisiana is hardly a precedent for what is now proposed. Louisiana was conterminous; and her population, so far as the whites were concerned, was similar, or capable of assimilation. We need not here inquire whether unmixed good was done by an acquisition which added greatly to the extent of the slave power and to the ultimate certainty of disruption and civil war.

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A more solid objection than the want of a constitutional provision for the acquisition of dependencies is the want of an apparatus for their government. The British Crown, for the government of its Indian Empire, has an Imperial service attached to it as a monarchy, and separate from the services which are under the immediate control of Parliament. British India, in fact, is an Empire by itself, governed by a Viceroy who is a delegate of the Crown, exempt as a rule from the influence of home politics, and reciprocally exercising little influence over them. Before the Mutiny, which broke up the army of the East India Company, India was still the dominion of that Company; and the transfer of it to the Crown, though inevitable, was not unaccompanied by serious misgiving as to the political consequences which might follow. Even for the government of other dependencies Great Britain has men like the late Lord Elgin, detached from home parties and devoted to the Imperial service. In her dependencies Great Britain is, in fact, still a monarchy, though at home she has become practically a republic. In the case of the United States, it would seem hardly possible to keep the Imperial service free from political influence, or, reciprocally, to prevent the influence of the Empire on politics at home. Imperial appointments would almost inevitably be treated as diplomatic appointments are treated now.

In what, after all, does the profit or bliss of Imperial sway consist? The final blow has just been dealt to the miserable and helpless remnant of that empire on which, in the day of its grandeur, the sun was said never to set, and to which Spanish pride has always desperately clung. It may safely be said that not the expulsion of Moriscos or Jews, not even despotism or the Inquisition, did so much to ruin Spain as the Imperial ambition which perverted the energies of her people; turning them from domestic industry and improvement to rapacious aggrandizement abroad. The political and religious tyranny was, in fact, largely the consequence of the Imperial position of the monarchy, which, by the enormous extent of its dominions and its uncontrolled sources of revenue, was lifted above the nation. It is remarkable that Spain, while she was accumulating in both hemispheres distant dependencies which she was fated in the end to lose, missed the natural and really profitable mark of her territorial aspirations, which was the unification of the Peninsula—an object which she might almost certainly have accomplished had she steadily bent her energies that way.

It is said, and by some to whose opinion great deference is due, that

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American commerce needs new markets, and that new markets for it would be opened by the proposed extension of American dominion. It can only be said that this view requires specification. The extension of political power has in itself no tendency to create trade. Would any particular barrier to American trade be removed? Would any further security be afforded the trader? Would the purchasing power of any customer of the United States be increased? Would not the Chinese, like the Japanese, learn to manufacture for themselves, and, instead of purchasing, compete? These are questions which seem to call for a specific reply.

If trade with China is the mark, the first question seems to be, what will become of China? When the Mogul Empire in India fell, it broke up into its satrapies, each of which formed an independent state with a government, though rude and despotic, of its own, till one by one they were all taken over by Great Britain. But if the Chinese Empire falls, it seems unlikely that the local mandarins will have independent authority or *prestige* enough to make themselves heads of separate states. The partitioning Powers will then find themselves in face of that formless and anarchic, but fanatical, nationality which gave birth to the Taeping Rebellion; and a state of things may ensue in which commercial interests will for the time be of small account.

In India Great Britain has unquestionably found a magnificent field for military enterprise and administrative skill. The Empire is an unequalled monument of both. That the political occupation of the country has been commercially or financially profitable, seems not so clear. The account is one which it is difficult to balance. England draws a large tribute in the way of salaries and pensions; while a part of her army is maintained at India's cost. On the other hand, she has the constant expense of guarding India and the approaches to it. That burden is always weighing on her foreign policy. It cost her the Crimean War. Under her auspices manufactures are there springing up which supplant the native productions and compete with her own. One of her ablest servants advised her long ago to be content with fortified factories which would have secured her trade. An Act of Parliament in 1793, when Pitt was Prime Minister, declared that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honor, and the policy of this nation." It would be heresy, perhaps, now to doubt whether the framers of that Act were entirely in the wrong.

If empire is to be regarded as a field for philanthropic effort and

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the advancement of civilization, it may safely be said that nothing in that way equals, or ever has equalled, the British Empire in India. For the last three-quarters of a century at all events, the Empire has been steadily administered in the interest of the Hindu. Yet what is the result? Two hundred millions of human sheep, without native leadership, without patriotism, without aspirations, without spur to self-improvement of any kind; multiplying, too many of them, in abject poverty and in infantile dependence on a government which their numbers and necessities will too probably in the end overwhelm. Great Britain has deserved and won the respect of the Hindu; but she has never won, and is perhaps now less likely than ever to win, his love. The two races remain perfectly alien to each other. Lord Elgin sorrowfully observes, that there is more of a bond between man and dog than between Englishman and Hindu. The natives generally, having been disarmed, cannot rise against the conqueror; and their disaffection is shown only in occasional and local outbreaks, chiefly of a religious character, or in the impotent utterances of the native press. But the part of the population which was armed, that is to say, the Sepoys, did break out into what was rather an insurrection of caste than a military mutiny, and committed atrocities which were fearfully avenged by the panic fears of the dominant race. It is a perilous business all round, this of governing inferior races. Nor is it clear that the work is better done by the highest race than by one upon a lower level, to which it is not so impossible to sympathize or even fuse with the lowest. "Some of the tribes of the Philippines are said to be as fierce as Apaches. If that is all, Uncle Sam will handle them in his accustomed style." Is not a warning conveyed in such words? Dire experience has shown that the character of the master suffers as well as the body of the slave.

War, the almost certain concomitant of empire, is alleged to have a most blessed effect on the internal harmony of nations. This we are told not only in the press, but from the pulpit; some going even so far as to intimate that the restoration of national harmony was a sufficient object for this war. The moral world would be strangely out of joint if a nation could cure itself of factiousness or of any internal disorder by shedding the blood and seizing the possessions of its neighbors. War has no such virtue. The victories of the Plantagenets in France were followed by insurrections and civil wars at home, largely owing to the spirit of violence which the raids on France had excited. The victories of Chatham were followed by disgraceful scenes of cabal and faction as well as of corruption, terminating in the prostration of patri-

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otism and the domination of George III and North. Party animosities in the United States do not seem to have been banished or even allayed by the Cuban War. Setting party divisions aside, no restoration of harmony appeared to be needed, so far as the white population was concerned. Not only peace, but good-will, between the North and the South had been restored in a surprising degree. The Blue and the Gray had fraternized on the field of Gettysburg. It was to harmonize White and Black that some kindly influence was manifestly and most urgently needed. But all through the war and since the war American papers have been almost daily recording cases of lynching, sometimes of such a character as to evince the last extremity of hatred and contempt. The Negro is lymphatic, apathetic, patient of degradation and even of insult. But San Domingo saw that he had a tiger in him; and when the tiger broke loose hell ensued. There has been at least one instance of the retaliatory lynching of a white man; and now we have a bloody battle of races at Virden. Why should the American Commonwealth want more Negroes?

Some of those who most ardently sympathized with the North in the struggle for the restoration of the Union have since, looking to the apparent hopelessness of the Race Problem, been inclined to doubt whether, after all, the restoration of the Union was entirely to be desired. Reannexed the South has been: assimilated or thoroughly incorporated, it has not been and, apparently, never can be. Though slavery is formally abolished, the structure of society in the South, with a dominant and a subject race separated by an impassable gulf from each other, is radically different from its structure in the North; and where there is a radical difference in the social structure, though the forms of political institutions may be identical, their spirit and their real working can never be the same. A line of cleavage, though not so marked as slavery, will remain between the North and the South. If to the Southern element large tropical extensions, with fresh instalments of the Negro race, or other races unfit for political enfranchisement, are added, will there not in time be danger of another disruption? There is talk already, and naturally enough, of an annexation of the West Indies by exchange with Great Britain for the Philippines. Hayti cannot be said to be less of a scandal or to afford less of a pretext for philanthropic conquest than Cuba, where, at all events, under Spanish rule, commercial cities had grown up, wealth had been acquired, Christianity of a certain kind prevailed, and there was civilization, if not of the highest grade.

What is this mood styled "Imperialism," "Jingoism," "Expansion-

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ism," "Greater Britain," which has suddenly come over the world? How is it that all at once moderation, regard for right and what was deemed common prudence, are discarded, and in their place we hear avowals of thirst for aggrandizement, and proclamations of the law of force, far more philosophic in form, but hardly more moral in spirit, than would have been the utterances of Attila or Timur. Europe has become an arsenal and drilling-ground. The bread is taken from the mouths of toil to furnish destruction with its implements; the toiler himself is pressed into its hosts; mad competition in armaments has gone on till the Czar himself stands aghast and appeals to reason and humanity. The people everywhere groan. Socialism and Anarchism, as a natural consequence, prevail. America at last catches the infection, and, as might be expected, from her receptivity and vivacity, in its extreme form. Lord Salisbury, casting the world's horoscope, predicts that the weak nations will all be devoured by the strong, and apparently that the process will go on till, instead of the community of nations, each contributing out of its special treasure to the common store, there will be left only one great predatory Power. That Power, we flatter ourselves, will be the Anglo-Saxon; and we think that the nations ought to look forward with gladness to its sole domination. But the nations may differ from us in taste: at all events they may prefer variety. What, again, we would ask, is the explanation of this paroxysm of aggrandizement? Is it the sudden opening by exploration of Africa and other regions hitherto unappropriated by civilized man? Is it the intense thirst of gain? Is it mere restlessness and satiety of peaceful industry and life? Is it the removal of religious restraints on self-aggrandizsment by the decadence of Christianity? It seems not altogether to be the last, since one mode of expansion is to send a missionary in advance, and, when he gets into trouble with the natives, to follow him up with a "punitive expedition."

One consequence of this singular tidal wave of aggressive sentiment seems likely to be a general destruction of the wild stocks of humanity, or at least of their native properties and characteristics. Yet history appears to tell us that it is from the wild stocks, rather than from offsets thrown out at a high level of civilization, that the trees which bore the grandest fruit have come. The Greater Greece bore no comparison with the little Greece in anything but territory and population.

Of the theory, that the Eastern races are incapable of raising themselves, and require to be elevated by philanthropic conquest, whereof the Anglo-Saxon race is the divinely appointed agent, the case of Japan,

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who has raised herself without any external aid but that of example, seems to be a sufficient confutation.

To any Englishman with strong ties to the United States nothing could be more welcome than the improvement of American feeling toward Great Britain, which the Cuban War has incidentally produced. So far as the anti-British sentiment was merely a historical tradition, it has received a salutary shock, the effect of which, it may be hoped, will be lasting. In the West, however, the sentiment appears to be not merely a historical tradition, but a living antagonism to the capitalist and plutocratic society of the East, which is identified with British influence and connection. Hatred of England, as the land of Gold and of everything that Gold is supposed to symbolize, glowed in all the speeches and manifestoes of Bryanism. Protectionists, of course, have a special interest in fostering it; while the Irish have a quarrel of their own in which by their vote they enlist the politician, so far at least as his public utterances are concerned. The more intelligent classes in the East, who read history and visit England, have for the most part ceased to be anti-British. We shall presently be able better to estimate the extent and probable permanency of the change.

International friendship is one thing: alliance, which some propose, and which seems to be the latest in the brilliant series of Mr. Chamberlain's political ventures, is another; and before so close a connection is formed it may be well carefully to forecast its ultimate influence on friendship. What would be the basis or the objects of such an alliance? Neither community of origin and language nor community of character, which last has been considerably qualified by change of abode, is necessarily accompanied with community of interest; and it is on community of interest practically that any alliance, to be lasting, must be based. No other two nations in the world are so manifestly each other's commercial rivals as Great Britain and the United States. American goods are seriously competing with those of England in the British market. Would not commercial rivalry be apt to prevail over the endearing influence of race and language? In the case of the English and Dutch of former days it prevailed not only over affinity and sentiment, but over the most pressing motives of common interest and peril. At present the policy of America is Protectionist; while that of Great Britain is Free Trade.

Diplomatic coöperation between the British and American Governments would be rendered difficult by the difference between their administrative systems. The foreign policy of Great Britain is tolerably

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continuous; tradition being preserved by the Permanent Under Secretary always at the side of the Parliamentary Minister; while ex-Ministers remain in Parliament, continue to give expression to their views, and retain a certain portion of their influence. But the Foreign Office of the United States undergoes a complete change at the end of each Presidential term; the President going out of public life, while the ex-Secretary of State, as a rule, does not take a seat in Congress or become one of the leaders of a party.

When we talk of "the great commonwealth of English-speaking people," and think of it as pursuing a common policy, it is as well to remember that the British part of it comprises two hundred millions of Hindoos, who, with other alien races comprehended in the Empire, form about four-fifths of the whole. Its interests, relations, and liabilities are not likely to coincide very closely with those of the United States.

It is with the Imperialist party in England, which is also in the main that of aristocracy and militarism, that the alliance would practically be formed. By that party it is that the prospect of an Anglo-American combination for the purpose of common aggrandizement is so eagerly hailed. At present, thanks to the recoil from Home Rule which threatened the dismemberment of the United Kingdom, Imperialism is completely in the ascendant. But, when Home Rule has been fairly buried, there may be a Liberal and Moderatist revival. Already there have been symptoms of it in more than one of the recent by-elections.

For the propagation of Anglo-Saxon ideas and institutions no diplomatic or military combination is required. Ideas are propagated by the press; while parliamentary government and trial by jury have made the round of the civilized world without the firing of a gun. To impose peace upon all nations by the fiat of the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers, we are sometimes told, would be the beneficent object of the combination. The nations would presently object to having peace or anything else imposed upon them by anybody's fiat; they would take arms to assert their independence; and the end, instead of universal peace, might be a general war.

Even if the general conclusion to which this article points is wrong, as it certainly is at present unfashionable, the points mentioned, or some of them, may be not undeserving of consideration. They are, at all events, not suggested by jealousy of American greatness.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

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NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR.

To obtain any definite lessons from the late war, it is necessary to look at details rather than at larger results. There was no violent upsetting of preconceived ideas, and little sweeping away of theory by stern fact: the war produced no great surprises; nor could it have been expected to do so. Despite the strictures of ill-informed critics, naval architecture is now very nearly one of the exact sciences: every type of ship has certain advantages and counterbalancing disadvantages of which the designers were fully aware when the ship was built. In fine, it is a truism, that "every warship is a compromise." Further, she is the result of intelligent evolution; and the efficiency or non-efficiency of a type is, consequently, easily gauged by its age. Hence, the lessons produced by the war with Spain have been mostly of the nature of demonstrations rather than of discoveries, so far as naval architecture is concerned; and what is true of the *matériel* is, to a very great degree, applicable to the *personnel* also. In both cases it is to side-issues that we must look for lessons—lessons, that is to say, as opposed to demonstrations of points very little obscure before.

For instance, there is the lesson of the necessity of preparedness. This is and was sufficiently obvious; and that the war found neither side fully prepared to act at once, cannot be considered as more than a demonstration of the fact. Possibly the war has done much to force this matter home. Indeed, it cannot fail to impress one how ships may actually exist and yet be no more than a "paper" fleet; for, so far as paper was concerned, the Spanish fleet, at the outbreak of hostilities, ought to have been capable of giving the American fleet a great deal of trouble, to say the least. That it failed in any way to do so, must be attributed to absolute unpreparedness of *matériel* and gross defects of *personnel*.

Possibly neither side expected that there would be war. It is idle to question Spanish movements before the war: the unconquerable objection to doing to-day what can be put off till to-morrow, so characteristic of Spaniards, may account for almost anything. But, save on the supposition that war would not occur, it is difficult to understand why the American Navy Board did not so arrange that a fleet should be ready

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at once to blockade Cervera while he lay at Cape Verde and to destroy him when he came out. That is obviously enough the thing that *ought* to have been done at once. That it was not done can be attributed only to inability to perform the task; and it is equally obvious that this inability was due to unpreparedness. But, however great the unpreparedness of the United States, it was as nothing compared with that of Spain.

Excluding torpedo-boats and small and obsolete craft, the "paper" forces of the rival Powers at the outbreak of the war may be stated as follows:—

Description.	The United States.	Spain.
First-class Battleships.....	4	1
Second-class Battleships, including armored Cruisers used as Battleships..	1	9 (including 2 old battleships reconstructed).
Coast-defence-ships not to be considered available for distant operations.....	6, and a number of old monitors practically floating-batteries only.	None.
Cruisers of all classes for cruiser duties	16 (two only of which were armored).	3 (one only of which was armored).
Large Gunboats, or Cruisers of very limited value.....	12	14
Sea-going Destroyers.....	None.	6

Assuming anything like equal preparedness and equal ability on the part of the *personnel* (a very large assumption, of course), this comparison makes out a very good brief for Spain; especially when we remember that, of the four first-class battleships of the United States, one, the "Oregon," which was in the Pacific, was for a considerable while out of the reckoning. In the same way, the numbers of American cruisers and coast-defence-ships given above include vessels that were far removed from the immediate scene of action; whereas every Spanish modern vessel was presumably at hand for use. Furthermore, on paper, the speed-advantage lay with Spain.

What, however, was the actual condition of affairs? The Spanish armored cruisers, the "Cisneros," the "Cataluna," and the "Princesa de Asturias," though two of them had been launched nearly two years, were still so incomplete as to possess no fighting-value at all. It is doubtful whether the first-class cruiser "Carlos V" had her big guns; and it appears certain that the ironclad cruiser "Cristobal Colon" had not. The "Pelayo" was in a half-reconstructed condition; and, besides the only partially armed "Cristobal Colon," three armored cruisers and

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some destroyers were the only vessels of fighting-value fit to put to sea. On the other hand, with the single exception of the "Chicago," which was undergoing reconstruction, the American ships were all ready for immediate use. Certain essential accessories may have been lacking; but the fleet, as a fleet, was certainly one *in esse*.

Spain's proper strategy was, therefore, clear enough. Being so unprepared, and knowing the real condition of affairs, Cervera's move to Cape Verde was absurd, save as a temporary ruse. Much has been said to the effect, that he might have gone on to Manila and given battle to Dewey before the "Monterey" or other vessels could arrive to reinforce him; but, after such a voyage, Dewey unsupported would probably have easily destroyed him. Spain, knowing how little reliance could be put on her ships, would have done better if she had kept them together and determined to postpone action. By that means she must eventually have drawn a large American fleet to the coast of Spain, where, if determined to fight, she would at least have had all that was to be had in her favor.

Or, presuming her to have grasped the elementary fact that engines, to be of use, need care and attention, she could have sent her best ships to demonstrate against the American coast, if it were possible—as it should have been easily enough—to elude the coming fleet. With fast colliers and storeships accompanying, this could have been effected by swift vessels.

The actual harm that would have been done to American interests could not possibly have been great. The probability of a stop being put to the affair by the American fleet would have been near enough; but, none the less, an intelligent *guerre de course* would have been attempted, and a valuable moral effect on the enemy obtained. By this means she would have had at least a *chance* to make America willing to patch up a peace whereby some shadow of her sea-empire might be retained. The exploits of the "Huascar" in the war between Chile and Peru showed what might be done this way against a stronger force; and the Chino-Japanese War demonstrated the futility of an incapable Power attempting other and more orthodox methods. But Spain plunged wildly into a *via media*, a hopeless struggle, apparently without ideas, without intentions, without plans; and one is almost tempted to ask whether her Government had not decided that "saving face" was the aim and sum of war, and its duties merely to see that sufficient men were killed.

Passing from generalities to details, we find the war divisible into

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two distinct operations—the Pacific and the Cuban. Dewey at Manila wrote "Finis" to the one within a week of the outbreak of war: Cervera himself closed the other when he allowed his squadron to be blockaded in Santiago.

Dewey's exploit at Manila is not to be passed over lightly because it resolved itself into mere target-practice on certain obsolete Spanish hulls. That rush for Manila, and the forcing of the bay, demanded what may be termed the higher quality of an admiral—ability to gauge his enemy. The fighting-value of the Spanish ships at Manila was almost *nil*, as Dewey was, of course, aware; but there were mines and forts to be considered. Of these he doubtless knew something; although his knowledge must have been relatively imperfect. It is hard to believe that anything short of an accurate estimate of Spanish personal incapabilities could have led him to force the place; and this probably told far more in his favor than good fortune.

As regards details of the battle off Cavité, which, in one way or another, are now fairly complete, Dewey's preparations were both ample and instructive. The armoring of the ammunition-hoists, by winding the cables round them, was a novel and decidedly good idea. There are no records of such protection having been extemporized at Yalu or elsewhere in the Chino-Japanese war. As things turned out, the precaution was quite unnecessary; but, had the Spaniards possessed any ability to get on the target, it might have made a considerable difference. Leading, as it does, to the magazines, an ammunition-tube represents a very vital portion of a ship. If the chances of a shell bursting in one are not large, yet the disaster that such an explosion might entail is sufficiently serious. It is too closely connected with the magazines to be pleasant; and, whatever precautions may be devised, they are not to be too much relied on in war. In any case, too, the supply to the gun or guns served by the tube which is hit is cut off. Hence the value of armored hoists and of Dewey's extemporized article. It would be extremely instructive could we but learn how the Spanish ammunition supply fared at Manila and Santiago: that we ever shall know is, however, doubtful. None the less, it is likely enough that, with the knowledge of what was deemed necessary on board the American cruisers, ship-designers may condescend to give a little more attention to a matter which hitherto, in cruisers at any rate, they have very generally ignored.

There is little else to learn from that May morning in Manila Bay. The failure of those mines which exploded harmlessly in front of the "Olympia" scarcely taught a lesson, or demonstrated anything new.

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Like the automobile torpedo, the mine has but one period, and that a very short one, when it can be employed with success. As I pointed out in a previous article [1] in this review, the dread of losing the supreme moment is likely to cause a torpedoist to fire too soon; and the same condition obtains with a mine. And so, the more the daring of a commander renders it necessary to restrain him, the more likely he is to run a mine-field with impunity.

As for the two Spanish torpedo-boats, their easy destruction was only to be expected: slow and inefficient, they never had a chance. At night, at the mouth of the bay, they might possibly have done much; but they were not there. It is idle to discuss their failure: it is equally idle to ask why Montejo did not seek to ram. Stories of such attempts have been circulated; but it is difficult to credit him with any serious effort.

It is said that American ammunition was getting scarce at the close of the day; but this is merely a new chapter of an old story. Speaking broadly, the more guns a ship carries in proportion to her size, the less her ammunition. America has always chosen guns rather than big magazines; so have all other nations save England and (in certain of her ships) France. The war has shed but little light upon the debatable point as to which of these systems is the better.

The main contest upon the Atlantic side of the continent ran on different lines; for both combatants had modern ships. If nothing has been actually learned, certain points, hitherto more or less obscure, have been forced into considerable prominence. But the failure of American cruisers to find Cervera cannot be held to teach much, unless it be to draw attention to the fairly obvious fact, that America had not enough cruisers to cover the Atlantic Ocean and to attend to the Cuban blockade as well. The Ocean is a big place, with certain very well defined roads across it outside of which a ship may travel and meet nothing. Further, the very excellent system of spreading false information—the sole thing the Spanish Admiralty was able to do well—made searching for Cervera as difficult as hunting the proverbial needle in a bundle of hay.

We did not need the war to learn that scouting successfully is a difficult operation. Peace manœuvres have taught that; and the elaborate and highly scientific "curves of search," with which the French recently experimented so largely, produced very indifferent success even in a circumscribed area. A fleet leaves no trail to mark its path; and scouting cruisers may cross and recross that path in vain, if only a few hours too

[1] "Naval Warfare: Present and Future." THE FORUM for October, 1897, p. 234.

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late or too soon. What the desolation of the ocean a few leagues from the recognized sea-road is, and how hard it is to hear of a fleet thus off the road, was shown conclusively enough so far back as 1890. In that year a large British manœuvre-fleet disappeared for three weeks. It took a straight course and kept all lights burning (both things that would not be done in war); yet nothing was heard of its whereabouts. In all the three weeks only two vessels were sighted, and those toward the end of the cruise. Cervera's historic evasion is, after this, hardly a thing to be wondered at.

Just about the time that Cervera appeared in West Indian waters, the distribution of the American fleet into two divisions that were anything but homogeneous held out to him certain faint prospects of success. Had he met with either Sampson's or Schley's squadron,—the two were then widely separated,—a runaway fight, supposing him to have had his speed, might have enabled him to destroy his pursuers in detail. The "might" is perhaps doubtful, even apart from consideration of bad gunnery; because, despite the evergreen article on dimensions in "Brassey's Naval Annual," one good ship has tremendous advantages over several inferior ones, for the simple reason that one brain, instead of several brains, is controlling. A perception of this may have prevented Cervera from making an attempt upon the "Oregon," then between Rio and the West Indies.

As a matter of fact, however, the Atlantic passage appears to have tried Cervera's ships to the uttermost; and a place where he could coal and rest was his sole objective. So to Santiago he went, to be shut in by a force vastly superior in every way. It has been said that he merely intended to make a short stay at Santiago, and that circumstances, either in the shape of defects in his ships, or orders from Spain, prevented his leaving as intended. Presuming it to have been his intention to leave, the supposition must be that he intended making for Havana after a battle with, or evasion of, one of the squadrons hurrying to Santiago. By his information, the Flying Squadron would have been supposed to consist of the "Indiana," or some other battleship of that class, the "Texas," the "Brooklyn," the "New Orleans," the "Minneapolis," and the "St. Paul." By a judicious disposition of his destroyers, he might have looked to neutralize the last three. Given his "paper" speed-advantage, and gunnery at all equal to the American, he here had some prospects of success. Lacking these, it is evident enough now that he would have been beaten. Indeed, with his defective engines and well-nigh useless guns, he was impotent. He, or

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rather those who sent him, must have been dense indeed to be unable to calculate, without need of the practical lesson, how futile hole-and-corner evasion must be. Had Camara's squadron appeared off the New England coast at or about the same time, or had the Spanish Government merely circulated a report that it had started thither, some gleam of intelligence might be shed into the plans of Cervera, and an instructive naval lesson might, perhaps, have been learned.

As things went, the sole lesson to be gleaned from this stage of the proceedings is in connection with the reputed reason for Schley's delay in arriving off Santiago. He is said to have made out the masts of Cervera's fleet in Havana harbor, and to have delayed off there, watching those mythical vessels for some time before his error was apparent. If this be true, there is food for considerable reflection in it, and possibly a useful hint for some admiral of the future. Indeed, had the Spaniards hit upon the idea of rigging up a dummy Cervera's fleet, —and it would have been a simple enough task quickly to convert merchant-steamers into very passable imitations of the "Vizcaya" and her sisters,—some most extraordinary developments might have been obtained. However, it is idle to speculate on such things now; and the matter is only mentioned because at one time, when Cervera was heard of as being in half a dozen different latitudes at the same moment, an impression was abroad that something of this sort had actually been done. The Nelson of evasive war—if one may use such a paradoxical term—will certainly employ such ruses when, if ever, he arrives.

And here one may well digress for a moment, to refer to one very unpleasant lesson of the war. I refer to those difficulties which a free press and a free democracy are apt to create in a campaign, through the thirst for information and the competition to impart it. Time after time in the early stages of the war, secrets of the plans of operation were ferreted out and divulged. It is idle to blame the newspapers for doing their best to supply the popular hunger for news of what was to be done: equally idle is it to blame the public for wanting to know. Rather must the thing be recognized as a new problem added to warfare. Further, as popular liberty grows, it may be expected to grow also. A rigorous censorship is difficult to enforce in a free country, especially in the early stages of a war. This light of publicity, this searching out of secret plans, may rob naval warfare of much or all of the benefits conferred by steam; and there is the further complication, that only the more advanced nations will be sufferers by it. Russia, for instance, would labor under no such disadvantage.

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As matters turned out, the loss to the United States by this publication of its plans probably did not amount to much; but, had the Spanish Government possessed more ability, it well might have done so. And since the strategy of a war is of infinitely greater importance than the mere battle-fighting part of the business, with opponents anything like equal, there is scarcely any limit to the harm that might ensue from this satiating of public curiosity upon the plan of campaign. Hence, in the early lucubrations of "Our Own Correspondent" we may read the greatest lesson conveyed by the war.

To return to Cervera, "bottled up" in Santiago harbor. Unable to touch the enemy's ships, the American ironclads here, as elsewhere, expended ammunition upon the land-defences.

These bombardments, from the killing of the historic mule at Matanzas down to the blowing to pieces of islands in Santiago harbor by the pneumatic guns of the "Vesuvius,"—I refer to these events as they were reported to us in the newspapers at the time,—created considerable astonishment in Europe, especially in England. For, so long ago as the bombardment of Alexandria by British armorclads, American naval officers had laid down the dictum that ships were futile against forts.

Almost daily, however, came reports from Cuba of a terrific bombardment and of the total destruction of forts—always followed, a day or two later, by accounts of further equally destructive bombardments against the selfsame forts. From this it quickly became apparent that, save to the "copy-hunting" eye of the special correspondent, little if any harm was ever done,—exactly the orthodox theory of bombardments. People, therefore, were considerably puzzled as to whether Sampson was foolish enough to believe he was doing anything at all proportionate to the energy expended, or whether the operation was intended to keep public opinion (which is very susceptible to the word "bombardment") up to the mark. It now appears established that Sampson's object was neither the one nor the other; but that he seized gladly upon the excellent opportunity for the best possible target-practice. A shot or two at long range soon showed the miserable quality of Spanish gunnery. After that, at a shorter distance the men could fire away at targets more difficult than ships, and with just enough risk to make the firing "under battle conditions."

Granted, therefore, that absolutely no damage of serious value was done upon the Spanish defences,—and this seems to be pretty well established,—it cannot be said that any American vessels were unduly risked and exposed. Possibly, too, these bombardments were of value

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as creating in the Spanish mind a powerful impression of American naval energy. Sampson's bombardments may be cited as a lesson how to improve and train a fleet's gunnery; though against more efficient artillerists such practice might be dearly purchased. "Un canon sur la terre vaut un navire sur la mer," says the French proverb; and nothing that happened in the recent war went to gainsay it. But, through the continual practice on Morro Castle, it is little wonder that, when Cervera's ships came out of Santiago, the American gunners at once found the range, and kept it.

Picturesquely appalling as the results of the dynamite-gun at Santiago perhaps were, it is extremely doubtful whether we have learned anything from its use. It is useless to blow holes in land or sea if the holes are nowhere near the enemy aimed at. We are rather wanting in any details of its use, beyond the picturesque verbosity of newspaper accounts: probably the war has left it *in statu quo*. I believe that among the many reasons put forward as to why Cervera emerged in the daytime, is the statement that at night the "Vesuvius" was to be found shelling the forts, and that he feared destruction by her in the channel. Certainly a dynamite-shell hitting any of the "Vizcaya" class amidships should have pretty effectually destroyed them; but the chances of being hit would have been very slight. After all, a 12- or 13-inch high-explosive shell from any of the battleships would have been sufficiently disastrous, and the chance of being hit infinitely more probable. Possibly enough, this reason also was a fabrication.

It has long been recognized, through experience gained in manœuvres,—which in the matter of blockades can be made to simulate war closely enough for all practical purposes,—that (1) isolated vessels can with difficulty be prevented from slipping out unobserved during any dark night; (2) a squadron of ships has a fair chance to do so, given a suitable night; and (3) the blockaders are exposed to such a risk from torpedo-craft that the maintenance of a blockade must be exceedingly difficult. There are other premises also; the sum total being that the blockading fleet must have a heavy superiority, or else must be content to watch the enemy with its light craft only, while the battleships lie ready at a convenient base to pursue.

Having a heavy superiority, Sampson adopted the blockade; but there were many who doubted whether Cervera could be with certainty shut in. Possibly Sampson doubted it himself, since he attempted, though vainly, to block the channel with the "Merrimac." The method of watching the harbor-mouth at night, so much admired by Capt. Mahan,

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is said to be the Spanish reason why no night attempt to get out was made. The means adopted were certainly instructive; but the theory, that they were the cause of Cervera's inaction, cannot be quite divested of a suspicion of sentiment. What were the Spanish forts dreaming of, not to fire at such an easy mark as a ship's search-light? Again, unless American ships are fitted with search-lights of altogether abnormal power, how could they have so flooded the channel with light, from their distance of three or four thousand yards, as altogether to preclude the torpedo-craft from creeping out? The fixed beam is ever a fragile defence against torpedo-boats; for, once having passed through it, they are very difficult to pick up again. The sole use of the "Furor" and "Pluton" being to harass the blockading fleet, the destruction of one American battleship would almost have paid for the loss of both. No attempt seems to have been made; and it is difficult to think of this inactivity save as gross incapability.

So, too, with the ships. For instance, had a man like Dewey been in command of Cervera's squadron, it is hard to think that Sampson could have kept him in. Like Dewey at Manila, so Sampson at Santiago recognized the calibre of the man with whom he had to deal, and made his dispositions accordingly. Brave Cervera no doubt was; but bravery is a very minor quality in an admiral. Of ability he appears to have had little or none. We cannot learn much from operations conducted so foolishly as his; and the fact that Sampson correctly gauged him does not add to our knowledge of naval warfare.

So far as can be gathered, Cervera came out of Santiago harbor at a speed of ten knots at the most, with his ships four cables apart, *i.e.*, with a good half-mile between each of them. Such a distance made it hard for them to support each other. The destroyers, instead of being under cover of the big ships, were three-quarters of a mile astern of the last of them. And coming out, the 20-knot "Cristobal Colon" managing to work up to a little under 14 knots, there was a purely runaway race, without any attempt to fight a battle with the ram, in which weapon, at least, the two fleets might be presumed to be on an equality. Could anything have been more suicidal? What wonder that Admiral Sampson said in his report "the duty of the American fleet was clear." From a display of such crass stupidity, heightened, rather than redeemed, by the individual bravery of the Spaniards, what knowledge can be gleaned?

A good stand-up fight would have been better not only for the naval scientist, who would thus have learned valuable lessons as to the relative efficacy of type, but also for the American sailor as a man, and for

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the nation as a people. How would the "Indiana" type have answered under a searching fire? How would the American gunners have shot under a hail of death such as Cervera's men fought under? To have known this would have been much. As it is, the war has left America little wiser on these points than she was a year ago.

Much has been written about the ease with which the Spanish ships were set on fire; and lessons about the danger of woodwork have been drawn therefrom. Exactly the same thing occurred after the Yalu. It was subsequently found that in that action the Chinese methods of painting ships were responsible for it. It is possible enough that the same may obtain now. Santiago is not very likely to cause wood to disappear from ships. In a properly found and managed vessel the danger of fire is probably far less than is now made out: it gave the Japanese no particular trouble at Yalu; nor in the very few hits sustained by the Americans in the late war did it give any. A wooden deck has a rigidity that no steel one has; and there are various other portions of a ship for which wood is by far the handiest material. We are likely, therefore, to draw eventually but a small lesson from the fate of the Spanish woodwork.

A more important thing about this setting on fire is that it was done almost or entirely by the ordinary "common shell" with powder-charges, not by any of the more recent explosives. We appear, indeed, to have learned from the war nothing about the action of high explosives.

It was particularly noticeable at Santiago that it was the medium quick-firers of 6-inch calibre and thereabouts which did the most execution; only one hit from a big gun being traced. The deduction from this can, I think, hardly be read rightly—as so many appear inclined to read it—that the modern sea-fight is an affair of moments.[1] Surely it should teach us that a modern naval battle, properly conducted, will be a long affair, and for this reason: The destruction of the "Vizcaya," the "Oquendo," and the "Maria Teresa" was brought about entirely by small or medium-sized shells, which, bursting on the main or lower decks amidships, set the vessels on fire, and so drove the men from the upper-deck guns. A few guns, an exceedingly small proportion, may have been actually disabled by hits; but fire underneath did nearly all the mischief.

Now the construction of the "Vizcaya" was peculiar, and on an obsolete model,—that of the British "Undaunted" class, of which she was a mere servile enlargement, save that her belt was a good deal longer. Her 5.5-inch guns were protected only by shields; all underneath them

[1] I refer, of course, to popular opinion, which appears eager to batten on this particular delusion.

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being quite as exposed as in an unarmored cruiser. There was some armor to the big guns, but only a strip just round the barbette. Below there was nothing; and around the gun there was only a thin shield, bound to become a mere shell-trap.

This sort of construction has now entirely gone out, save in French models, where a development of it is retained. The thin armor to the "Indiana's" lower deck is enough to keep out all *shell* of 6-inch or less calibre. The "Kearsarge" and "Alabama" classes have the same sort of protection better developed: six-inch shell, or even most eight-inch, can do nothing to them, save wreck the ends. A ship like the British "Majestic" is proof against even the largest shell entering the lower deck, except at the bow and stern, where she is weaker than the "Alabama." A ship like the "Monterey" might be attacked by 6-inch shell for a week without suffering any very grievous harm therefrom. In fine, the modern type is built to defeat shell-fire, and is very capable of doing so. Solid shot, or shell from more or less monster guns, are all that most modern designs have to fear.

This rehabilitates the big gun as the only piece able seriously to hurt a modern ship; and Santiago, like the Yalu, showed that big-gun hits will be few. In consequence of the recent war, we may look to see the medium quick-firer ultimately lose, rather than gain, in importance; indeed, the 8-inch is likely to become the minimum for the future.

Now the "Cristobal Colon," with 6-inch Harvey armor almost all over her, was not set on fire, and really but little hurt: had she only been able to make anything like her trial speed she would assuredly have escaped. Her position in the line may partially account for her survival, but her construction a good deal more; and in efficient hands she might have done much. Instead, she was forced ashore; but the fault did not lie with her construction.

Consequently, we may from this infer, with considerable prospect of accuracy, that the ship of the future, for battle purposes, is the ship with plenty of armor. Since the bigger she is, the more armor and guns can she carry, virtue may well seem to lie also in size. For the economical ship, either ironclad proper or cruiser proper, the future seems to have no use, so far as epoch-making battles are concerned. To this, naval opinion has gradually been trending, and will now perhaps trend more rapidly. An ironclad must ever be a compromise in details of construction; but there neither need nor should be any compromise as to her uses. For that which she is intended to do she should be built and used, and for that alone.

FRED. T. JANE.

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SOME WEAK PLACES IN OUR PENSION SYSTEM.

THE war with Spain will add some thousands of names to the pension-roll of the United States, and a large amount to the sum total of pension expenditures. There is no subject in which the people are more deeply interested than this. No other country has dealt so liberally and ungrudgingly with the survivors and widows and other dependents of its wars. The official figures bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the Republic has not been ungrateful. In the last thirty-three years it has paid to its pensioners the vast sum of $2,251,555,921, besides $14,775,794 in fees for the medical examinations of applicants, and $60,690,157 for other expenses on account of the administration of the pension laws; making a grand aggregate of $2,327,021,872. The amount paid to pensioners last year was $145,859,395.

A small portion of the money required for the payment of navy pensions is derived from the income of the Navy Pension Fund, which is on deposit in the National Treasury and on which interest is allowed by the Government at the rate of 3 per cent. The principal of the Fund consists of the share, less 2 per cent, of the United States of moneys received on account of war prizes captured by the navy; and it amounted on June 30, 1898, to about $14,000,000. The net proceeds of the Navy Pension Fund applicable to payment of pensions last year amounted to $345,000; and the total amount paid to navy pensioners amounted to $3,724,000. It is expected that the principal of the Navy Pension Fund will be increased by several hundred thousand dollars within the current year, on account of the sale of prizes captured by the navy during the war with Spain.

Since the beginning, in 1818, the names of 1,475,121 persons have been placed on the pension-roll, of whom 992,961 were survivors, and 482,160 widows, minors, and other dependent relatives. The number of names on the roll on June 30, 1898, was 993,720. Of these 12,034 were survivors, and 14,629 widows of wars prior to 1861; 331,919 were invalid survivors, and 95,500 widows, of the Civil War and of the Indian Wars, etc., since that time; and 413,909 were survivors, and 125,729 other beneficiaries, under the law of June 27, 1890, sometimes

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called the Dependent Pension Act. During the last year 98,574 new certificates were issued to pensioners; and, after deducting those on account of increase of rate, reissues, etc., the total number of names added to the roll was 64,351. The total number of names dropped from the roll in the same year was 46,651; and the net increase of the roll was 17,700. The number of claims pending on June 30 was, in round numbers, 635,000, of which 435,000 were claims for increase, and 200,000 were original. Of the latter, however, it was estimated by the Commissioner of Pensions that 125,000 were duplicates and triplicates. The actual total number of pending claims, therefore, was about 510,000.

The administration of the pension service requires the employment of a large force of officials, clerks, etc. The organization of the Pension Bureau in Washington consists of a commissioner, two deputy commissioners, and about 1,740 subordinate officials, clerks, and messengers. The field force consists of 300 special examiners, whose duty it is to investigate and report on all cases referred to them by the Commissioner of Pensions, and 4,663 examining surgeons, whose duty it is to make a thorough medical examination of every applicant for a pension and to ascertain and describe the origin, nature, and extent of his physical disability. For the payment of fees of examining surgeons last year Congress appropriated the sum of $950,000.

All appeals from the decisions of the Commissioner of Pensions—and all of these are on motion of claimants or their attorneys—are carried to the Board of Pension Appeals, whose conclusions become decisions when approved by the Second Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Last year the decisions of the Commissioner of Pensions were sustained in 3,326 cases of appeal, and reversed in 393.

The pension laws are liberal; and they have been supplemented by a vast number of decisions of commissioners and secretaries and assistant secretaries of the Department of the Interior, by which the virtue of liberality has been broadened to an extent which has sometimes exceeded the intent of the lawmakers. Since July 10, 1862, more than one hundred Acts have been passed by Congress affecting pension claimants, pensioners, or the manner of paying pensions; and during the same period it has passed no fewer than 6,490 private pension laws for the benefit of claimants who were dissatisfied with the rulings of the Pension Bureau, or who were unable to establish their claims under existing laws, or who desired larger pensions than they were entitled to receive under such laws.

About one-fourth of the public enactments have been in the shape

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of riders to appropriation Bills,—always a vicious and dangerous mode of legislation. That some of the pension legislation of Congress has been ill-considered and improvident, comparatively few persons will deny; but that the veterans of the Union, as a body, are primarily responsible for it, cannot be shown. Whenever the gratitude of the nation has been abused it has not been by them. Of course, it has not always been difficult for designing men, whose pecuniary interests as attorneys were involved, to get up large petitions in favor of this or that measure, and, having obtained them, to impress Congressmen with the belief that opposition to, or failure to advocate, the measure would be resented by the old soldiers and their friends. In the earlier days of the Republic such means were not used. There was not then a grand army consisting of some seventy-five thousand pension-claim agents—an army one-fourth as strong numerically as the Grand Army of the Republic, and infinitely more potential than that great organization could be in shaping pension legislation. In those days pension legislation was less frequent and less liberal.

The first general pension law for the benefit of the soldiers of the Revolutionary War was not enacted until 1818—thirty-five years after the declaration of peace and after the second war with Great Britain. Its benefits could be enjoyed only by men who had served at least nine months in the continental line on land or sea, and who were in indigent circumstances. Only two years later Congress repented of its liberality; and, the number of applications for pensions having reached the enormous total of 8,000, that body passed what was known as the "Alarm Act," under which pensioners were dropped, and the applications of others rejected, some of whom owned property of a value not exceeding $150. It was not until 1836 that any widows of the Revolution became entitled to pensions for a period of five years, and then only such as were married to soldiers before the expiration of their term of service; said service to have lasted at least six months.

These and other pension laws enacted prior to the Civil War might be cited as evidences of an illiberal spirit in Congress; but it would hardly do to assert that that body was composed of less patriotic men in 1820 than in 1890, when the so-called Dependent Pension Law was enacted. Some observations on that Act will be pertinent here. The theory and intent of the Dependent Pension Bill, which passed the Fiftieth Congress and was vetoed by President Cleveland, was to grant a pension to every honorably discharged soldier, sailor, and marine of the Civil War who had served ninety days or more and who, being depend-

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ent on his daily labor, was unable to earn a living by reason of physical or mental disability not originating in the service. This Bill, according to Chairman Matson, of the House Committee which framed and reported it, provided for "but one pension, and that pension is one of $12 a month and is given for a total inability to procure a subsistence by daily labor." The Committee estimated that the number of beneficiaries could not exceed 100,000, nor the annual cost $12,000,000.

The so-called Dependent Pension Law enacted by the Fifty-first Congress differed radically from the one passed by the preceding Congress. Inability to earn a support by manual labor was prescribed as the first condition; inability to earn a partial support was recognized as entitling the claimant to a proportionate fraction of the full pension of $12 a month; and widows and minors were included among the beneficiaries of the Act. These changes broadened the scope of the measure indefinitely. Instead of 100,000 beneficiaries, the number on June 30, 1898, was 539,638, including 125,729 widows who would not have been entitled under the original Act; and the expenditures, instead of being $12,000,000, amounted in 1897 to more than $66,000,000. The total disbursements for pensions under this Act have amounted to $431,908,000. Thousands of men who are beneficiaries of it earn incomes amounting to $3,000, $5,000, and even $15,000 a year by other than manual labor; while hundreds, if not thousands, of other beneficiaries are men of independent means.

Reference has been made to frequent changes in the pension laws by means of riders to appropriation Bills. An example is found in a provision inserted in the Pension Appropriation Law, approved June 7, 1888, which granted arrears of pensions to widows and minors during the period of widowhood or minority, irrespective of the date of filing of the application. So far as can be ascertained, this provision was inserted without the knowledge, certainly without the recommendation, of the Secretary of the Interior or of the Commissioner of Pensions. How it operates in some cases will be pointed out further on.

More than one effort has been made in Congress to secure a revision and codification of the pension laws: but influences have always been successfully brought to bear to prevent such action; and this body of legislation still remains what it has been for twenty years—a piece of patchwork to which additions have been and are constantly being made. Rates of pension have been prescribed or changed by a large proportion of the enactments; and every change has marked an increase. In the main, however, the rates are fixed, under general provisions, by the ad-

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ministrative officers. More than one hundred and fifty different monthly rates of pension are paid to pensioners; and more than one hundred of these rates are so fixed. For loss of both hands $100 a month is paid; while for loss of both feet, or total disability of both hands, $72 a month is allowed. The same allowance is made for total blindness, and for disabilities of a nature entailing upon the pensioner "the constant aid and attendance of another person." If the disability be such as to require the "frequent aid and attendance" of another person, the allowance is $50 a month. The number of pensioners on the roll on June 30, 1898, whose pensions were at the rate of $72 each was 2,680. Of course, $72 a month offers a strong temptation to many persons; and there is reason to believe that the law has sometimes been stretched to cover cases outside the intent of Congress. For example, it is difficult to conceive that the disabilities of a pensioner who is able to perform and does discharge the duties of a Government clerk of the third class, at a salary of $1,600 a year, are of such a nature as to require that he shall have "the constant aid and attendance of another person." It is equally difficult to understand how he could obtain an allowance of $72 a month without a stretching of the law,—especially after his case, having been thoroughly investigated, had been rejected by the Commissioner of Pensions.

The decisions on appeal have been numerous and sometimes exceedingly important, not only because they have affected the construction and interpretation of the law, and set precedents which have been far-reaching, but also because they have given a pensionable status to claims which had theretofore been barred. One such decision, it is said, had the effect of adding thirty thousand or more to the army of pension claimants; and another gave a pensionable status to an unknown, but very large, number of persons who had never been mustered into the military service of the United States. Every decision on appeal has been on the application of a claimant or his attorney; and as often as it has been in his favor it has been set up and urged, usually with success, as a precedent governing all analogous cases, no matter what may have been the peculiar circumstances and facts involved.

In view of the foregoing facts and practices, and of others which might be cited, the statement is true in the main that in the administration of the pension system regard is paid not to the letter of the law, but chiefly to the decisions of the Commissioner of Pensions and of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior and to the "established practice of the office" thereunder. In his Report for the present year, the Commissioner of Pensions, who is one of the most energetic, efficient, and con-

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scientious officers in the service of the Government, expresses the opinion that, "in order to secure reliable, intelligent, and uniform practice in the future, a commission should be appointed" to revise the pension laws, rules, and regulations; and he justifies this opinion by the following observation:

> "Since the passage of the general law of July 14, 1862, there have been numerous laws, amendatory, special, and general, with the many rulings and decisions interpreting the laws, until the whole system is a most complex and wonderful network or labyrinth of laws and legal opinions, to the end that a precedent may be cited for any action of this Bureau."

One of the serious difficulties met with in the adjudication of army invalid pension claims arising out of the Civil War has been that of obtaining conclusive or satisfactory evidence showing that the disabilities on account of which the claims were based were incurred in, or traceable to, military service. There was not in existence any record showing the physical condition of the soldier at the time of his discharge; and the medical and hospital records were defective in many important particulars. The lack of such a record has been not only a serious obstacle to the prompt and equitable adjudication of pension claims, but a prolific source of pension frauds. It is well known to every official who has had to do with the administration of the pension laws, as well as to many others, that thousands of men who were perfectly sound at the date of their discharge, having incurred no permanent disability whatever in the military service, have been induced to become applicants for pensions on account of disabilities alleged to have been thus incurred. The fact, that the medical records will not support these claims in any respect, does not by any means defeat them, because, to insure the allowance of the claims, it is only necessary for the claimants to produce testimony of comrades and others to the effect that the alleged disabilities were incurred in service, and have continued since discharge therefrom. The facility with which testimony of this kind can be obtained by claimants or attorneys, and the extent to which such fraudulent practices are carried, can hardly be appreciated by those who are not conversant with the administration of the pension laws. The greater number by far of the fraudulent and unworthy claims that have been allowed under those laws, as well as of those that are now being persistently urged by the introduction of new testimony after repeated rejections, have been allowed, or may yet be allowed, because the Government has no record which shows the actual physical condition at the time of discharge of the men on whose service the claims were based.

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Having these and many other facts in view, the Secretary of War, on the suggestions of officials familiar with the administration of the pension laws, and having the interests of the soldiers and their widows as well as of the Government at heart, has taken steps to have a record made and preserved of the physical condition at the date of his discharge of every volunteer soldier enlisted since the declaration of war against Spain. This record, which will be of inestimable value, consists, first, of the soldier's own declaration of his belief as to his physical condition, and if it has been impaired as a result of his military service, how and when; second, of the statement of his company or other immediate commander; and, third, of the certificate of a surgeon, who is required to make a thorough physical examination. If the soldier claims to have a disability of which the examining surgeon can find no evidence, or claims to have a disability incurred in the line of duty, whereas the medical officer is of the opinion that it was not so incurred, he will not be discharged until after he shall have been examined by a board of three other medical officers, who shall make a full report on the case. All the papers in the case of each soldier are to be preserved among the permanent records of the War Department.

If such a record had been made and preserved in the case of every volunteer soldier discharged from the army during and after the Civil War, the claims of survivors and widows of that war might have been settled years ago, and millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars saved to the national Treasury. Within the last year the Commissioner of Pensions has taken measures which, if successful, will greatly facilitate the adjudication of future claims of widows and minors. A circular has been sent to each invalid pensioner of the Civil War, requesting him to furnish a statement containing the full names of his wife and children (if any), with dates of marriage and birth, and such other information as will facilitate the settlement of their claims for pensions in case of his death.

The foundation of the pension system, so far as invalid pensioners under the general law and survivors under the Act of June 27, 1890, are concerned, is the medical examining board. In all the States which furnished large numbers of Union troops there is at least one such board in every county; and in some counties there are several. Every claimant under the Act of June 27, 1890, or any other general law, or who is an applicant for an increase of pension, or who, having been dropped from the roll, applies to be restored thereto, is required to appear before one of these boards for examination; the report

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of the board furnishing the basis of his claim. Copies of the various laws, together with detailed instructions, are furnished to each examining board, and are supposed to be conscientiously observed and obeyed by them. Inasmuch as the members of these boards are physicians and surgeons of good standing in their respective communities, it might, perhaps, be assumed that their reports and recommendations would be reasonably uniform; but such is not the case. It may be that doctors more frequently disagree in regard to the cause and degree of a physical disability, especially if it be of long standing, than they do in regard to its proper treatment. Moreover, the members of medical examining boards, especially in the rural districts, are more or less susceptible to local sentiment and influences. In some parts of the country reputable physicians have declined, or have reluctantly consented, to serve on such boards, on the ground that, if their examinations and actions should not be satisfactory to applicants, the results would be injurious to their professional practice and reputation.

Even when local sentiment and sympathy cannot be supposed to affect in the slightest degree the conclusions and reports of the medical examining boards, the results are at startling variance. A single example will suffice to illustrate this. Several months ago a pensioner who had applied for an increase of rating complained of unfair treatment by the medical board before which he had appeared for examination. The complaint was lodged in a very influential quarter, and was made the subject of official inquiry and action. The complainant was permitted to appear before four different medical boards in succession in one of the larger cities. All these examinations were within the space of forty-eight hours. Each board was composed of three physicians of excellent reputation; and all were in the classified service. The report in each case was unanimous. What were the findings? One found no ratable disability whatever; another found a ratable disability according to which the complainant (who was already receiving a pension of $16 a month) was entitled to a pension of $8 a month; a third found a ratable disability on account of which he was entitled to $17 a month; and the fourth found a ratable disability according to which he was entitled to $24 a month. The total amount of fees paid by the Government for these four examinations was $24. Now, after remarking that all these boards were acting under the same laws and instructions, further comment would be superfluous,—especially in view of the fact that there are nearly fifteen hundred medical examining boards of pensions scattered throughout the United States, passing on an innumerable variety of

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cases, and that these boards dealt with a total of about 225,000 cases last year.

To remedy this radical defect in the administration of the pension laws, it has been suggested that the existing boards be discontinued, and that a sufficient number of medical examining boards be appointed in each State, which shall sit from time to time at each county seat for the purpose of examining all pension applicants in said county. These boards would be composed of physicians and surgeons who, by devoting all their time to the work, would become thoroughly versed in the pension laws and decisions; and a uniformity of results would be obtained which is impossible under the present system. Moreover, the boards would be less susceptible to local sentiment and influence than is now the case; and many honest pension claimants, as well as the Government, would be gainers by the change.

It is a somewhat startling fact that of the 745,828 invalid and dependent pensioners on the roll on June 30, 1898, no fewer than 435,000, or more than 58 per cent, were applicants for an increase. One of the causes of the tremendous flood of such applications is the inequality of ratings due to the lack of uniformity of findings by medical examining boards. A pensioner receiving $7.50 a month, who finds that his neighbor (whose disability is the same, or even less) is receiving $15 a month, is naturally dissatisfied; and, however honest and conscientious he may be, he will not often repulse a suggestion that an application for an increase of his own pension will place him on an equality with his neighbor. And a pension attorney is always at his elbow to offer the suggestion and to lend his aid—for a consideration.

The pension attorney is at the bottom of and behind a very large proportion of the applications for increase of pensions. He is omnipresent and, as the projector, promoter, and frequently the framer, of new pension legislation, well-nigh omniscient in all matters relating to that branch of human knowledge. What he does not know about pension laws and decisions, and the "established practice" of the Pension Bureau, as well as of precedents furnished from week to week by the reviewing officials in the Department of the Interior, is not worth the knowing. His original applications are skilfully, not to say artfully, drawn with a view to future applications for increase. An ingenuous applicant, who ascribes his physical disability to rheumatism or some other single cause, is surprised (if he reads the application prepared for his signature) to find that he is also afflicted with heart disease, malarial poisoning, jaundice, chronic diarrhœa, deafness, and a score of other dis-

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eases,—all the result of his army service. But it does not end there. Having succeeded in securing an allowance on one or two of the disabilities, and thus establishing the pensionable status of his client, the attorney then has an application for increase filed; and other applications of the same sort follow in steady succession as long as the diseases hold out, or increase of disabilities which have been recognized can be shown.

A very large proportion of the applications—probably a majority of them—have no fairer basis than the ingenuity of pension-claim agents. In what other way could such a case as the following, for example, be explained? A pensioner's application for increase was granted on March 25. On April 6, just twelve days later, he secured an order to appear before an examining board on another application for increase, which was granted on August 11. This pension was advanced twice in five months! It would seem only just that the frequency of examinations for reratings and advances of pensions should be limited, say, to one a year in any one case; but, thus far, outside influences have prevented this.

Among the provisions of the pension laws, which are found most difficult to execute with exact justice both to claimants and pensioners and the Government, are those which affect the widows and children (minors) of men who served in the army or navy. Some of these difficulties arise from the laws themselves and the decisions under them; others are due to evasions and non-observance of the laws by claimants and pensioners as well as by notaries, magistrates, and other officials before whom pension-vouchers are executed. The pension of a widow ceases in case of remarriage, and at the date of that event. The difficulty of enforcing this provision of the law is very great. Experience has shown that little or no attention is paid to it by officials before whom widows' pension-vouchers are executed, and that in many cases the pensioners themselves are unaware of or ignore the provision. An official investigation, set on foot a few months ago, disclosed the fact, that it was the exception, rather than the rule, for notaries and other officials to observe the law requiring that the voucher of every widow shall be attested by two witnesses, who shall certify under oath that they are personally acquainted with the person, and know her to be the widow of the soldier as represented, and that she has never been remarried since his death. In one case noted, one of the witnesses to the vouchers of more than a score of soldiers' widows was a clerk in the office of the notary public before whom the vouchers were executed. Under examination, the clerk admitted that he was not personally acquainted with any of the persons, and, of course, did not know whether or not they had been remarried, or

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whether they were the widows they represented themselves to be. The widows—most of them colored women—also testified that they were not acquainted with this witness, and that the witnesses "were always furnished by the 'squire.'"

An examination of the records of several pension agencies disclosed the fact, which was also supported by investigations made by the pension agents themselves, that there was general among notaries and other officials before whom pension-vouchers were executed a practice of having "stock witnesses" to certify those of widows whom they did not know, and in regard to whose past or present remarriage relations they knew and could know absolutely nothing. In the rush of business attending the payment of pensions it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impracticable, for the pension agent closely to scrutinize or compare the names of witnesses on hundreds, or thousands, of widows' vouchers. It will at once be seen that here is not only a weak point in the administration of the pension laws,—even when the officials before whom vouchers are executed are simply careless, or ignorant of the law, and not dishonest,—but that the door is opened wide for fraud, by false personation and otherwise, of which dishonest persons are quick to take advantage.

These frauds are sometimes detected and punished; but the disagreeable probability is that thousands of them are not discovered. Only a few months ago an investigation by a special examiner of the Pension Bureau unearthed one of these frauds in Providence, Rhode Island, the beneficiary of which had been for years receiving a handsome yearly income from the certificates of pensioners who were dead. Against this scoundrel, who is now serving a term in the Penitentiary, more than twenty indictments were found. He was a pension-claim agent as well as a notary public, and was thus enabled to carry on the fraud with greater success.

Since the enactment of the provision in the Appropriation Act of 1887, authorizing a woman who was the widow of a soldier during any period of time to apply for, at any time, and obtain a pension from the date of death of her soldier-husband, a flood of claims of that sort has poured into the Pension Bureau through the hands of the claim agents who were instrumental in having the legislation enacted. In many cases allowances of $2 a month each have been applied for and obtained on account of children (minors) who at the time of such allowance had reached the age of manhood or womanhood; some of them being thirty to forty years of age and in good circumstances. Of course, the sole

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intent of the law, under which an allowance of $2 a month was made to each widow pensioner on account of each child under sixteen years of age, was to assist in its support and education until it had reached a self-supporting age. That intent has been largely frustrated by the provision referred to; and the same remark applies with equal force to the cases of many widows. Take a case in point, that of a widow whose husband had died in August, 1861, about a month after his enlistment in a regiment of home guards in which he saw no actual military service. She had five children, the eldest of which was born in 1852, and the youngest in 1860. In 1893 the widow applied for a pension on her own behalf and on account of the support and education of the children during their minority; and it was granted. At that time the eldest child, if living, was 41 years old, and the youngest 33. The total payment of arrears to this widow amounted to $4,728,—$3,408 on her own account, and $1,320 on account of the children. Another case was that of the widow of a man who had been a captain in one of the volunteer regiments, and died in 1871, never having applied for a pension. He left a widow, who was remarried in 1887, sixteen years after his death. In 1893 she applied for and received a pension for the period of her soldier widowhood, at the rate of $20 a month. The total amount paid to her for the benefit of herself and her second husband—who was never a soldier—was $3,840.

In his last Annual Report the Commissioner of Pensions strongly recommends legislation providing that no pension be granted to any widow who was not married to the soldier before the date of its enactment. This would be in harmony with all the earlier legislation of Congress on the subject of widows' pensions, as well as with the Act of 1890; and there are sound reasons, grounded in private and public morals, why the recommendation should be approved, without regard to the heavy future demands on the public Treasury which the continuance of the existing system would involve. The latter, however, is by no means a matter for slight consideration. The longevity of soldiers' widows is proverbial. For example, while the names of only three survivors of the war of 1812, which ended eighty-three years ago, were borne on the pension-roll on June 30, 1898, the same roll bore the names of no fewer than 2,407 widows of that war, seven of which were added in 1897. The inference is irresistible that many of the soldiers of 1812, when well advanced in years, married wives who were young and possessed of robust health and strong constitutions. Women who entered into the bonds of wedlock with the aged veterans of that war were not tempted

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by an expectation of receiving life pensions after the lapse of a few years. Unless official and other observers are mistaken, and their assertions worthless, such an expectation leads to the marriage of many young women every year to aged and decrepit veterans of the Civil War, who have only a few months, or years at most, to live. In fact, a number of death-bed marriages have been recorded, where the only possible motive of the brides could have been to qualify themselves to receive pensions as soldiers' widows. The woman who was the wife of a soldier in the field during the Civil War suffered untold anxiety; and, in many a case, her life was one of constant struggle for existence,—especially if she had small children. If her husband lost his life in the service, or subsequently incurred disabilities therein, or died, her burden was made still heavier. The intent of the lawmakers, in granting pensions to soldiers' widows, was to recompense them in some degree for the anxieties, suffering, and privations they had been called upon to endure. At the last session of Congress the proposition, that pensions should not be granted to any soldier's widow unless she had been married to him prior to 1898, was defeated in the House Committee on Invalid Pensions, by a vote of 8 to 7, solely by the efforts and influence of pension-claim agents.

Pension-claim agents and their influence have been referred to several times in the course of this article; but a further word in regard to them will be pertinent. Many of them are honest, high-minded, patriotic men; many more belong to the "shyster" breed, whose sole object in life is to line their own pockets at the expense of both the Government and their unfortunate clients. They are shrewd and untiring; they understand every twist and turn of pension administration; they are adepts in pension laws and decisions; and many of them are as unscrupulous as they are ingenious. Some of them are languishing behind prison bars to-day because their zeal in the pursuit of pension fees led them to break the law. Every man of them is a loud and lusty patriot, a devoted friend of the soldier and of the soldier's widow and fatherless children. In their view, a commissioner of pensions who rejects any pension claims is an "enemy of the soldier"; and, by vituperation and misrepresentation, they succeed in impressing this view on the minds of many persons, including some Congressmen, whose demagogic instincts, or timidity, or desire to conciliate and capture the "soldier vote," make them easy prey. Because a candidate for the Presidency once righteously said that the claims of the veterans of the Union and their widows should not be weighed in the apothecary's scales, these

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zealous attorneys have since insisted that every pension claim, good and bad alike, should be allowed for the full amount.

The business of the pension-claim agent has been a lucrative one; and he is naturally opposed to surrendering any part of it. Some of such agents have accumulated large fortunes within the space of a few years; and thousands have enjoyed handsome incomes, many of which have been largely derived from "shady" or unlawful practices. They have led hundreds of claimants into paths which ended in prison. Every dollar that has been paid to pension attorneys has been contributed by pension claimants, many thousands of whom have thus been unmercifully fleeced. In fourteen years, 1874–1898, the total amount of legal fees paid by the Government to pension attorneys out of the pensions allowed to their respective clients has been $14,945,317,—an average of more than $1,067,000 a year. Probably, these sums, large as they are, do not represent more than 60 per cent of the total amount actually received from pension claimants by attorneys and their "drummers" and "dummies," who are scattered throughout the country. In other words, the claimants were compelled to pay in fourteen years nearly $10,000,000 in illegal fees.

If the average yearly fees, legal and otherwise, collected by the attorneys and their agents during the six years for which no record of the legal fees was kept, equalled those during the other fourteen years of the period, the aggregate revenue of the pension-claim agents and their assistants and dummies for the twenty years, 1879–1898, amounted to more than $35,000,000. It has paid them pretty well to pose as the friends of the soldier and his widow and fatherless children; to shout at Grand Army encampments and political conventions; to get up petitions in favor of the enactment of more "liberal" pension legislation; to coax and persuade or "bulldoze" Congressmen, as necessity might require; and to get on the "blind" side of easy-going pension officials whenever it was practicable to do so.

No man can make an estimate of the pension cost of the recent war with Spain, which will be even approximately accurate. All such estimates in the past have been very much too low. Gen. Garfield, who favored a just and liberal pension policy, once said that if the expenditures should ever reach $50,000,000 per annum the system would break down under its own weight. The annual pension-roll and the cost of administration already amount to about three times Gen. Garfield's estimate, which he regarded as an exceedingly liberal one; and the expenditures are steadily increasing. His estimate is exceeded now by

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the annual expenditures under the so-called Dependent Pension Act alone. When that legislation was pending in Congress no Member who either favored or was opposed to it was rash enough to assert, or even to suggest, that the expenditures on account of it would ever reach $50,000,000 a year.

In a recent conversation a Government officer of high rank, who for many years has had much to do with the administration of the pension laws, and has devoted close and careful study to the subject, remarked:

"It is impossible for anyone to make even an approximately correct estimate of future pension expenditures, because no one can predict what changes will result from future legislation, or how the cost of the pension-roll will be affected from year to year by changes in administrative practice, by the allowance of pending or new claims, by disproportion in age between deceased veterans and their surviving widows, and by increase of the average annual rating on account of increase of disability."

He added, that, assuming that none of the foregoing causes would operate, and taking as a basis the War Department estimate of the number of survivors of the Civil War, the minimum total possible expenditure for pensions on account of that war, between now and 1945—when it is assumed that the last survivor will have disappeared—would amount to $2,011,140,298.

He continued:

"Of course, the assumption upon which the foregoing calculation is based is unwarranted. The number of pensioners will not decrease nearly as rapidly as the number of survivors will decrease; the average pension-rating will increase, because of gradual increasing disability, even if no new pension laws shall be enacted; the ratio of widows to surviving veterans on the roll will constantly increase; there will be many widows on the roll after the last veteran shall have passed away; and, sooner or later, there will certainly be some legislation that will increase the annual expenditure. It will be seen, therefore, that the foregoing estimate is very much too low, and that it has no value except as a basis for the statement that the total expenditure will certainly equal the amount named, and will undoubtedly largely exceed it."

S. N. CLARK.

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GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN.—I.

"We Germans wish to put no one in the shade. All that we desire is a place in the sunshine by the side of others." Such was the sentiment recently expressed in the Reichstag by Freiherr von Bülow, Secretary for Foreign Affairs; the occasion being the occupation of Kiao Chou. His words voiced the feeling of the whole German nation. The assurance that we do not wish to encroach on the rights of others is absolute; while the desire of the greatest military Power of Europe for a place in the sunshine of prosperity is certainly not unreasonable.

If German affairs have been conducted upon this principle since 1870, surely no nation—revengeful France excepted—can find cause for rancorous sentiments against the German people. Such, however, is the case among our habitually cool cousins across the Channel; and the national feeling of Germany has been aggravated in consequence. It cannot be denied that a tension exists between the two countries—so far, at least, as the political leaders are concerned; and this tension cannot be increased without seriously endangering the vital interests of both, and possibly precipitating the dictatorship of Russia in the eastern hemisphere.

What has led to this condition of affairs? Have we been true to our pledge, or have we, since the great victories of Wörth, Metz, and Sedan, endeavored to damage British interests and to increase our *prestige* at the expense of others? The most searching introspection will, I think, fail to convince us that we have been overbearing toward Great Britain,—a country to which we have long been united by many ties, and to which we shall always be drawn by interests of the first order.

Germany did not raise a finger to further the designs of Russia and France against English dominion in Egypt; nor did she, after the peace of San Stefano in 1878, assume the *rôle* of arbitrator, but rather that of the "honest broker." Indeed, she refrained from using her influence against England even at the risk of incurring the enmity of Russia. Six years later, during the controversy on the Congo Question, when the right of establishing colonies in Equatorial Africa was discussed, Germany unhesitatingly endorsed Lord Salisbury's policy of "open doors,"

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and emphasized the equal right of all nations to establish intercourse with the barbaric and semi-civilized tribes of Africa; insisting that, for several decades, such a policy had proved efficacious in Eastern Asia.

In consequence of the opinion thus frankly avowed, Germany at once relinquished her claim to that beautiful region of Eastern Africa lying north of the Kilimanjaro, together with the Island of Zanzibar—the Malta of the Indian Ocean. Even Englishmen marvelled at the chivalrous conduct of Germany, in abandoning possessions to which she had acquired a fairly good title. We may unhesitatingly assert that no German has ever dreamed of despoiling England of one foot of her vast colonial possessions.

Since the reign of Charles V,—on whose realm the sun never set,—the opportunity of becoming the greatest naval Power in the world has been irrevocably lost to Germany. On the other hand, the greatly altered conditions arising from the construction of transcontinental railways and canals have made it impossible for England to exercise a universal dominion during the twentieth century.

The colonial possessions, which the genial diplomacy of Bismarck has secured to the Germans, comprise two million square kilometres, which are insignificant when compared with the twenty-six million square kilometres of England, or the seventeen million of Russia. The occupation of Kiao Chou was a step such as England has taken repeatedly in uncivilized countries without asking questions. The British have long had their Hong Kong; and they have now acquired Wei-hai-wei.

The Germans have organized a fleet, but this cannot possibly become a menace to England; for, even when the plan recently adopted is carried into effect, our navy will only be one-sixth as large as Great Britain's. Our minister of the navy, Tirpitz, is dwarfed by his English colleague, Goschen. Thus it will remain. For, whenever international complications arise, we can throw into the scale our formidable army, the greatest land-power in the world. We can always guard against usurpations, whether they proceed from Russians or Englishmen; and, consequently, we do not require a naval armament equal to that of Great Britain. Indeed, we should be unable to support so large a fleet. Within the last twenty-five years, the enterprising merchants of our Hanseatic ports have secured to us the second place in the foreign markets of the world. In guarding our commercial interests, therefore, we have merely done what any nation is justified in doing—more particularly when, like ourselves, it possesses an overflowing population.

Since 1870 we have never essayed the *rôle* of dictator in the Euro-

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pean Concert; and if we have preferred, during the last three years, to remain passive in matters remotely affecting our interests, we have certainly not been actuated by any desire to offend England. Acting upon the advice of Prince Bismarck, we have sought to maintain amicable relations with Russia, notwithstanding the alliance of that country with France—and this not for the purpose of damaging British interests, but of securing ourselves against a possible "revanche" on the part of France. Were we requested to choose between Frenchmen and Englishmen on the Nile, or between Russians and Englishmen on the Indus, Ganges, or Yangtse, we should certainly cast a preponderant vote in favor of our British cousins; and no British diplomat stationed at Berlin, familiar with German popular sentiment, will report to the contrary. It is unnecessary to adduce further proofs to convince American readers that our policy, since 1871, has been conducted upon the lines of Von Bülow's remark quoted in the opening paragraph of this paper. On this point our conscience is perfectly clear.

Perhaps some British writer may not concur in my opinion, but claim that we have not been altogether blameless. Should he plead his cause in THE FORUM, I am sure that my countrymen will be open to conviction. It is absolutely necessary, however, in order that the existing tension may be gradually removed, that Englishmen should hear the German side of the case stated before an impartial tribunal.

In endeavoring to explain the reason of the strong anti-British sentiment now existing in Germany, we must, above all, guard against superficiality, and probe beneath the surface. Court relations, expressions in the Jingo press, utterances of British diplomats, the abuse showered upon the German Emperor,—neither of these is responsible for the present discontent. Although the English court, with its German branches, is not nearly so popular to-day as it was when Englishmen came over to Coburg to select a consort for their youthful Queen, the great mass of Germans are entirely unaffected by court affairs. It is true that Emperor William's despatch to President Krüger aroused the wrath of the English people; yet this wrath was but evanescent. Upon reflection, Englishmen perceived that the despatch, unpleasant though it must have been, was merely designed to brand the deed of filibusters.

As far as *we* are concerned, the occasional grumbling of Englishmen over the extraordinary development of German commerce has not materially disturbed our equanimity. In a recent article in the "Saturday Review," the writer, referring to Germany, makes use of the expression, "Ceterum censeo, Germaniam esse delendam." This was indeed a pretty

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hard dose to swallow. Yet, after all, the German people have not been very deeply affected by the utterances of certain English statesmen; although it must be admitted that some irritation has been caused by political speeches in England. We trust that no Prussian Chamberlain will ever speak and act in office as did the English Secretary for the Colonies. Undoubtedly, however, the youthful Hotspur was bridled by Lord Salisbury. After all, we can afford to let the *colleagues* of the English Prime Minister have their say.

More deeply rooted in our memory is the article, inspired by Lord Salisbury himself, and published in the "Standard," upon the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War. I refer more particularly to the passage in which the German Emperor was enjoined "to heed the wise counsel of his grandmother." Yet even this utterance did not greatly wound our susceptibilities. We are quite certain that the young Emperor, who could afford to dispense with the sage advice of Prince Bismarck, will not walk in the leading-strings of the Queen of England. Neither the article in the "Standard" nor that in the "Saturday Review" is responsible for the prevailing antipathy to Great Britain. The main cause for our dissatisfaction may be epitomized in a single sentence: England's policy toward Germany, both in the Colonies and in the Orient, is practically identical with that prevailing prior to 1870, *i.e.*, in the days of Lord Palmerston. A cursory glance at our development during the last half-century will readily convince the reader that our dissatisfaction is traceable mainly to the disrespect with which England still persists in treating our people.

Prior to 1870 the Germans might have been more justly accused of Anglomania than of Anglophobia. Not even the overbearing attitude of Lord Palmerston, and his threat to treat as filibusters the few warships built by the aid of the small savings of German patriots, could affect the pleasant relations then existing between the two countries. The necessity of returning into the German Confederation (imposed upon us after 1848 by Prince Schwarzenberg) was felt far more keenly than was the attempt of Lord Palmerston to wound our national pride and to impair our position among the nations. As a liberal and constitutional monarchy, Great Britain was decidedly popular in Germany. Upon the outbreak of the Crimean War, our sympathies were entirely with England against Russia. I shall never forget the enthusiasm with which the reported capture of Sebastopol by the English fleet was greeted. Many would have advocated an alliance of Prussia with Austria in her attitude of armed neutrality against Russia.

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The Treaty of Paris (1856), although concluded without the co-operation of Prussia, was hailed with universal approval; and it was considered quite in order that the "Russian Bear," with "clipped claws," should be encaged forever within the basin of the Black Sea. The procedure of England in 1856 was diametrically opposed to her present policy of "open doors." Even then there were statesmen in Germany who declared that the seas and harbors of the world could not be closed forever against a great and increasing nation like Russia. Yet the opinions of these statesmen found no acceptance. The sympathy for England could not be diminished—least of all in North Germany, where the great landowners were then fanatical Free-Traders, as they are to-day confirmed Protectionists. Indeed, in 1865, with the advent of the "Aera Delbrück" (an expression coined by Bismarck), Germany inaugurated a commercial policy, modelled upon that of the famous Cobden Club of England.

A turning-point in our relations with England was reached in 1870. Yet even then our sympathy was not at once converted into antipathy, but rather into indifference. This became more marked about 1874, when the commercial treaties of 1865 began to fall into disfavor. Our victories in France had awakened a national sentiment powerful enough, when irritated, to react most forcibly—as demonstrated by our present attitude toward Great Britain. In the eighteenth century it was still possible for England to buy, at the courts of German princes, the mercenaries sent against the American colonies. The despicable barter of our princes with the sons of the soil had come to be regarded as one of the greatest blots upon the escutcheon of German honor. These methods have become impossible since the War of Liberation against Napoleon I.

Prior to 1870 England was still in a position to coerce Germany at any time into an alliance with her against Russia,—an alliance similar to that existing between England and France during the Crimean War. It is conceivable that in this way England might again have reaped her harvest upon the soil which the nations of Central Europe had drenched with their blood,—as at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, when England lost but twenty thousand men in twenty years. All this has been changed since the formation of the new German Empire. "To wage war against Russia with the bones of German musketeers" would be impossible for England, even if the daughter of Queen Victoria had been earlier endowed with the Imperial Crown of Germany, and had worn it longer than for the ninety-nine days that marked the brief reign of our lamented Emperor Frederick.

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The first decade of the new German Empire passed without serious friction. England had not yet given us sufficient cause. It is true that, after the Battle of Sedan, England had furnished French soldiers with weapons. As the French harbors, however, were not in a state of blockade, all neutrals, English merchants included, were justified in making capital out of the war. Yet, even in 1870 Emperor William I already had a premonition of what has now become a *fait accompli*. This is proved by Prof. Oncken in the "Festbuch" published in 1897, the centenary of Emperor William's birth. In this the venerable monarch makes the accusation that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Clarendon, had acted treacherously toward Prussia in regard to the question of disarmament. Furthermore, the King feels aggrieved at the wish expressed by Lord Granville concerning the neutrality of Belgium, namely, that the French should be permitted to operate unmolested upon the flank and rear of the German army. In the letters written by King William to his royal consort, the mediatory propositions of Queen Victoria were referred to as efforts to deprive Germany of the fruits of the war. Yet, at this time, the indignation against Queen Victoria of the Emperor—the father-in-law of her daughter—was not yet shared by the nation at large.

For several decades the Emperor and his advisers maintained a wise secrecy as to their views. Nevertheless, all enthusiasm for the Treaty of 1856 (concluded without the consent of Prussia) had vanished in 1870; and Prince Bismarck was enabled to reward Russia for her neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, by permitting her to tear the treaty to pieces and to place a powerful fleet upon the waters of the Black Sea. In this way England was deprived in the London Protocol of the fruits of the Crimean War,—a war in which, after all, the national soldiery of France participated far more largely than did the hired troops of England. At the same time, the mediatory propositions of Queen Victoria fell short of their purpose. Not we, therefore, but England, had cause for irritation.

A state of serious tension between the two countries did not ensue, however, until ten years later. This tension was not caused by any measures devised by England in retaliation for the resumption of Germany's protective policy (1879, 1885, 1887). On the contrary, England, up to the present day, has given us free access to all her markets; and in this she has displayed extraordinary patience. Yet it appears that, after all, she was deceived in her reckoning. Leaving our policy of Protection entirely out of the question, the fact remains that we have

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made marvellous strides in our foreign commerce; and this commercial development has created numerous points of friction with England over a considerable portion of the eastern hemisphere. It has therefore devolved upon Germany to use every means in her power to prevent Continental wars,—which could prove advantageous only to England,—and no longer tamely to submit to that policy of exclusion adopted by certain countries with reference to transoceanic markets, but to inaugurate an active colonial policy of her own; to guard her coasts against blockade; to protect her merchant marine on distant seas; and to obtain for her merchants *points d'appui* on foreign shores. The following figures will serve to give American readers an idea of the results of the change effected in Germany's foreign policy.

In 1895 our entire trade with England (through rates excluded) amounted to only 1,362 million marks, as compared with 2,400 millions for all other transoceanic countries. Our trade with the United States alone amounted to 1,000 million marks annually. Moreover, England has now almost entirely lost our carrying trade, once so profitable to her. Since 1873, our trade with England, estimated in tonnage, has increased 88 per cent; but in the last decade it has declined 35 per cent, while our trade with other countries has increased as follows:

Sweden	97	per cent.
Austria-Hungary	341	" "
North America	128	" "
Mexico, Central and South America	317	" "
India and the Far East	488	" "
Australia	475	" "
South Africa	270	" "
The Levant	2,261	" "

Prior to 1873 we possessed no colonies. The fisheries in the North Sea were controlled entirely by England. Since 1873 these have increased from 5,100 to 52,600 tons. Hamburg's transoceanic commerce alone, estimated in tonnage, has been trebled within the last twenty-five years; while its monetary value has doubled. The Hamburg-American Steamship Company and the North German Lloyd rank among the greatest steamship companies in the world; while the capital of Hamburg's steamship lines alone amounts to 900 million marks. The number of our steamers has increased more than sixfold, and their tonnage tenfold. Some of our vessels (the "Kaiser Wilhelm II," for exam-

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ple), are not only unexcelled, but perhaps unequalled, while they are easily convertible into auxiliary cruisers. In addition to these industries, we have begun to take an active interest in plantations. It is said that over 20 million marks of German capital has been invested in the coffee-plantations of Venezuela, and that similar extensive interests exist in Honduras, Guatemala, and in the German Colonies. Foreign warships are now constructed upon our wharves. Our consular flag waves in every part of the globe. And Germany is the only European country that has made such marvellous commercial progress. While the total trade of Germany has advanced to the extent of 1,100 million marks, the trade of France, of Russia, and even of England, has retrograded, or, at least, has not increased in the same proportion. It must still be admitted, however, that our share of the world's commerce is scarcely two-thirds that of England; and that it is unlikely that we shall ever attain the first place.

While the War of 1870 fully awakened the national consciousness, our extraordinary commercial and industrial development since that period have compelled us to maintain our independence, and no longer to submit to the tutelage and dictation of England. We have been compelled to oppose with might and main all influences which threatened the peace of the world, and aimed at the destruction of Continental commerce. A serious reaction of German popular sentiment against England was therefore inevitable in the event of an infringement of our privileges, or an attempt to damage our prosperity by instigating war between Central Europe and Russia. In both directions, England has now actually given cause for such reaction. Since 1880 she has everywhere antagonized our colonial policy; while her methods in Turkey during the last few years can be interpreted only as an attempt to provoke a European war involving the whole Continent to its detriment, and benefiting England alone. These are the causes of our resentment.

Americans will undoubtedly recall the apprehension of the English people, when Bismarck secured to us our modest colonial possessions in Africa and in Australasia. Public opinion in England still asserted toward us the pretentious claim, long abandoned by her with regard to the other Powers, to prohibit or permit the acquisition of transoceanic colonies. Wherever we endeavored to raise the German flag for the protection of our extensive and well-established mercantile interests abroad we encountered the opposition of England. All this tended to stir our resentment; hence the enthusiasm aroused by the Transvaal despatch of the German Emperor.

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The domineering attitude of England with regard to our colonial policy was not, however, the sole cause of our deep-seated resentment. Indeed, there still are people among us, identified with the "Aera Delbrück," who consider Germany's colonial policy an anachronism, and condemn it upon the ground that the new colonies are not directly remunerative. This is equivalent to saying that children who have not yet lost their first teeth should contribute to the support of their parents. However naïve this view, the fact remains that Germany's attempts at colonization have not met with universal approval at home. The colonial policy of England cannot, therefore, be accepted as the sole reason of our antagonism.

It has been only within the last few years that the bottom has been completely knocked out of the once-overflowing cask of our affection. This occurred when, from the highlands of Armenia down to the island designated in the history of the Apostles as the home of "the Eternal Liars," England sprung the mines which were to ignite the fires of war over the entire continent, so that she alone might profit by the universal holocaust. Whether justly or unjustly entertained, the general conviction was that England, unable to obtain the assistance of France for a second Crimean War, sought to drive the Powers of the Triple Alliance into a war against Russia, so that, in this way, their national prosperity might be destroyed by their own hands; while England, profiting by the murkiness of the atmosphere, would cast her nets for a tremendous haul.

It was no less a man than Bismarck who indefatigably emphasized this suspicion; and, as the educated German invariably scents religious hypocrisy whenever England transacts political business under the sign of the Cross, the before-mentioned conviction easily and rapidly gained ground. In this instance, however, the reckoning was made without the host: the fulfilment of so outrageous a demand became impossible after 1870. That England could nevertheless cherish this idea, and, undismayed by repeated failure, obstinately pursue it for three years, is the cause of Germany's embitterment—an embitterment which, unfortunately, has even led to sympathy for him whom Gladstone, of all English statesmen the least popular in Germany, once styled "the murderer in the Yildiz Kiosk."

When, at last, after unsuccessful attempts to drive the Armenians to the shambles of the Sultan, England espoused the cause of the Greeks and the Cretans, the antipathy of Germany was directed against these, not because of their nationality, but because they had become the *pro-*

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tégés of England and the bearers of her firebrands. The assertion, that our antipathies were directed mainly against the German holders of Greek securities, is false: the friendly services of our Government in behalf of the old creditors of Greece were at least unsolicited by public sentiment. Many politicians of Germany were, and still are, of the opinion that the peace of Europe could have been maintained just as effectually if German diplomacy had acted less impulsively toward the Greeks, instead of playing the part, as it seemed, of the highest "Magister Morum" of Europe.

Such is Germany's attitude toward Great Britain to-day. After what has been said, I may perhaps be justified in tracing the cause of the tension between the two nations to the anachronistic policy pursued by England toward the German Empire since 1870. If England wishes to have Germany with, and not against her, she must abandon her present policy, and resolve to deal with us upon a basis of perfect parity, both as regards demands and sacrifices. In short, her entire policy must be conducted upon the principle of "Do ut des."

ALBERT VON SCHÄFFLE.

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THE NICARAGUA CANAL.

COLUMBUS died a disappointed man because he had failed to find a new route to the Indies. His ships were stopped by the impassable barrier of a continent the existence of which he had not dreamed of. It remained for the adventurer Balboa, making his way across Darien in 1513, to be the first to look out upon the waters of the Pacific Ocean and to realize by how narrow a strip of land the Atlantic was separated from the Pacific. From that time to the present there has been an ever-increasing desire to cut through this barrier, and thus to connect the waters of the two great oceans and to reduce the sailing-distance around the world by more than one-third of the circumference of the globe.

Spain, then at the height of her glory and power, directed all her captains sailing to the New World to seek for the strait (which they believed existed somewhere) connecting the two oceans.

The discovery in 1522 of a great lake situated at the summit, nearly in the centre of the Isthmus, together with a great river, the outlet of the lake, flowing to the east,—which made it possible to approach, in small vessels, from the Atlantic to within twelve miles of the Pacific, —seemed to indicate that at this point the Isthmus could be cut, and a free water-channel established. This lake is now known as Lake Nicaragua, and its outlet as the San Juan River.

From that day to the beginning of the present century many examinations of the Isthmus were made, and various schemes devised for the construction of a canal; but the difficulties were too great for the engineers of the period.

The completion of the Suez Canal in 1870 led to a revival of the interest in a canal across Central America. The unfortunate failure of Count de Lesseps and his company at Panama, where many millions were squandered and stolen, has retarded movements looking to the construction of the canal. American engineers have always favored a canal by the way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua; and that route has come to be known as the American route. One-half of the money ($256,000,000) wasted at Panama would have built the Nicaragua Canal. Whilst the failure at Panama has prevented great capital-

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ists from taking up the Nicaragua plan, the American people have never for a moment doubted the practicability of that route; nor has their determination that the Canal should be constructed there under American auspices been lessened. Repeated surveys of this route made by the United States Government and by private parties have demonstrated its practicability, and at a cost which would make the enterprise a commercial success.

The stirring events of the last few months have so demonstrated the necessity of the Canal, from a military as well as from a commercial standpoint, that the American people are substantially a unit to-day in demanding the immediate undertaking of the enterprise, and its accomplishment at the earliest possible moment. The wonderful voyage of the battleship "Oregon" round Cape Horn, and the return trip, now being made, of the same vessel, accompanied by the "Iowa," are object-lessons so striking that every unprejudiced mind must at once admit the necessity of the Canal as a means of defence of our harbors and cities on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as of our new outlying possessions and dependencies.

The question is frequently heard, "Why is the building of the Canal not undertaken by private capital or by the Government?"

As to the former, the writer has said that the Panama fiasco and scandal have been the chief causes in preventing private capital from taking up this enterprise in a way energetic enough to insure its speedy completion.

The reason that the Government has done nothing more than to make repeated surveys and reports is to be found in two facts: First, in a matter of this kind our Government moves only when pressed to do so by the demands of a great majority of the citizens. It has been no mean task for those who have advocated the construction of the Canal to convince a majority of seventy millions of people that it ought to be undertaken by the Government. But the final argument in the advocacy of the measure has been furnished by the trip of the "Oregon"; and this has rendered unnecessary any further efforts in the matter of educating the people on this question.

The second reason why the Government has not acted is found in the fact, that the representatives of great capital invested in our transcontinental railroads have believed that the construction of a canal across the Isthmus would greatly injure their properties. Acting upon that belief, they have used the power of their corporations in every way possible to prevent Congressional action. The history of the Nicaragua

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Canal in Congress for the past ten years would be very interesting to the readers of THE FORUM; but it is altogether too long for the limits of this article. It must suffice to say, that the committees of both Houses have repeatedly reported Bills favorable to the construction of the Canal. Once a Bill for its construction passed the Senate, but failed to receive consideration in the House. The influences above referred to have always been able to prevent joint action of the two Houses at the same session of Congress. A powerful lobby has been maintained at Washington during all these years; and skilful statistical writers have been employed to prove to the American people, through the columns of the press and magazines, that the Canal is unnecessary, either as a means of defence or in the interests of commerce, and that, if it were constructed, few vessels would ever pass through it; thus making it a stupendous commercial failure.

It has been the opinion of everyone who has examined this question, except the railroad magnates themselves, that the building of the Canal would be of greater benefit to the transcontinental railroads than to any other single interest. There are at the present time six transcontinental railroads competing for a business which could easily be carried by three.

The Pacific Coast is a great empire by itself. It has been estimated that it is capable of producing food enough to support one hundred millions of people. The fertility of its soil and the salubrity of its climate cannot be surpassed. Yet, at the present time, upon the entire coast from San Diego to the line of British Columbia in the North, and running back to the mountains, there are fewer people, all told, by several hundred thousands, than are to-day contained in the city of New York. The failure of the Pacific Coast to make a great growth since the discovery of gold in 1849 has been a great disappointment to its early settlers. The reason is found in the fact that there is not sufficient profit in the pursuit of agriculture or lumbering to attract the surplus population of the East. Once the Canal is opened, the population of the Pacific Coast will rapidly increase; and before a decade has passed it will have more than doubled. This increased population will of necessity bring largely increased business to the railroads. The annual reports of several of the transcontinental railroads show that their through business is less than 10 per cent of the entire business of the roads, and that their profits are made upon "short haul" and not upon the freight carried from ocean to ocean.

After all these years of waiting, I am satisfied that the position in

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which this enterprise stands to-day, not only before the American people, but before the whole commercial world, is such that its speedy accomplishment is assured, either by the Government of the United States or by private capital.

The discussion of this question naturally divides itself into three parts:

First. Is the route proposed by the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua feasible from an engineering point of view at such a cost as will give assurance of the Canal's success?

Second. Is the Canal desirable? Will it greatly benefit American interests? Will it surely add to our means of defence?

Third. Will it pay?

(1) *Is it feasible?* Without wearying the reader with a detailed account of the numerous surveys which have been made of the Nicaragua route, suffice it to say that every engineer, either American or foreign, whose opinion commands respect and who has examined the route and the plans as made by the present company, has pronounced the scheme to be entirely feasible and one that presents no insurmountable engineering problems.

The Government of the United States during the Administration of Gen. Grant made a careful examination of every possible route across the Isthmus, and finally reported in favor of the Nicaragua route. This report was made by Gen. Humphreys, then Chief of the Engineer Corps of the army. Since that day a company holding concessions from Nicaragua and Costa Rica for the construction and operation of the Canal has made most extensive surveys, extending over a number of years, with a large corps of engineers under the direction of Chief Engineer A. G. Menocal.

At the present time there is a Canal Commission, consisting of Admiral Walker, Gen. Hains, and Prof. Haupt. The Commission was created by Act of Congress; and the gentlemen named were appointed by the President. They have had at their disposal something over $300,000; and, for the past six months or more, they have had in Nicaragua over fifty engineers who have been carefully going over the route of the Canal as proposed by the Company, verifying the work, and making additional surveys. The Commission will report at the next session of Congress. It is impossible at this writing to state what that report will be in detail; but this much can be said: All of the three Commissioners have stated since their return that they find the undertaking to be entirely feasible. It is also known that their investigations have already demonstrated that some of the important parts of the work,

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as proposed, have been found to be less difficult, and less expensive in execution, than the estimates of the Company's engineers.

As to the matter of cost, the Company's engineers have always held that a canal, with thirty feet of water, and locks large enough to pass the largest battleships, could be constructed for considerably less than $100,000,000.

The present Commissioners were called before the Nicaragua Canal Committee of the Senate this past summer, and gave what may be called an off-hand opinion as to the cost of the Canal. I say "off-hand," because their work was not completed, and of course their estimates could not take a form of accuracy.

Gen. Hains gave it as his opinion that the Canal could not cost more than $140,000,000, and might cost considerably less. Admiral Walker stated that, in his judgment, the cost would not exceed $125,000,000, while Prof. Haupt's estimate was $90,000,000.

The writer of this article, in many public addresses delivered on this question, has always stated that the Canal could be built for $100,000,000, on condition that the money was in hand or guaranteed by the Government, so that contracts could be let for the entire work at one time; and that, under those conditions, the work could be finished within five years. But, if the highest estimate of Gen. Hains should be found to be correct, the Canal would be the cheapest addition ever made to the transportation facilities of the commercial world.

(2) *Is it desirable? Will it greatly benefit American interests?* As already stated, it is believed that the American people are substantially a unit in desiring the speedy construction of the Nicaragua Canal. This desire is doubtless due to the fact that we have come to realize that the Canal will be of very great benefit to our commerce, both domestic and foreign. In modern commerce the time and cost of transporting products to the market are both matters of the first importance. The producer who can put his products into the market in less time and at a less cost for transportation than his competitor is sure of that market. To-day the Pacific States are farther from the markets of the world than any country with which they are brought into competition. The Pacific States produce chiefly raw material, such as agricultural products, lumber, and minerals. They ship annually a million tons of wheat to Europe, and there compete with Russia, Argentina, and India, all of which countries can put their wheat into Europe in less than one-fourth of the time required for the trip from San Francisco to Liverpool *via* the Horn; thereby coming into market first after the harvest, and saving largely

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in the cost of transportation, insurance, and interest upon capital invested. Were it not for the wonderful productiveness of our Pacific Coast wheat-fields, they would not be able to compete at all with the countries mentioned.

The lumber from the great forests of Oregon and Washington finds to-day an altogether insufficient market in Japan, Australia, and the West Coast of South America. The depletion of our white-pine forests in the Central West will within a few years leave a great market in the Eastern States for this lumber, provided the Canal is built, so that it may by that route be delivered at a cost of transportation which will leave a fair profit to the producer. Europe also would become a large consumer of this lumber, if it could be furnished at a reasonable price.

The distance from New York to San Francisco by Cape Horn is 15,660 miles. By the Nicaragua route it will be 4,907 miles,—a saving of 10,753 miles. The usual time for a sailing-vessel to make this voyage is one hundred and twenty days. A modern freight-steamer would make it in twenty days or less through the Canal. This fact alone would be a sufficient reason for the construction of the Canal, if no other benefit were to be derived from it, as the Canal would undoubtedly create between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States a great commerce which, unfortunately, does not exist to-day.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1870 gave to European commerce a great advantage over the United States in the trade of the Orient by lessening considerably the time and cost of transportation from European ports to ports in India, China, and Japan, while increasing at the same time the disadvantage of distance under which we labored before that canal was constructed, when the route for both European and American commerce was *via* Cape of Good Hope. For example, previous to the opening of the Suez Canal, the sailing distance from Liverpool to Shanghai was 13,650 miles, and from New York to Shanghai 14,340 miles,—a difference of 690 miles in favor of Liverpool. The building of the Suez Canal made the distance from Liverpool to Shanghai 10,330 miles, and from New York to Shanghai 12,360 miles, —thus saving 3,320 miles for Liverpool, and only 1,980 for New York. In other words, the advantage of Liverpool over New York was increased from 690 to 2,030 miles. Taking the average speed of a freight-steamer at 200 miles a day, this gives European ports an advantage over American ports, through the Suez Canal, of nearly seven days, plus the additional expense thereby resulting to the American merchant.

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This fact has been taken advantage of, especially by England, in increasing the number of her merchant-vessels engaged in the trade to the Orient, as is shown by the reports of the Suez Canal Company regarding the transit of vessels. The traffic through the Suez Canal has increased from 488 vessels in 1870 to 2,283 in 1888, and to 3,409 in 1896. And, while in 1888 the number of British vessels using the Canal was only 547, in 1896 it had increased to 2,162, out of a total of 3,409. Out of 3,352 vessels which passed through the Suez Canal in 1894, 5 only were American!

Whilst our exports were composed chiefly of food and other agricultural products, which found a foreign market only in Europe, we gave ourselves little concern about the disadvantage we were under in regard to the markets of the East; but, now that our manufacturing industries have increased until we have a large surplus, which, if marketed at all, must secure markets in foreign lands, we find ourselves the competitors of England, Germany, and France, and therefore must seek, not only to reëstablish the conditions which existed before the building of the Suez Canal, but find a shorter and cheaper route to the markets of the Orient if we expect to be able to compete with our European rivals. This can only be done by the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, which will bring all the ports of the Atlantic Coast of the United States much nearer than Liverpool to Japan and the eastern coast of China above Shanghai, to Port Arthur (the terminus of the Russian Siberian Railway), and to the islands of the Pacific.

For example, let us take Shanghai as the dividing-point of the trade-spheres of the Suez and Nicaragua canals. Our commerce labors to-day under a disadvantage of 2,030 miles to Shanghai, as compared with that of Liverpool, or nearly seven days of navigation by steam. By the Nicaragua route it would not only be placed on an equality to that point, but would have an advantage of 118 miles. Take the further example of the distance from Liverpool to Yokohama by the Suez Canal, 11,030 miles. By the Nicaragua Canal it will be 11,947 miles, whereas the distance from New York to Yokohama would be only 9,227,—a net advantage in favor of New York of 1,803 miles over Liverpool *via* Suez, and of 2,720 miles over Liverpool *via* Nicaragua.

This difference is sufficient to give us substantially control of the trade with Japan, provided we can give Japan the manufactured products she requires at a first cost not greater than that of England. Japan at the present time requires from abroad chiefly iron and steel products, steel rails, and railroad equipment and supplies. We are producing all

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those materials in competition with England; yet even under the disadvantages of distance above mentioned, we have taken substantially all the orders in Japan, and have even furnished steel rails to the Government of India, much to the disgust of English manufacturers.

In seeking a foreign market for our manufactures, it is evident that we shall chiefly find it in the Pacific. More than five hundred millions of people live in the countries bordering upon the Pacific Ocean, nearly all of which were closed against foreign trade fifty years ago. Our own Commander Perry opened Japan to our commerce. But a few years ago our Government received the first embassy sent out by Korea. Japan has already developed a great foreign trade, which is increasing enormously every year; the increase of one year alone,—1897 over 1896,—having been 28 per cent.

Undoubtedly the time has arrived when China, with its teeming millions, is to be fully opened to the commerce of the world. If we are to have our fair share, we must be prepared to step in and establish our trade in the country upon terms which will enable us to compete with the manufacturers of Europe.

The building of the Nicaragua Canal would also give us a great advantage in the trade of New Zealand. The distance from Liverpool by the Nicaragua Canal to Auckland would be 11,182 miles, whereas the distance from New York to Auckland would be only 8,462,—an advantage of 2,720 miles in favor of New York. This same advantage of 2,720 miles obtains for all points on the Pacific Coast in Mexico and Central and South America, from Acapulco to Valparaiso. The distance from New York to our new possession, Honolulu, would be reduced from 13,290 miles *via* the Straits of Magellan to 6,417 miles *via* Nicaragua,—a saving of 6,873 miles.

We have seen how the Pacific States are to be benefited by the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, and also the great advantages which would accrue to the ports of the Atlantic Coast in bringing them nearer to the East. If we turn to the Gulf States we shall find that they would be benefited to an equal extent.

New Orleans is 700 miles nearer to the Eastern terminus of the Canal than New York. The great staple of the South is cotton. Alabama, as well as Tennessee, has great coal-fields and deposits of iron ore. In both these States to-day pig-iron is produced more cheaply than anywhere else in the world. The opening of the Nicaragua Canal would give the South, with its coal, iron, and cotton, the freedom of entrance into the Pacific. But little coal, and that of an inferior

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quality, is found in the Pacific States and on the Pacific coast of South America.

Japan has built a large number of modern cotton-mills, and is building still more. She is now coming to the United States for raw cotton, which is shipped across the continent by rail, and then carried by steamer to Yokohama, where it competes with cotton from India. If the Canal were opened, cotton could be laid down in Yokohama at a much less cost for transportation than now, and would be able to compete successfully with Indian cotton. The developments now going on in Japan, and the enterprises which will undoubtedly be undertaken in the near future in China, will call for iron in all its forms. This can be furnished more cheaply from Alabama and Tennessee than from any other place in the world, provided we are able to furnish cheap transportation; and that can be done so successfully through the Nicaragua Canal as to defy competition from any source. Thus we see that from a commercial standpoint every portion of our country would be benefited by the construction of this work.

Will the Canal surely add to our means of defence? The desirability of the Canal as a means of defence appeals to the judgment of all of our people as well as to the minds of the trained soldier and naval officer. Gen. Tracy, when Secretary of the Navy, said, in one of his reports:

> "The Canal must be built, or two independent navies maintained, one in the Atlantic, the other in the Pacific; and the increased cost of building the navy and maintaining it would be very much greater than the cost of building the Canal."

But I do not care to go further into the discussion of the enterprise as a means of defence. Suffice it to say that professionals have already discussed it and pronounced it desirable.

(3) *Will the Canal pay?* It ought to be quite unnecessary to make any argument to answer this question in the affirmative. It stands to reason that the saving of from 3,000 to 10,000 miles of travel would be a sufficient inducement to shipping to divert it from its present channels to the Nicaragua Canal. We may, therefore, take for granted that wherever such a saving could be effected, the tonnage benefited by it would naturally become tributary to the Canal. We may safely count on the trade between Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy with the Pacific ports of the United States, which amounted in 1890 to $36,474,699; on that of the same countries with the west coast of Mexico, Central America, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, $117,765,237; on that of Great Britain with New Zealand, $53,429,965; on that

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of the Atlantic ports of the United States with Japan, Hong Kong, China, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, and the Hawaiian Islands, $55,726,594; on that of the United States with Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, $8,426,662; and, finally, on the trade of Brazil and Cuba with the Pacific ports of the United States, $1,102,871,—a grand total of $272,926,028. These figures are taken from the Report of the United States Commissioner of Commerce and Navigation for the year 1890.

Of this total $21,250,000 represents shipments of 780,000 tons of wheat from San Francisco to Europe; $27,290,410, shipments of 860,000 tons nitrates from Chile; $2,111,412, shipments of 75,000 tons of wheat from Chile; $350,000, shipments of 81,000 tons of nitrates and guano from Peru; and $7,745,000, shipments of 382,610 tons of coal oil from the United States to the various ports of the Pacific.

The sum of $214,179,206, the remainder of the traffic mentioned above, represents general traffic between the ports indicated. Taken at an average value of $62 per ton, it is equivalent to 3,454,503 tons. We thus have a total tonnage in 1890 of 5,633,113 tons, which would be directly tributary to the Canal so soon as completed. And if we strike off from the figures given above 1,000,000 tons, being the tonnage of the nitrates and wheat from Chile, which might prefer to go round the Horn instead of paying the tolls of the Canal, there would still be left 4,633,113 tons which could be counted upon for the tonnage of the Canal.

The tolls would probably be fixed at the rate prevailing at present in Suez, which is $1.80. This would give annual gross receipts of $8,339,603. Assuming the Canal to be built for $100,000,000 in cash, or in bonds guaranteed by the Government at 3 per cent, then the fixed charges would be : $3,000,000 for interest; $1,000,000 for maintenance; and a further allowance of $1,000,000 for sinking fund. This would leave, for distribution as dividend upon the stock, the sum of $3,339,603.

A careful study of the question of tonnage which would use a canal across the American isthmus was made by a commission, of which M. Levasseur, Member of the Institute of France, was chairman; and the report of that commission was fully discussed at the Paris Congress of 1879. The figures given at that time for the tonnage of the Panama Canal were 5,268,000; and the report of the Congress itself estimated at 5,250,000 tons the traffic which would exist upon its opening.

Statistics show the normal growth of commerce to be at the ratio of about 1 per cent per annum. This would give for the year 1904, the

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probable time of the opening of the Nicaragua Canal, an increase of 14 per cent over the figures for 1890, which, without compounding, would bring the tonnage of 4,633,000 tons, quoted above, to 5,281,748 in 1904. But it is not the object of the writer to dwell on the probabilities of the traffic for the Canal, otherwise mention would be made of an additional tonnage of 7,471,674 tons, representing $463,243,847 of trade from Europe to ports of the Pacific in 1890, other than that already referred to,—trade which might properly be called "within the zone of the Canal's attraction." No account has been taken of the probabilities of the development of commerce, though we have seen that from 1896 to 1897, the increase of the foreign commerce of Japan alone was 28 per cent; nor has any estimate been made of what we might term the coastwise trade which would doubtless be created between our Atlantic and Pacific ports by the building of the Canal.

Let me illustrate the probabilities of the development of the traffic of the Nicaragua Canal by citing the following few data from the reports of the Suez Canal:

Year.	No. of Ships.	Tonnage.	Gross Receipts.
1870	488	436,600	4,345,758 fcs.
1880	2,028	3,057,421	36,492,620 "
1891	4,206	8,699,020	83,421,504 "

For a number of years the dividends have been from 18 to 20 per cent. The shares of the Canal held by the British Government cost £4,000,000: they are worth to-day, at the market price, £19,000,000.

Every unprejudiced person capable of giving a judgment upon this question holds that within five years after the completion of the Nicaragua Canal its tonnage will be very much larger than that of the Suez Canal.

Looked at from every point of view, it is seen that the Canal is desired by every interest, and is in fact a necessity as a means of defence under the changed conditions which have come upon us in the past few months. If we are to take a leading part in the development of the Pacific we can do so only by holding the key to the Pacific, which is the Canal across the Isthmus. These views are not only held by a large majority of our own people, but are concurred in by the leading engineers and commercial men of Europe. The Hon. Archibald R. Colquhoun, the distinguished English engineer, a few years ago made a thorough examination of the Nicaragua Canal route; and in a work which he

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published upon the matter two years ago, entitled "The Key of the Pacific," he stated his views in regard to the Nicaragua Canal as follows:

"It will render greater service to the New World than the Suez Canal does to the Old. It will bring Japan, Northern China, Australasia, and part of Malaysia nearer to the Atlantic cities of the United States than they are now to England. . . . It will give an immense impulse to United States manufactures, especially cotton and iron, and will greatly stimulate the ship-building industry and the development of the naval power of the United States."

Concluding, he says:

"I believe that the Canal can be made, and that, long hindered by political difficulties alone, it will now be carried out under the auspices of the United States Government. The Canal is a necessity of the age; and were the cost double what I estimate it to be, the immense benefits certain to result would amply justify its execution. It will bind together the remote sections of that immense country, assimilate its diverse interests, go far toward solving many difficult problems, and make the United States still more united. Finally, I believe it will, taken in connection with the vast changes occurring in the Far East, bring about the most serious rivalry to the commercial supremacy of Great Britain which she has ever yet had to encounter."

A most important question before the American people at the present time is, Shall this canal be built by Americans, and be owned and controlled by them, or shall European capital be permitted to come in, and complete this great work, and control it for its advantage? The opportunity is now presented to us to complete the work which Columbus began, by creating a new route to the Orient, the results of which will be more far-reaching than Columbus and his supporters ever imagined, and will bring far greater wealth and prosperity to the United States than the boldest imagination dares prophesy.

WARNER MILLER.

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THE NEW PANAMA CANAL.

THE delays and risks experienced in bringing the "Oregon" eastward from the Pacific Coast, at the outbreak of the war with Spain, have drawn the attention of the whole country to the importance of an early construction of a ship-canal across the isthmus now obstructing free communication between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The route by Cape Horn is entirely too long to meet present demands, either commercial or military.

But, while *a* canal is so urgently demanded, it is equally true that it should be, in respect to facilities of transit, security of operation, and cost and time of construction, *the best canal possible.* The work will be a gigantic engineering feat; and no mistake in selecting the route should be made at the outset.

Unfortunately, the American public has been led to believe, by the collapse of the old sea-level project at Panama, that there is only one really practicable route for a canal; viz., that by Nicaragua. The elaborate investigations which have been in progress at Panama during the past eight years are little known or appreciated in America; having been conducted quietly (especially during the last four years) by the new company, with a view to determine the best and most economical solution of the problem before making public the information obtained.

The writer, being a member of the Comité Technique, invited to assist the new Panama Canal Company in directing its investigations and forming its conclusions, has had exceptional advantages for understanding the subject in its present aspects. The Comité is international in composition, and includes French, English, German, Russian, and American engineers—among them the chief engineers of the Manchester and Kiel maritime canals. It may be added that, in this respect, it reflects the view of the Company that the work should be broadly international in character, a benefit to the whole world, and not simply a French construction. Last spring the writer visited the Isthmus of Panama with other engineers, and personally examined the route in detail. He has had for many months free access to the elaborate records of surveys, borings, experimental excavations, river gaugings, and re-

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searches of every kind conducted by the Company, and is therefore qualified to present the subject in its true aspects, which may be found to differ widely from the popular impressions now existing in America.

When the idea of constructing a sea-level canal at Panama was definitely abandoned, there remained three important difficulties to consider: (1) The regulation of the water-supply, and control of the floods of the Chagres River; (2) the serious caving which had occurred at the Culebra; and (3) the ill effects of the climate upon the health of the employees. The present conclusions as to each will be given in turn.

(1) The studies of the region of the Chagres have been most elaborate; including water-levels, automatically recorded since 1883; frequent measurements of the discharge at crucial points; the collection and discussion of data respecting all the historic floods (five in number, of which one was carefully measured); rain records at points well distributed along the route of the Canal, aggregating fifteen years on the Atlantic Coast, thirteen years on the Pacific Coast, and thirty-two years in the interior; and, finally, a collation of all this material, and the elaboration of projects perfectly providing for controlling the floods, for the supply of the summit-level with water during the dry season (January, February, March, and April), and for ample hydraulic power at the dams, transmitted by electricity, for operating the locks and lighting the Canal at night. It may safely be affirmed that the Chagres River is no longer an element of danger, but is rather a useful friend whose assistance will be of great value to the Canal in its operation.

(2) The question of caving in the deep central cut has been studied in the most thorough manner; involving not only many borings and pits to determine the material to be encountered, but also a tunnel excavated throughout the troublesome region along the axis of the Canal, having a projected width at bottom of $32\frac{3}{4}$ feet, with slopes of about 45 degrees, and a projected elevation above sea-level varying from 128 feet to $157\frac{1}{2}$ feet. This work, together with a tunnel 689 feet long and $9\frac{3}{4}$ feet wide, pierced, at an elevation of $134\frac{1}{2}$ feet above sea-level, at the spot which had given the most trouble on the whole route, combined with the evidence afforded by the borings and pits at greater depth, leads to the conviction that, at Culebra, where the deepest cutting is required, the excavation has already passed through the strata subject to caving, and that the remainder traverses an indurated argillaceous schist changing to compact rock, where no fears of yielding to pressure need be entertained. At Emperador, where the cutting required for the Canal is much less, the indications are similar, except that the material at present reached is

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less resisting; but with proper precautions in the way of drainage, which were wholly neglected by the contractors of the old company, little or no difficulty from serious caving need be apprehended. This work of experimental excavation has been continued for more than three years; involving the removal of about 3,924,000 cubic yards. It was projected, partly to determine the proper inclination for the side slopes, and partly to estimate the unit cost. The results are highly satisfactory; and the old bugbear of a sliding mountain divide has been proved to be imaginary.

(3) The health of the *personnel* formerly caused trouble; coolies and other races not well suited to hard labor under a tropical sun being employed. With negroes from the British Antilles, little difficulty is now experienced. This matter was carefully investigated during the inspection last spring; American engineers and employees on the Canal and the Panama Railroad being questioned, the fine hospital near Panama—where the Company provides for its sick—being visited, and the views of the medical officers and of the Sisters of Charity, acting as nurses, being obtained. All agreed that the dangers resulting from the climate have been much exaggerated. The surgeon in charge of the hospital, Dr. Lacroisade, who has resided on the Isthmus since 1887, after presenting full statistics covering the sick-reports for the past year of a force of about 3,800 agents and laborers under employment, said:

"Among the diseases attributable to the climate the most numerous are simple marsh fevers, which have not occasioned a single death. Two diseases only belonging to the epidemic type have appeared—the beriberi, of which there is no longer any question [it was imported with negro laborers brought from Africa as an experiment, and disappeared when they were sent back], and yellow fever. The latter, after having been absent from the Isthmus for at least six years, was imported in 1897, and continued about six months, from March to August, when it again disappeared after very light ravages (only six deaths). Thus it cannot be considered that this pest is really epidemic on the Isthmus. From the other infectious epidemics, such as variola, typhoid fever, diphtheria, etc., the Isthmus appears to be almost entirely exempt. From the foregoing we may conclude that life on the Isthmus scarcely incurs more dangers than elsewhere, even for Europeans who, after the blacks of the British Antilles, appear to resist the climate best. Residence here would, then, offer nothing alarming, were it not for a constant feeling of fatigue and uneasiness due to a temperature always high, and an atmosphere saturated with moisture."

There appears, therefore, to be no danger of serious mortality in the construction of the Canal, if due care be taken to benefit by past experience in selecting the laborers.

The three old spectres barring the route being thus laid at rest, it remains to consider the present project for the Canal. This has been

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most carefully elaborated. No less than sixteen projects (not including the older proposals) have been worked out in detail, including estimates of cost and of the time needed for construction.

The entire length of the Canal is 46 miles, of which about 15 miles on the Atlantic side and 7½ miles on the Pacific side, or about one-half of the whole distance, will be at sea-level. Of this distance 18 miles, or about two-fifths of the entire route, is to-day essentially completed, so that at a moderate outlay for dredging it will be made at once serviceable. We have, therefore, only to consider the 23½ miles between Bohio, on the Atlantic side, and Miraflores, on that of the Pacific. Two excellent harbors, which will demand no outlay for protection, are available; and the Panama Railroad skirts the Canal throughout its entire route to be availed of in construction. Ample quarters, in fair condition, for the increased force of laborers are already prepared at many sites. These advantages are immense where time is of so much importance.

There is another advantage, in my judgment scarcely less valuable. By careful technical studies, the Company has succeeded in provisionally adjusting the project so that a choice between the best three different summit-levels may be reserved, to be decided by actual experience in conducting the work upon a grand scale. These projects are designated as "Level 96¾ feet," "Level 69 feet," and "Level 32¾ feet"; the figures indicating the elevation in feet of the bottom of the Canal at its highest level above mean tide, which is found at practically the same absolute level in both oceans, although the tidal range at Colon is only a few inches, while at Naos it may at times reach 20 feet. A comparison of the estimated cost of construction, properly so called, has established that, as between larger excavation, on the one hand, and more locks and higher dams, etc., on the other, there will be nearly a balance of expenditure. The cost of either of the plans is estimated at about $100,000,000. It is not the same, however, when the element of time is considered. This time will vary with the amount of excavation called for in the deep cutting at Culebra and Emperador, which will largely determine the duration of the work. The deeper this cut, the longer will be the time required to complete the Canal, and, consequently, the greater will be the outlay in general expenses of administration, interest on the funds to be raised, loss of revenue, etc. These are important elements of expense, sometimes neglected in estimates.

Basing the rate of probable excavation chiefly upon the experience acquired by the old company in operating on a large scale, checked by that of the new company in operating under many disadvantages upon

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a small scale, it has been computed that there will be required to complete the project of Level 96¾ feet about eight years, and longer proportionally for the other projects. But it must not be forgotten that the old company has been criticised, perhaps justly, for the mode adopted by its contractors in prosecuting the work; rapidity of execution not having been made an object to be specially sought. Also that great improvements have been introduced during the past ten years in machines and methods. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect that, with these improvements, and with better stipulations in the contracts, these estimates of time, at least for the higher levels, may be notably reduced, and excessive incidental expenses for interest, etc., be thus avoided. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to consider the rapidity attained in excavating the ship-canals of Manchester and Kiel, and especially the drainage-channel at Chicago, where such great advances were made.

It is a great merit so to have adjusted the projects as to be able to pass readily from one to the other, if experience in the progress of the work should show this to be desirable. But how is this advantage to be secured? Simply by so adjusting the different levels as to permit the change to be made by omitting upper locks—thus calling for ten, or eight, or six locks, in the three projects, respectively.

All three projects require a dam at Bohio; transforming the Chagres River into a vast lake, of which the boundaries have been accurately determined. It will extend a distance of 13 miles to Obispo, where the Canal leaves the River, and will cover an area of about 21¼ sq. miles. Its lowest level is fixed at 52½ feet, its normal level at 55¾ feet, and its highest level at 65½ feet above mean tide. It thus provides a reservoir to retain one hundred and ninety-six million cubic yards of flood-discharge, which, with one hundred and thirty million more held back at Alhajuela in the Upper Chagres, will effectively control the torrential stream. Two locks will admit ships coming from the Atlantic into this lake. Thence, to attain the summit-level at Elevation 96¾ feet, three locks will be required—all at Obispo; while for Elevation 69 feet two will suffice, and for Elevation 32¾ feet, one only, or perhaps none, will be necessary. The descent to the Pacific is made for the three projects, respectively, by two locks at Paraiso, two at Pedro Miguel, and one at Miraflores; or by one lock at Paraiso, two at Pedro Miguel, and one at Miraflores; or by two locks at Pedro Miguel, with a tidal lock at Miraflores.

All of these locks have a rock foundation; and none presents extraordinary difficulties. All are double; one chamber having a serviceable

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length of 738 feet and a width of 82 feet, and the other (for smaller vessels) the same length divided by a set of intermediate gates, and a width of 59 feet. The maximum lift is 29½ feet, except that provision for 32¾ feet is made at Bohio when, very rarely, and then only for a few hours, the lake may rise to maximum flood-level.

With respect to alignment of the Canal the following are the conditions adopted: The curves not to have a radius less than 8,200 feet, which experience has shown to be required for easy navigation; the depth to be 29½ feet, with provision at the locks for 31¼ feet should an increase ever become desirable; the cross-section never to fall below about three times the midship section of the vessels which will navigate the Canal; ample enlargements, at distances not exceeding 5½ miles, for ships to pass each other; bottom-widths of 164 feet in Lake Bohio and 98½ feet in the central part; retaining the existing width (72¼ feet) in the Atlantic level, to be enlarged to 98½ feet after the Canal is opened to navigation, 98½ feet in the Pacific level, and 164 feet in the channel extending through the bay from La Boca to Isle Naos where the Canal terminates.

Only two large dams are required,—the first at Bohio, creating a lake which, besides acting as a flood-regulator, will obviate the necessity of encountering strong currents where the route traverses the bed of the Chagres, a very important matter for ocean shipping; and the second at Alhajuela, in the Upper River, to assist in controlling the floods, to supply the summit-level in the dry season, and to furnish hydraulic power, transmitted by electricity for operating the Canal.

The dam at Bohio will be of earth revetted with stone, with a foundation bed of clay and abutting against rock banks. The extreme length of crest is 1,286 feet, the extreme height above the bed of the river is 75½ feet, and above the lowest point of the foundation 93½ feet. All details of construction, including the devices for controlling the River during the progress of the work, have been carefully elaborated, and will command the confidence of engineers. The sites for the two overflow weirs are remote from the dam; and an abundance of excellent material is found near at hand.

The dam at Alhajuela, about ten miles from the Canal, is to be of concrete masonry, founded on compact rock, and abutting against rock walls. The extreme length of crest is 936¾ feet; the extreme height above the bed of the river is 134½ feet, and above the lowest point of the foundation 164 feet. The cross-section and the practical details of construction are in accordance with all the requirements of modern

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engineering. Good rock and sand are abundant in the immediate vicinity.

To connect this reservoir with the summit-level, a feeder 10 miles long, starting at 190¼ feet above sea-level, is required. It traverses a rough country, and its construction will be relatively costly; but when compared with many of our irrigating canals west of the Mississippi it offers no serious difficulties.

The minor dams at Obispo, Paraiso, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores will vary in height according to the project adopted: the first, second, and fourth will be of concrete masonry, and that at Pedro Miguel of earth. None of them presents difficulties worthy of note.

The regulating weirs will be of the "Stoney" design, which has given entire satisfaction on the Manchester Ship-Canal; and all of them will be detached from the dams.

Such is a brief summary of the present condition of the studies for the Panama Canal. It remains to compare the project with that at Nicaragua. The details of the latter are so fully presented in the report of the Government Commission of 1895 and accompanying documents, and are so well known in America, that a recapitulation in detail is not required here. The new commission, of which Admiral Walker is president, has as yet made no formal report; but the individual views of the three members were given in so much detail at the hearing before the Senate Select Committee in June last, that the modifications likely to be recommended may be inferred. The essential features of the project are the following: The whole length of the route is 176½ miles. Of this distance about 67¾ miles lie in the bed of a crooked river through which must pass the outflow of Lake Nicaragua, draining some three thousand square miles, and about 57¼ miles in the Lake itself, calling for from 10 to 14 miles of dredging in soft mud. The summit-level is fixed at 110 feet above mean tide; and both of the Government commissions recognize the extreme difficulty of regulating this level so as to avoid, on the one hand, flooding a valuable district on the Pacific side of the Lake, and, on the other hand, exposing rocks in the bed of the Upper San Juan, where there are several bad rapids to be drowned or excavated before a ship-channel is possible.

The Nicaragua Canal Company advocates two principal dams, one at Ochoa on the San Juan, and the other at La Flor west of the Lake; but as the latter was regarded as impracticable by the Ludlow Commission, and apparently is not favored at the projected height by the Walker Commission, it will be left out of consideration. The Ochoa dam pre-

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sents serious difficulties; and although the present commission has succeeded in finding a rock bottom at great depth (Admiral Walker estimates it approximately at 40 or 45 feet, and Prof. Haupt at 60 feet, below sea-level, *i.e.*, at 80 to 85 feet and 100 feet respectively below the deepest part of the bed of the river), no definite plan has yet been presented for modifying the loose rock and clay dam heretofore regarded as necessary. This construction is without precedent in canal engineering; and Admiral Walker says of it: "Of course a dam of loose rock would have to be enormous in size: it would be like moving a hill into the river."

But the alternative of digging from 80 to 100 feet to reach foundations in the bed of a river which cannot be temporarily diverted, and then of raising a masonry mass to a height of 150 or 170 feet above this newly discovered rock bed, is not an easy or a safe undertaking. Moreover, to hold the summit-level at 110 feet, enormous embankments are required in the San Francisco basin. They are sixty-seven in number and six miles in length; and some of them will rise from 60 to 85 feet above soft mud, which must be excavated to a depth of 30 feet to reach a clay foundation. The chief engineer of the Company regards these embankments as "the weakest feature of the whole route"; and they appear to have impressed the present commission, as they did that of which Gen. Ludlow was president, most unfavorably. Indeed, new surveys have been ordered to attempt to radically change the existing project, with a view to reducing the height of the dam at Ochoa and of the huge embankments, at the expense of making an equally deep cut in the Eastern divide and of raising a second dam at Machuca Rapids, either retaining the site at Ochoa, or replacing the dam there by one at Tambour Grande below. Of this prospective change Admiral Walker says:

"We have had some parties out to find how far we would have to run embankments, and it is quite possible they may be as bad as the San Francisco embankments. . . . I think the chances are, by putting a dam at Machuca and a dam below at Ochoa, or Tambour Grande, and taking a low-level route, we may escape this heavy work and get into Greytown with considerable less expenditure of money, and with a canal that would not, perhaps, keep its superintendent awake at nights so much."

Evidently the plans of the Nicaragua Canal cannot be regarded as definitely determined. But it is not only in the construction of the Canal proper that serious difficulties are to be encountered. When the writer traversed the transit route in 1856, the harbor at Greytown was open to the largest steamers, and presented no difficulty. To-day, owing to the travel of sand along the coast, under the influence of the winds and waves, the port no longer exists for seagoing vessels. The jetty con-

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structed during 1890–93 by the Canal Company has proved a total failure, and the problem is now presented, not in the simple form of making a new port, but of reopening an old one which nature has decided to close. American engineers have had experience in the difficulty and cost of such constructions at Fernandina, at the mouth of St. John's River, at Brazos, and at many other points; and before undertaking a canal it would seem to be prudent to reopen the port and determine the first cost and the probable annual outlay for maintenance. A canal, access to which would be subjected to occasional interruptions from natural forces now known to be in action, would be a serious mistake; and it may be added that a study of the six charts accompanying the report of the Ludlow Commission, showing the condition of this port at five different dates between 1832 and 1895, is not reassuring.

As to the important element of the cost of the Canal, there appears to be considerable difference of opinion. The chief engineer of the Company estimated it, in 1895, at $69,893,660, and the Ludlow Commission, at the same date, at $133,472,893. Engineers will recognize the impossibility of exact figures in the present state of the investigations now in progress under the Walker Commission; and each of the members has carefully guarded himself from expressing a definite opinion. Admiral Walker, at his recent examination before the Senate committee, said:

"We have made no figures. It is no use to figure on the thing until we have all our data. But I do not see why that canal cannot be built. I should think myself, speaking as anybody in the street might speak, that the Canal could be put through for 125 millions; and it would not surprise me if it came considerably below that."

Prof. Haupt, on the same occasion, stated that he thought the Canal could be built "inside of $90,000,000."

Gen. Hains said:

"I think a canal of the dimensions that have generally been referred to—30 feet deep, with locks 650 feet long, and all the cross-sections that have been referred to as necessary in rock and earth—could be constructed for a maximum sum of about $140,000,000, with a possible reduction of $25,000,000 or $30,000,000. . . . But the trouble is that just now I am not prepared to give an opinion that would be worth anything."

Evidently in view of previous experience in such works showing that the actual cost has usually very largely exceeded even carefully prepared estimates, it would be premature to form an opinion as to the outlay that will be required for the Nicaragua Canal; but a general idea of that

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demanded by the two routes may be formed from the following comparison:

Panama.	*Nicaragua.*
Two good harbors now existing.	Two harbors to be created; one of them (Greytown) presenting unusual natural difficulties.
A good railroad now existing along the entire route.	A long and difficult railroad to be constructed, which Gen. Hains considers should extend along all the route, except the lake portion, *i.e.*, for a distance of 120 miles.
Actual construction, now well advanced, (about two-fifths entire length actually completed) and remaining difficulties accurately known.	Practically nothing done in way of construction, and many of the essential elements undecided.
No constructions projected which are not justified by recognized engineering practice.	One or two dams projected wholly without precedent in canal work; and many embankments which must be permanent elements of danger.
Except the works at Bohio, no difficult excavations or constructions to be made where the annual rainfall exceeds 93 inches (only about 50 per cent more than on our Gulf Coast).	The most difficult works lie in a region where the observations of the Canal Company indicate the annual rainfall to be nearly 22 feet (256 inches), or nearly three times as much as at the Panama sites.
Route lies wholly in Colombia, where all interests will be benefited by the Canal.	Route lies on the border of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where local jealousy already exists, which may prejudice the interests of the Canal.
Distance to be lighted and supervised when the Canal is completed, 46 miles.	Distance to be lighted and supervised when the Canal is completed, 176 miles, or nearly four times as great as the Panama.
No active volcanoes within about 200 miles of the route of the Canal, and earthquakes therefore less probable.	Active volcanoes near route; one, Omotepe, on an island in Lake Nicaragua, and another, Onose, only about 40 miles from the locks. An earthquake on April 29, 1898, at Léon, destroyed several buildings.
Cost carefully estimated on detailed plans at about one hundred million dollars.	Cost estimated by the Government Commission, on data recognized as wholly insufficient, at about one hundred and thirty-three million dollars.
Concessions from Colombia (upon which whole undertaking is based) ample, satisfactory, and unquestioned.	Concessions from Nicaragua and Costa Rica (upon which whole undertaking is based) either expired, or expire next year, and officially declared by Nicaragua to be forfeited and void.

But let us assume that both canals are constructed and open to

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navigation, and then compare the two routes, by considering which of them would undoubtedly be selected by vessels seeking to cross the Isthmus. This is a crucial test which will reveal their relative merits:—

Panama.	*Nicaragua.*
Ports both known to be good and easy of access.	Both ports artificial, to which access may be doubtful, especially on Atlantic side.
Length of route 46 miles, and time of transit 14 hours.	Length of route 176 miles, and time of transit not less than 44 hours.
Summit-level probably 103 feet and perhaps only 66 feet.	Summit-level 110 feet.
Locks double from the opening of the Canal, one chamber 738 by 82 feet, and the other 738 by 59 feet, with intermediate gates.	Locks single (subsequently to have another chamber added); dimensions 350 by 80 feet.
Curvature gentle. Smallest radius 8,200 feet. Of the 46 miles, 26¾ are straight, and 15 have radii equal to or exceeding 9,850 feet.	Curvature too sharp. Smallest radius in Canal proper 4,000 feet. For 68 miles the route traverses the San Juan River, where, to gain 47¼ miles as a bird flies, it is necessary to travel 67⅜ miles—a loss of 43 per cent.
No troublesome winds or river currents to be encountered even in times of flood.	Heavy trade-winds and strong river currents.

It would seem from this analysis that there can be little difference of opinion as to which is the better route. But perhaps some enthusiastic advocate will say, "The Nicaragua Canal may be the more costly, may present more natural difficulties, may require more time for construction, and may be less easy of transit; but let us have an American canal, made with our own money, and wholly under our own control."

Such considerations are outside the province of an engineer. But, perhaps, it may be suggested that we have already interests and responsibilities on the Isthmus, where the Panama Railroad was built and is now controlled by an American company, under American protection; that the business control of any canal must vest in its stock- and bond-holders, in time of peace, while, in fact, in time of war—unless its neutrality be guaranteed by the great maritime Powers—the transit will be controlled by the belligerent having command of the sea.

May it not, then, be wiser for our Government to extend its powerful assistance to what Nature has determined as the best route, rather than to expend more time and more money for what, after all is said, must remain a distinctly inferior canal, unable to compete with its rival for the commerce of the world?

HENRY L. ABBOT.

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DOES COLLEGE EDUCATION PAY?

In "The Cosmopolitan" for May, 1897, President D. C. Gilman, in an article on modern education, uses these startling words:

> "Notwithstanding the long experience of the human race, it is surprising to see how many people despise the college-bred man, how few college graduates are to be found in the halls of legislation. . . ."

In a subsequent issue of the same magazine, Mr. Grant Allen attacks modern college education after this fashion:

> "In my opinion, a father who has sons and daughters of the proper age to go to college will do better by his children, and not less economically for himself, if he sends them for two years to travel in Europe than if he sends them for three years to an American or English university."

Words like these, uttered by educated men, must necessarily do higher education much harm. If people despise the college-bred man, young men will naturally hesitate to enroll themselves in this odious class. If a two-year trip through Europe is better than anything the colleges and universities can offer, young people will surely not be hasty to give up such charming opportunities for the toil and worry that one must undergo in college. If it is surprising how few college graduates are to be found in the halls of legislation, young men ambitious to serve their country may well hesitate before they make the investment of energy and time and money necessary to complete the course of any respectable college. They may well ask themselves the question, "Does college education pay?" This question it is my purpose to answer in the following pages. I propose to bring higher education down to the lowest level, and let Commercialism measure it by her own standards. The "Does it pay?" measuring-line shall be applied; and by it shall the character of the training furnished by the college and the university be determined.

There are two standpoints from which this question may be regarded; viz., that of the individual, and that of the aggregation of individuals—the community, the State. In this paper I shall confine my attention to an examination of the question from the standpoint of the individual. Let us, then, look about us and see if the positions of

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honor and trust are held by college graduates, and then ascertain to what extent in our history this has been true.

"Appleton's Cyclopædia of American Biography" contains, in round figures, fifteen thousand names. Of that number a few over five thousand are the names of college graduates, and ten thousand approximately are the names of those who are not college graduates. It is extremely difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy the number of college graduates who have lived in our country since the beginning of our history. Suppose we adopt the usual estimate of one hundred and fifty thousand. Five thousand of these have done such work as to deserve recognition; that is, one man in every thirty sent out by the colleges and universities has reached some distinction. This proportion seems pitifully small; and our case seems already lost. But let us put over against these college graduates those who are not graduates.

As the male population of the United States grows up and passes through the age of college education, a little more than 1 per cent actually graduates from colleges and universities,—for ease in calculation, let us call it 1 per cent. Then, if we count the graduates in our country since the beginning of our history at one hundred and fifty thousand, the non-graduate males of graduate age number fifteen millions. Of this vast multitude only ten thousand have done such work as merits recognition in an encyclopædia of biography. Only one in every fifteen hundred of the non-graduates has attained distinction; while one in every thirty of the college graduates has been equally fortunate. That is to say, the boy who takes time to prepare himself for his work by submitting himself to the discipline furnished by the college or university increases his chances of success fifty-fold.

Leaving this general treatment, and coming down to particulars, let us inquire into the relative success gained by the 1 per cent of graduates and the 99 per cent of non-graduates, and into the influence of each class upon our national life. If people despise the college-bred man, we should expect to find less than 1 per cent of college graduates in positions of responsibility in our national affairs. Beginning our investigation with an examination of the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Congresses we find, according to the "Official Congressional Directory," that thirty-two, or 36.36 per cent, of the eighty-eight members of the Senate of the Fifty-fourth Congress were college graduates. From the "Directory," supplemented by some correspondence, it has been ascertained that of the three hundred and fifty-seven members of the House of Representatives, one hundred and twenty-eight, or nearly 36 per cent, were college graduates.

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There are exactly the same number of graduates in the Senate of the Fifty-fifth Congress as there were in the Fifty-fourth; and the same thing is true of the House of Representatives. Let us be sure that we understand the significance of these figures. Since the college graduates in our male population of graduate age constitute about 1 per cent of that class, that is, since only one man in a hundred is a graduate, we ought not to find more than one Senator and not more than four Representatives in either the Fifty-fourth or the Fifty-fifth Congress who are college graduates. But we actually find an average of thirty-two Senators and of one hundred and twenty-eight Representatives—just thirty-two times as many as we should expect to find. Are not these astounding figures, in view of the fact that so many "people despise the college-bred man"? Shall we not rather change President Gilman's words to read thus: "It is surprising how many college graduates are to be found in our halls of legislation"?

An examination into the percentage of college graduates among all the Speakers of the House discloses one very important fact. Of the thirty-two Speakers of the House, fifteen, or 46.8 per cent, have been college graduates. The number of graduates in the House of Representatives during the entire period of our national life will probably not exceed 34 per cent of the whole number of Members. Thus the preeminence of graduates is shown in quite a striking way. While they constitute but 34 per cent of the Members of the House, they have furnished over 46 per cent of the Speakers. The percentage of the graduates among the Speakers is slowly increasing. From 1789 to 1841, a period of fifty-two years, the percentage of graduates was 35.6; from 1841 to 1898, a period of fifty-seven years, the percentage is 55.

Let us continue our inquiry into the influence of college graduates on our national affairs, by taking a survey of the entire period of our national life, beginning with the Colonial period, and coming down to the present time.

In the spring of 1776 the most famous Congress in our history met at Philadelphia—the Congress that passed the Declaration of Independence. John Hancock, the President of the Congress, was a graduate of Harvard. A Committee of five was appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence. The members of the Committee were Thomas Jefferson, a graduate of William and Mary, John Adams, a graduate of Harvard, Robert R. Livingston, a graduate of King's College (now Columbia College), Benjamin Franklin and Roger Sherman, both non-graduates. Three of these men—60 per cent of the Committee—were college grad-

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uates. This Committee chose two of its own members to prepare the document to be submitted to Congress. And whom did they choose? Jefferson and Adams—both graduates. Fifty-six men signed that famous instrument. Of these, twenty, or 35.7 per cent, were college graduates.

A college graduate wrote the Declaration of Independence; and another college graduate was its ablest defender. Mr. Jefferson himself said: "John Adams was the pillar of its support on the floor of Congress —its ablest advocate and defender against the multifarious assaults it encountered." And when the War for Independence was over, who were chosen for the important task of dictating terms of peace with England? John Jay, a graduate of King's College, John Adams, a graduate of Harvard, and Benjamin Franklin.

The next important step in our political development was the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in place of the Articles of Confederation, under which the national government had been administered. It will be well worth our while to see what part the college graduate played in bringing about this very important change.

Among the men who detected the weakness of the Articles of Confederation, and the necessity of a radical change in the form of government, the most active and influential were James Madison, a graduate of Princeton, Alexander Hamilton,[1] a graduate of Columbia, and James Monroe, a student of William and Mary. In 1786 Mr. Madison put through the Virginia Assembly a resolution which resulted in the Constitutional Convention. This resolution called for a meeting at Annapolis in September, 1786, of commissioners from all the States, to obtain a uniform commercial system. On account of the small number of States represented at this meeting, the discussion of commercial matters was abandoned; and Hamilton, who represented New York as a member of a committee appointed for that purpose, wrote an address to the States. This address proposed that the States appoint commissioners to meet at Philadelphia in the following May, for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. In this way the matter was brought directly to the attention of Congress, which body so far approved the plan as to call for a convention of delegates from the several States at the time and place mentioned in Hamilton's address. When this convention assembled, who were the leaders? Who were the men that

[1] Hamilton entered King's College in the class of 1774. On April 6, 1776, the college buildings were taken for military purposes, the students were dispersed, and the exercises of the College suspended. It was not until the close of the war that the College resumed its functions. In 1774 the name was changed to Columbia College; and in 1788 it conferred upon Hamilton the degree of Master of Arts.

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shaped the thought of this assembly, and determined the character of our Constitution? Four plans were submitted for consideration: the Virginia Plan, the South Carolina Plan, the New Jersey Plan, and that proposed by Hamilton. Out of these plans was formed the Constitution of the United States. By whom were they prepared? Hamilton's plan was of course his own work. The Virginia Plan was the work of James Madison, and formed so considerable a part of the groundwork of the Constitution, as finally adopted, that he has been called "the Father of the Constitution." The South Carolina Plan was presented by Charles Pinckney, and the New Jersey Plan by William Paterson, a graduate of Princeton.

This convention was a notable gathering. It consisted of fifty-four men, representing twelve States. Of these, twenty-three, or 42.5 per cent, were college graduates; and exactly one-half of the entire number was made up of college-bred men.

When the Constitution had been adopted by the Convention, and submitted to the various States for ratification, there were three college graduates who, through the medium of the press, explained the provisions of that instrument, and urged the States to adopt it. These men were Madison, Jay, and Hamilton.

Let us sum up the influence of the college graduate thus far on our political development. We have discovered that the author of the Declaration of Independence was a college graduate; that its ablest defender was a college graduate; that of the fifty-six men who signed it twenty were college graduates; that two of the three men who led to the assembling of the Constitutional Convention were also college graduates; that the authors of three of the four plans submitted to the Convention were college graduates; and that the man who won the name "Father of the Constitution" was also a graduate. Twenty-three of the fifty-four men composing the Convention were graduates; and the three men who contributed most toward its adoption by the States were also college graduates.

I may remark here that, if higher education had done nothing for the United States beyond furnishing these men, who rendered such distinguished service, this country would still be its debtor; but we shall see, as we proceed, that these men form but a small fraction of that large number of college graduates who have served the United States with fidelity and honor.

I shall now trace further the influence of the college graduate upon our national life by showing the proportion of college graduates among

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our Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Cabinet Officers, and Justices of the Supreme Court from the beginning of our history.

Presidents.

There have been twenty Presidents who were chosen by the people, and four who reached the Presidency through the death of the President. Of the twenty elected, eleven, or exactly 55 per cent, were college graduates. Of the twenty-four men who have sat in the President's Chair, thirteen, more than 54 per cent, were college graduates; viz., John Adams (Harvard); Thomas Jefferson (William and Mary); Madison (Princeton); John Quincy Adams (Harvard); Tyler (William and Mary); Polk (University of North Carolina); Pierce (Bowdoin); Buchanan (Dickinson); Grant (West Point); Hayes (Kenyon); Garfield (Williams); Arthur (Union); and Benjamin Harrison (Miami).

Let us be sure that we understand the meaning of these figures. If there is nothing of good or of harm in a college education, it might reasonably be expected that the 99 per cent of non-graduates in our population would furnish all the Presidents, and that it would be the merest chance if a graduate from the remaining 1 per cent were chosen. The chances against him are ninety-nine: there is but a single chance in his favor. But what has happened? Out of a total of twenty men eleven are college graduates. In short, college education has wrought almost a miracle, and has increased its possessor's chances of becoming President from one to fifty-five.

Vice-Presidents.

There have been twenty-four Vice-Presidents. Of these, thirteen, or 54.16 per cent, were college graduates. It thus appears that the 1 per cent of graduates in our population has furnished 54.16 per cent of our Vice-Presidents; while the 99 per cent of non-graduates has furnished only 45.84 per cent.

It is interesting to note the percentage of graduates among the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the great political parties. The first convention to frame a platform and to nominate candidates was held at Philadelphia in 1800. From that time down to the present, forty-four men have been nominated for the Presidency by the leading political parties. In this number the candidates of the Prohibition, Labor, Greenback, and other parties springing up since 1872, are not counted. Of the forty-four candidates for the Presidency, twenty-five, or 56.8 per cent, were college graduates; and of the fifty-one

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candidates for the Vice-Presidency, twenty-seven, or 52.9 per cent, were college graduates. There have been but two campaigns when the American citizen could not have cast his ballot for a college-bred man for President. The first was the campaign of 1832, when Andrew Jackson was the candidate of the Democrats, and Henry Clay of the Whigs; and the second was that of 1848, when Zachary Taylor was the candidate of the Whigs, Lewis Cass of the Democrats, and Martin Van Buren of the Free-Soil Party.

Secretaries of State.

There have been thirty-five Secretaries of State since the beginning of our national history. Twenty-two, or 62.85 per cent, were college graduates; and they form a distinguished body of men. Call over the names of those men who in this office have performed the most distinguished service: Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Buchanan, Seward, Fish, Blaine, Olney. This is not my list, but that of a man whose business is history, a distinguished university professor. In this list of twelve names there are but two of non-graduates—Monroe and Clay. Thus it appears that, while the non-graduates formed 37.14 per cent of the whole number, those who have rendered distinguished service in this office formed but 5.7 per cent. The distinguished graduates, however, formed 28.57 per cent of the whole number. It may be said that six graduates have achieved distinction as Secretaries of State where one non-graduate has done so.

Secretaries of the Treasury.

Of the forty men who have held this office, twenty, or 50 per cent, were college graduates. It is a noteworthy fact that during the formative period of our government, from 1789 to 1814, a period of twenty-five years, the Treasury was in the hands of college graduates alone, and that at every subsequent critical period down to 1889 a college graduate held this office. In 1861, when the finances of the nation were in chaos, and the hand of a master was needed to keep them from ruin, who was asked to serve as Secretary of the Treasury? Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, a graduate of Dartmouth. When he resigned, who was called by the unanimous appeal of the nation to succeed him? William P. Fessenden, of Maine, a graduate of Bowdoin.

I asked an able student of finance to name the great financiers among the Secretaries of the Treasury. He placed Hamilton and Gallatin at the head of the list; and in the second class he included Chase,

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Dallas, and Fessenden. All of these were college-bred men; and four of the five were graduates.

Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Navy.

Twenty-five, or 50 per cent, of the men who have held the office of Secretary of War, and eighteen, or 50 per cent, of the Secretaries of the Navy were college graduates. Beginning in 1844 with John Y. Mason, we have, down to 1889, with the exception of Isaac Toucey (1857), and of R. W. Thompson (1877), an unbroken series of college-trained men. During this period of forty-five years all of the Secretaries of the Navy except four were college graduates; and two of those four were college-bred men. These offices afford in time of peace no special opportunities for attaining distinction; hence the lists of Secretaries of War and of Secretaries of the Navy do not show many eminent names.

Secretaries of the Interior.

This office was not established until 1849; hence the number of men who have held it is comparatively small. There have been in all twenty-one Secretaries of the Interior, of which number eleven, or 52.3 per cent, were college graduates.

Postmasters-General.

The Postmaster-General was not made a Cabinet officer until 1829; but in the following estimate all the men who have ever held the office are included. There have been thirty-eight of these, of which number twenty, or 52.6 per cent, were college graduates. It is singular, unless a college training fits a man for business, that so many college graduates have been called to fill this position, which requires high business ability.

Attorneys-General.

Of the forty-five Attorneys-General, thirty, or 66.66 per cent, were college graduates, and 80 per cent college-bred men. It is a striking and impressive fact that the percentage of graduates among the men who have held this office is higher than among the other members of the Cabinet. The next highest percentage is found among the Secretaries of State, 62.8; while the graduates among all the Cabinet Officers, exclusive of the Attorneys-General, form but 52.9 per cent of the whole number. Probably no one will deny that of all the Cabinet positions those of Secretary of State and Attorney-General are the most difficult to fill. It is, therefore, a strong evidence of the superiority of the

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graduates over the non-graduates to find that the former so far outnumber the latter in these important positions.

Nor have the non-graduates among the Attorneys-General distinguished themselves as lawyers and statesmen of the first rank to so great a degree as the graduates. I requested an accomplished jurist to mark the names of those Attorneys-General who had achieved special distinction. In his opinion, during this century but seven non-graduates deserved to be mentioned; and four of these were college-bred men. During the last thirty-five years there have been but six Attorneys-General deserving special mention,—just one-third of the number holding that office during that period;—and among them there was not a single non-graduate. In his list of the ten Attorneys-General who should be placed at the head of the list, on account of their eminence, are seven graduates and three non-graduates; and the term of service of but one of the non-graduates falls within the last fifty years.

Justices of the Supreme Court.

The superiority of the college graduate comes out most clearly in the appointments of Justices of the Supreme Court. There have been fifty-eight of these; and of that number, forty, or nearly 69 per cent of the whole number, were graduates. There have been seven Chief Justices, of whom six, or 85.7 per cent, were graduates. Of the eighteen Associate Justices who were not graduates fourteen were appointed prior to 1836. From 1837 down to 1893 the only non-graduate appointed to the Supreme Bench was Noah H. Swayne, of Ohio, appointed in 1861. Thus, for a period of fifty-six years, only one man who was not a college graduate was appointed to this high office; and he was a well-educated man. In 1893 Mr. Cleveland broke the precedent established by his predecessors.

I asked an ex-judge of the Supreme Court, a lawyer of much ability, to name the most distinguished men among the Associate Justices. He gave me six names; and among them was not the name of a single non-graduate.

A logical deduction from the facts I have stated is, that the influence of the graduate on our national affairs is on the increase. From 1789 to 1841, a period of fifty-two years, the college graduates among the Justices of the Supreme Court were just 50 per cent of the whole: from 1841 to 1898, a period of fifty-seven years, the graduates form nearly 87 per cent of the whole number.

A similar interesting increase in the number of graduates may be

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noted in the case of the Presidents, Attorneys-General, and Secretaries of State. During the first period—fifty-two years—the Presidents who were graduates were but 50 per cent of the whole number; while during the second period—fifty-seven years—they form nearly 60 per cent of all persons chosen to the Presidency, and 56.2 per cent of all the men who have held that office. During the first period the percentage of graduates among the Attorneys-General was 62; and during the second period it is nearly 70. In the first period the percentage of graduates among the Secretaries of State was only 53. In the second period it was 68. It can also be shown that the percentage of college graduates in the House of Representatives is slowly increasing. Thirty years ago they formed 32 per cent of the whole: now they form about 36 per cent.

In the Senate there has been a decrease from 46 per cent in 1867 to 36.3 per cent in 1897. Are there not persons who think that there has been a corresponding decrease in the efficiency of the Senate?

The facts set forth in this paper may be thus summarized:

1. The 1 per cent of college graduates in our male population of graduate age is furnishing 36 per cent of the Members of Congress, and has supplied 55 per cent of the Presidents, 54.16 per cent of the Vice-Presidents, nearly 55 per cent of all the Cabinet Officers, nearly 69 per cent of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and 85.7 per cent of the Chief Justices.

2. The proportion of graduates increases in direct ratio to the importance of the office, if we consider elective and appointive offices separately. In the latter class the order of the officers, arranged according to percentage of graduates, is as follows: Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, Justices, Attorneys-General, Secretaries of State, and other Cabinet Officers where the margin of difference is quite small.

3. More college graduates than formerly are being chosen to the Presidency, to the House of Representatives, to the most important positions in the Cabinet, and to the Supreme Bench.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI. JOHN CARLETON JONES.

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THE CHANGE IN ENGLISH SENTIMENT TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

THE attitude of Englishmen toward the United States is often misunderstood. Americans, who themselves think a very great deal of European opinion, find the indifference of their kinsfolk to the sentiments entertained toward them on the other side of the Atlantic strangely irritating. The fact is, that Englishmen, as a rule, regard all foreigners, including even Americans, not so much with hostility as with a kind of good-humored tolerance. They feel for them neither affection nor hatred. There is none of that fierceness of national animosity which, for instance, animates the French against the Germans, the Hungarians against the Russians, or the Slav races against the Turks. The English do not pay any people the compliment of cherishing toward them a genuine fervor of dislike. Even the Russians, our rivals in war and politics, are not unpopular; nor are the French, though we have been fighting with them, on and off, for the greater part of five centuries.

But if the Briton is slow to hate, he is not quick to love. To him foreign peoples are of no great interest, one way or the other, except so far as they affect his business, or are likely to come into political relations with him. That kind of intense, personal feeling with which the people of some countries regard those of others is almost outside his consciousness. He can hardly realize its existence, and is always greatly surprised when he is reminded that he—I mean, of course, when he is taken as the representative of a nation, not as an individual—is widely and heartily detested abroad. He does not in the least understand why it is so, and, to do him justice, seldom gives himself the trouble to entertain any such uncomfortably violent sentiments himself.

This temper of mind might be less easy for Englishmen to maintain, if it were not the case that they have largely forgotten their own history. There is no country in the world that has a more legitimate right than Great Britain to be proud of its past. Its annals are perhaps less romantic and picturesque than those of some other nations: but they are sufficiently rich in great names and stirring events to be dwelt upon with affection by the men of the present generation; and no other

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European people has a history which exhibits so orderly and harmonious a process of continuous development. Nor are the elements of military and naval success and brilliant achievement, in war and conquest and the government of distant countries, wanting. In point of fact, they are present to an extraordinarily large extent in the chronicles of Britain. Nevertheless, I do not think I exaggerate the truth when I say that Englishmen, as a rule, are less conscious of their past than the inhabitants of most other countries.

There has been in recent years a determined effort, by a small and able body of writers, to revive English interest in our splendid and unparalleled naval history; and we are at last beginning to acquire a certain familiarity with a few great admirals besides Nelson, and with a few maritime campaigns other than those of Trafalgar and the Nile. But it is significant that the first impulse to this revival came to us from outside, and has been due to Capt. Mahan more than to any other single writer. Even as it is, the knowledge of the average educated Englishman on these matters remains astonishingly slight and fragmentary; and as for the people, they know nothing about the matter at all. In any case, history, to the Englishman, is a mere subject for literary or antiquarian curiosity. It has no living interest for him, and inspires him with none of that passionate attachment, and that frenzy of gratitude or revenge, which the subject sometimes arouses in the minds of men of other countries. Compare, for instance, the feelings of the French and the English toward the events of the early part of the present century. The mention of the name of Napoleon still awakens fierce antagonism or jealous pride in the Gallic bosom: a Frenchman cannot think of Waterloo, of Leipsic, of Austerlitz, with the tranquillity with which he surveys the history of the Greeks and Romans or that of the Goths and Vandals. It is not only that the memory of the great conflict is fresh in his mind; but the effects of it are almost before his eyes. He knows that to be a Napoleonist or an Anti-Napoleonist may possibly within his own lifetime become a question for which Frenchmen may be called upon to fight or die; and he feels that his daily interests are constantly affected by the results of those heated years of war, conquest, and revolution.

It is the same with Germans. When they think of the history of a quarter of a century ago, it cannot be with the calmness of the study. There are men moving among them who still bear upon their bodies the scars made by Chassepot bullets: there are others whose grandfathers and grandmothers have told them stories of the evil times when French cuirassiers and dragoons were raiding among the fields of Westphalia,

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and French conscripts were quartered upon the villages of the Rhine. Or, if the Englishman comes nearer home for a country where the past stretches its hands down to the present, he has only to turn to Ireland. In that unsatisfied land history is a very real thing. I recollect once casually making some reference to Oliver Cromwell, when in company with an Irish friend, a man of education and culture, and, as I imagnied, of wide and tolerant sympathies. The mere allusion to the great Protector turned him pale with anger. "Cromwell!" he said; "the man was a scoundrel: he hanged two ancestors of mine." I dare say Cromwell was responsible for the death of the ancestors of a reasonable number of living Englishmen also; but nobody on the eastern side of the Irish Sea bears him a personal grudge on that account. This is not merely because Englishmen are less faithful than Irishmen to the memory of their forefathers, but because there has been nothing to keep the old sore open in their minds. "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?" What does Cromwell, or what do all the dusty theological and politicai quarrels of the seventeenth century, matter to a Londoner of A.D. 1898? It is otherwise beyond St. George's Channel. Cromwell, no doubt, lived a long time ago; but the Cromwellian spirit and influence, the old feud between down-trodden Papist and persecuting Puritan, between the Saxon garrison and the Celtic native, have been carried down to our own day. History acquires a real and living interest when the foes and friends, the quarrels and questions, of which you read in the historian's pages seem to be telling directly and visibly upon your own daily lives and, it may be, your own pockets.

In most countries, indeed, the trials and vicissitudes which they have experienced during the past two or three generations have linked them, by the ties of suffering and wrong, to their past, and have kept burning the animosities and the ideals of former days. There is scarcely a European state outside the British Isles which has not, within comparatively recent years, had its own territory invaded by the foreigner, and which has not had to incur the terrific sacrifices involved in modern warfare. When a man has seen the alien invader lying before him on the grass, rifle in hand, thoroughly determined to send a bullet into his heart if he can, that alien obviously becomes for the future a person of considerably more than merely academic interest. Great Britain has had none of this searching and soul-stirring experience. It is true she has been at war more constantly during the present century than any other state in the civilized world; but then, our British wars have been of a comparatively easy and comfortable kind. One would not under-

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value the devotion and valor which they have called forth on the part of a limited number of Englishmen, or the magnificent qualities which have been displayed in the course of these campaigns. But the nation, as a whole, has not felt its wars as others have. It has rejoiced in the exploits of its sailors and soldiers, and it has paid the bill without flinching; but it has not shared in the actual toils and tribulations, and in the triumphs, in the manner of those who have had to repel a great invading army from their own soil, or to pour armed hordes of men, drawn from their fields and factories, across a hostile frontier. England's "little wars" have been fought by handfuls of paid mercenaries in distant regions of the globe; and even her struggle with Russia in 1854, and that with the Indian rebels in 1857, never came home to the masses of the people as did the Franco-German War, or the Austro-Prussian War, or the American Civil War, to those who were concerned in them. The result, naturally, is that racial and national antagonism is much less virulent in England than in any other country. The Englishman is not fond of foreigners: perhaps, indeed, he rather dislikes them; but it is with a good-natured, placid, rather contemptuous dislike, due to the Briton's complacent, though unexpressed, belief in his own superiority rather than to any bitterness born of the sense of injury and wrong-doing. An English visitor to the United States is frequently struck by the vividness with which the events of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 are still present to the minds of many Americans. More than once, when the relations of the two countries were discussed, I have heard the events of 1781 or 1812 alluded to with a kind of personal asperity, that seemed strange enough to me, who knew that the exploits of Washington and all King George's generals were only a vague memory in England, and that not one cultivated Englishman in a hundred could so much as mention the name of a single captain who served under the White Ensign in the War of 1812.

One might enlarge on this theme; but enough, perhaps, has been said to show why Englishmen have always found it difficult, other causes apart, to respond in kind to the fierce hostility, which so often and so easily flames out in the United States when any political difficulty between the two countries arises. The phenomenon has been regarded rather with curiosity than with resentment: we have put down the occasional outbursts of militant jingoism, it has suited some American politicians to encourage, as the result of the Irish vote, and have thought little more about it. At the same time, it cannot be supposed that the process was altogether satisfactory and agreeable to us; and I am afraid

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it must be confessed that the efforts of those Englishmen who made it their business to advocate better and closer relations between the two English-speaking countries did not seem to have been particularly successful in the closing months of 1897, when the Cuban crisis was becoming acute. The memory of the Venezuela dispute had not, by any means, passed out of the English mind. There is no occasion to discuss that happily buried controversy. In England nine persons out of ten never understood it; and the tenth was perfectly content to allow Her Majesty's Government to settle it precisely as they pleased. But Mr. Cleveland's and Mr. Olney's sudden assault upon England had not been forgotten; and it was felt that the United States, in almost menacing us with war over a trumpery squabble with a bankrupt South American republic, for which neither Englishmen nor Americans cared the price of a cartridge, had acted with something less than friendliness and good feeling, more particularly as the onslaught seemed to have been purposely timed at a moment when our hands were full of trouble all the world over.

Then there was the Bering Sea Question, which had left behind it a certain amount of soreness, and a feeling that, somehow or other, the United States had not treated Great Britain quite fairly. The delay, however caused, in the payment of the damages due under the Award had created a bad impression. Moreover, without wishing to revive memories best forgotten, one may hint that the conduct and language of certain prominent United States politicians during the preceding eighteen months had not been of a character to conciliate British public opinion. On the whole, then, it must be admitted that England regarded the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain with somewhat mixed feelings. Of course, there could be no enthusiasm in favor of Spain herself, whose abominable misgovernment of her colonies was generally acknowledged; but there was a certain tenderness for an old ally with famous traditions, who seemed to be plunging with reckless, but chivalrous, valor into a conflict with an enemy immeasurably superior to herself in every element of power.

Few Englishmen ventured to formulate the wish that the United States would be beaten; and it was generally conceded that the ultimate triumph of Spain, if it could occur, would be a disaster to civilization. But there was an unexpressed thought in many minds, and even vague hints, that it would be no bad thing for England if the war began with a reverse or two for the United States. It was felt that the Jingo spirit had gone a trifle too far for our safety and comfort. The rising imperialism of the Republic had been watched and noted in Britain; and many

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shrewd observers surveyed with some alarm the prospect of a rapid and easy American triumph over the Spaniards, believing that the net result of such a campaign would be merely to whet the American appetite for further successes, which might be achieved at the cost of a greater maritime empire than Spain. The real unimportance of some of the loud-mouthed orators of the Senate and of the House was not understood in England; and Americans cannot be surprised if Englishmen, taking the lion's-tail-twisting talk much more seriously than it deserved, awaited the appearance of the United States in the world's arena as a great colonial and naval Power with more apprehension than delight.

The change of sentiment which took place during the course of the war is as striking as it is satisfactory. It is not too much to say, that no country in the world has been so popular and respected with Englishmen as the United States is to-day. Seven months ago, though the more responsible English newspapers gave a general and guarded support to the United States, there was, as I have said, little display of enthusiasm; and there were not wanting some organs of public opinion, not wholly without influence, which did not hesitate to attack the Republic openly, and to express a desire for the success of Spain. Now, all is changed. Even the "Saturday Review," which distinguished itself in the early spring by pouring out volleys of vituperation against the United States, has altered its tone. The later American successes were almost as popular in London as in New York; the hard fighting of Gen. Shafter's troops received proper acknowledgments from soldiers and civilians in England; and the skilful tactics, dashing seamanship, and excellent gunnery of Admiral Sampson's fleet were regarded with almost as much satisfaction as if the Union Jack, instead of the Stars and Stripes, had floated over the fine squadron which drove poor Cervera's shattered hulks in flames upon the rocks outside Santiago.

The change, I think, has been produced mainly by two circumstances. In the first place, much has been done by the conduct and bearing of the American troops and officers of both services during the operations. Nothing succeeds like success,—especially, I am afraid, with Englishmen, who are more prone than most people to estimate men and nations not so much by what they are as by what they can do. Now, the Americans have most distinctly shown that they can do certain things of which all folks of the Anglo-Saxon strain are habitually proud. They can fight with both skill and unquenchable courage; they know how to handle a fleet; and they exhibit special excellence on that element of which Eng-

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lishmen always believe that the mastery belongs by prescriptive right to their race. What is more, the Americans have displayed other qualities which touch a responsive chord in the British bosom: they behaved with moderation and good temper in the hour of victory, and with conspicuous humanity and calmness amid all the temptations and exasperations of battle. Our kinsfolk, in fact, have done credit to the common family; and, naturally, we like them the better for it. They are chips of the old block, after all; and they have shown, as we think, that there is something about the Anglo-Saxon which puts him a step higher in the scale of civilization than those "lesser breeds without the law" of which Mr. Kipling speaks.

And the English would have to be a much less warm-hearted and kindly tempered people than they are, if they were not touched by the extraordinary manifestation of gratitude with which their diplomatic services to the United States Government have been recognized by the United States people. Those services were, it is true, not small nor unimportant; but few Englishmen, I suppose, could have anticipated that they would have been rewarded by such an outburst of something like affection as that which has been witnessed in America during the past few months. It was a revelation to Englishmen, to find that, in spite of all the politicians and all the Hibernian bosses, there was this well of friendliness and good feeling in the American people, which could be so easily and swiftly tapped. "Then, after all," said John Bull, in pleased amazement, "they *do* rather like us." He had been told the contrary so often through his only sources of information—the newspapers and politicians—that the conviction came upon him with all the shock of a delightful surprise. John may have his faults; but sulking and moroseness are not, as a rule, among them. If a man, especially a kinsman, holds out a friendly hand to him, John Bull is ready enough to take it in his hearty grasp; and so the sympathy which has been displayed in America has found its counterpart in an equally cordial, if less effusive, manifestation on this side of the ocean.

But there is something further. Coincidently with this highly satisfactory demonstration of American friendship there have been accumulating, with ever-increasing rapidity, fresh signs of menace and hostility elsewhere. The two things, by a singular fortune, have moved on *pari passu*. Britain's isolation from the European Concert has been emphasized by her statesmen and accepted by her people for a considerable period; but it is only within the last few months that the full consequences of this position have begun to be realized. Swiftly, step by

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step, we are being drawn into open antagonism with Russia. It is not here necessary to consider whether this attitude is prudent or otherwise, or whether a wiser statesmanship might not have avoided it. It is enough that the rivalry is acknowledged, and that preparation for the inevitable breach with our great rival in Asia is now openly and officially accepted as part of a foreign policy of the Empire. This has been asserted again and again by English statesmen, with growing point and directness, in the course of the present year. Beginning with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's and Mr. Balfour's declarations last autumn of the determination of England to support her rights in the Far East, we pass on to the still more famous "open door" manifesto, which was in general, though not in particular, terms a warning to Russia in regard to China. The warning became a threat in Mr. Chamberlain's audaciously plain-spoken Birmingham speech, in which he warned his countrymen that they who would sup with Russia required to be provided with a long spoon; it almost took the shape of a defiance when Great Britain announced her intention of occupying Wei-hai-wei; it trembled on the verge of warlike preparations when Mr. Goschen startled the House of Commons with a new naval programme, in which he stated, with no concealment or hesitation, that the fleet of additional battleships, armored cruisers, and torpedo-boat-destroyers which was to be added to England's navy, was distinctly intended for no purpose other than that of coping with the new ships built or ordered by the Government of the Czar; and early in August the dispute seemed fast approaching a crisis when Lord Salisbury plainly declared that the Chinese Tsung-li-Yamen would be supported by Great Britain against any Power (meaning Russia) which should attempt to put pressure upon it to cancel or repudiate a railway concession granted to British subjects. What may come out of the Czar's somewhat visionary irenicon, one cannot tell; but in the meanwhile Russia and England are facing one another in the Far East almost as avowed enemies. At the same time, the only other European Powers that count seriously in the balance, when the question is one which may have to be settled by the comparative weight of armaments, have thrown themselves on the side of England's rival. Russia could, it was supposed, reckon on the assistance of France and Germany—and to these may be added Austria and Spain—in the council chamber, and, it is even possible, in the more formidable arena where international questions may eventually have to be decided. With the exception of Japan, and of Italy,—whose bankrupt finances and internal instability would condemn her to a merely passive *rôle*,—England sees herself without a stable ally in Europe or Asia. No wonder,

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that, like Canning, she turns with hope to the New World, "to redress the balance of the Old."

The Spanish-American War and the new attitude of the United States have altered the international situation for the better, so far as England is concerned. Formerly the expansion of America in the Pacific was regarded with doubt and apprehension. English observers who looked into the future have long been convinced that this expansion was bound to come. They have tried to get their countrymen to understand that it was useless to oppose a movement which was so clearly dictated by the "manifest destiny" of a great nation. But, if they were prepared to submit to the inevitable, they looked forward to its results with uneasiness. They foresaw in the United States another first-class military and naval Power, with a thriving foreign trade, coaling-stations, and fortified ports scattered all over the largest of the oceans, with a dominant influence in Eastern Asia, perhaps gradually extending toward India and the Red Sea, and with the short strategic and commercial routes between Europe and the East in its hands, by means of the Isthmus and the Nicaragua Canal. England might not grudge the Union its increase in strength and *prestige;* still less could she attempt to impede it: but she saw little gain for herself in this creation of another most energetic and resourceful rival in sea-power and commerce. I do not think it occurred to one man in a hundred, when he thought about the subject, that a great American warlike or mercantile marine could be really formidable to any state but Great Britain. The events of the past few months have put the matter in an entirely different, and much more agreeable, shape. Englishmen have suddenly discovered that the development of American imperialism, instead of being a danger, may, in reality, be a valuable support and assistance to them. If they may have to cope with the rivalry of a superbly equipped competitor in trade, they may also find themselves side by side with an ally of extraordinary efficiency. Threatened by a combination of the military Powers of the Continent, or even, it may be, by a league of the Latin, the Slavonic, and the Mongolian races, they fall back with delight on the prospect of a counter-alliance of the free people of kindred blood and institutions, who alone have been able to make liberty, law, and order consistent with one another and with the highest material progress. This is a new light to Englishmen; and it does much to irradiate the gloom which everywhere else seems darkening over the international horizon.

There is, indeed, some danger that our expectations have been elevated rather beyond the point at which prudence would suggest that they

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should stop. Cautious public speakers and writers have warned us not to make too much of "Anglo-Saxon" alliance, while it is still inchoate and incomplete. But I am afraid that these wise admonitions have not always been taken to heart, and that a great many Englishmen are flattering themselves with the notion, that, when serious trouble comes for England, it can reckon on the support of the United States. It is not for me to say how far there is any real warrant for this belief. But the mere fact that it can be held, as it is, by a large body of persons in Great Britain, shows how striking has been the change in public opinion since the period when the common idea was entertained that John Bull's difficulty would be Uncle Sam's opportunity, and that, if ever England found herself seriously involved with a combination of European Powers, she would be more likely to find American sympathies with her enemies than with herself. A man who should say that in print to-day would be laughed at by the great majority of readers. Ten months ago the opposite theory would have seemed equally ridiculous to all but the comparatively uninfluential minority, which preached to inattentive ears the doctrine of the real unity of Anglo-American interests, as against those of the outside world.

SIDNEY LOW.

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HERMANN SUDERMANN.

AMONG the imaginative writers of modern Germany two stand to-day in as unquestioned preëminence as did the Dioscuri of Weimar a hundred years ago, though neither has attained the complete fulfilment of the promise of his literary beginnings. Of the two, Hauptmann is better known in this country than Sudermann; but perhaps this is as much due to chance circumstances and a small band of zealous advocates as to any superiority of invention. In technic and in the mastery of the resources of his art Sudermann is certainly the superior.

It is true that, to enjoy either thoroughly, one must have been in touch with their environment; for both are so thoroughly German as to be almost provincial in their native vigor. One feels this especially in the earlier work of Sudermann. Few subjects in contemporary literature are more interesting than the evolution of this author's genius to literary clearness; thick smoke giving place to bright-burning flame —the clouds of dawn dissipated before the rising sun. It is from the point of view of this evolution that I propose to examine his work during the past decade. But first a word of chronology.

Sudermann was born in 1857 and in East Prussia, as one might surmise; for this is the favorite scene and subject of his early literary imagination. He was but fourteen at the founding of the German Empire, and so passed the most impressionable years of his youth in a time of national expansion and material development that found no adequate literary expression. Dry-rot seemed to be threatening German letters; and against this Bleibtreu in the early eighties headed a band of "Young Germans," with whom Sudermann in his first work shows some affiliation, especially in their common disposition to look to France for literary counsel. His first volume, "Twilight Tales," written when he was thirty, bears witness to the influence on him of the healthier aspects of Maupassant's humor and of the genial grace and gayety of Daudet. A vein of cynicism runs through the best of these stories, however; and two of them, "The Friend" and "The New-Year's Confession," give effective expression to a profound pessimism.

In the same year with "Twilight Tales" appeared "Dame Care,"

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now the most widely read of his novels, though it was long in attracting attention, and seems inferior to "The Katzensteg" in realistic power, and to "It was" in psychic insight. But all his future qualities are here portrayed; for he has not yet the art to hide his art. There is the tendency to types and symbols, to extreme manifestations of will, and to a somewhat crude realism. One notes here also a fault that has pursued Sudermann ever since; viz., a painfully elaborate elucidation of characters. The reader has already rejoiced to divine their natures from some indication of speech or act; and when these are explained he resents this aspersion on his perspicacity as one does the elucidation of a *bon mot*. Personality is obscured by trivial comment; and the author seems to be spinning copy while the action is marking time.

But, for all that, "Dame Care" is a work of deep poetry and strong imagination. It is sometimes morbid; but it is always genuine. The action is often improbable; but the fundamental idea, that care lames the springs of effort and can be banished only by a great decision, is true for thousands. Seldom has the strength and beauty of unselfishness, the contrast between being and seeming, or a contempt for the opinion of mediocrity, been more effectively expressed, yet without the scornful bitterness of the later fiction.

"Dame Care" is a sort of realistic fairy tale. It is the old story of the younger son who breaks the spell that binds the castle, and wins the enchanted princess. Only, while in the fairy tale the jungle opens of its own accord to form a path for *Prince Charming* to the *Sleeping Beauty*, here there is long struggle, recurrent defeat, and discouragement; and this gives to "Dame Care," as it does to Sudermann's work during 1888 and 1889, a tone of depression and gloom. One feels that the national glory had not been without its disappointment. Vital social questions were still unsolved. The national character was not elevated. Brighter colors may break here and there through the cloud; but the general background of the fiction of these years is an envious, discontented, grasping, and cunning peasantry, such as Balzac had described in "Les Paysans," which disappears from Sudermann's work after 1889, though the cynical mood may be traced till it ends in 1892 in the laughter of "Iolanthe's Marriage."

"Dame Care" is not a great novel; but only one destined to become a great novelist could have written it. The story does not move steadily forward: it is ill-constructed. The interest is not sustained. The beginning is admirable, and conveys, as no other German story has yet done, the life and mode of thought of the German country gentry. But our

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attention is presently diverted to characters that seem to have stepped out of the palmy days of romanticism, and which vanish without affecting the narrative of this Odyssey of duty, that finds its way at last to a somewhat lame conclusion. Yet the story will always have interest, by reason of its many autobiographical touches and its genuine appeal to the sympathy of the reader.

In passing from "Dame Care" to "Brothers and Sisters" (1888) and "The Katzensteg" (1889), one is struck by the recurrence of set characters. The father is nearly always domineering and tyrannical; the son habitually mistakes stubbornness for loyalty and virtue; the wife is either the German ideal *Hausfrau*, the submissive domestic animal, or the French *menagère*, partner in the concern; while of the marriage of true minds there is but little suggestion. His young girls also fall into two groups, the elves and the angels, all body or all soul,—sprites like the *Elspeth* of "Dame Care," or incarnations of natural force like the *Rosine* of "The Katzensteg." There is, as some one has said, a sort of oscillation between "L'Assommoir" and "The Wide, Wide World."

"Brothers and Sisters" consists of two tales connected by a like situation. In "The Story of the Silent Mill" two brothers love the same woman; in "The Wish" two sisters, the same man. Both are tragic and fatalistic, and leave a deep impression of horror. In the former the woman is left alone,—husband and lover dead, and that not without her fault,—to seek in solitude and ascetic excess "to atone for the great crime that men call Youth." In "The Wish" we have the situation which has been well handled in Ricard's "Sœurs" and in Hardy's "On the Western Circuit," and by Maupassant also, though with a wholly different conclusion. The thought, that she had desired her sister's death in order that she might marry the widower, so preys on *Olga* that at last, horror-stricken at her unwitting disloyalty, she seeks refuge from the fulfilment of her love in suicide. This latter is the better of the two tales, though both suffer from prolixity. The prologue and epilogue in "The Wish" are quite superfluous. Sudermann seems not to realize his own power,—that he has made the character of *Olga* clear as day to all who have eyes to see. There is wavering still between realism and romanticism; but there is a decided advance in psychic analysis.

The year 1889 marks a noteworthy crystallization of Sudermann's ideas of literature and life. The growing success of Zola, the rising fame of Schopenhauer, and, most of all, perhaps, the example of Ibsen and Tolstoï, modified the sturdy independence of his beginnings. The

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first result of the conflict of these forces within him is a pessimistic negation of morality. It is as though Sudermann had himself had the experience, and come to the ethical position of the magnanimous hero of "The Katzensteg," who, as destiny closed upon him,

"saw the mists lifted that separated the basis of human being from that of human consciousness, as though he could penetrate deeper than men are wont to do into the depths of the unknown. What men call good and evil floated before him anchorless on superficial clouds: below them rested in slumbering strength the natural."

"The Katzensteg" is a weird and wild, repulsive yet fascinating, story; but its interest lies less in the moral torture of *Boseslav* at his father's treason to his country—in which we cannot feel there is any tragic necessity—than in the curious psychological study of *Regine*, his father's outcast accomplice, with the animal virtues and the vices of her instincts. Her fault seems, to *Boseslav*, to lie not in nature, but in social convention; and in defying vulgar folly he invokes the tragic catastrophe. Yet, stern as is this tragedy of a noble soul struggling with fate, "The Katzensteg" is less persistently harrowing than "Dame Care," and it has no touches quite so ghastly; for Sudermann is emerging from romantic pessimism. He is still sombre and stern; but he has now the joy of combat.

Stylistically "The Katzensteg" was much the best work that Sudermann had yet done; but its strength, like that of "Dame Care," lay in individual scenes and in essentially dramatic situations. It was, therefore, natural that he should be led to dramatic composition, and almost inevitable that dramatic success should react on his narrative style; making it more direct, less prolix, and giving it a unity of action more strict than is required by the novelistic genre. From 1889 onward he becomes best and most widely known as a dramatist; and the single novel and one important story that he has since written show so strongly the effect of dramatic composition that we may notice them here as a natural transition to his work for the German stage.

In "Iolanthe's Marriage" (1892) high-minded pessimism has already yielded to a serener philosophy. The satire is as keen as it is even; but it is more jovial, more kindly. The realism of *Boseslav's* East Prussian purgatory is exchanged for conditions within the range of ordinary experience and sympathy; and, though some may regret the touches of Rabelaisian humor, we breathe more freely, feel more at home, here than in the earlier stories. But what is most striking in "Iolanthe's Marriage" is the economy of means. Every line tells. Every character stands clear-cut; and there is unflagging movement as in a good drama.

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It leaves as deep an impression as "The Katzensteg," and a pleasanter memory.

"Iolanthe's Marriage" is only a trifle; but it shows how contact with dramatic technic banished from his style, once for all, indecision, obscurity, and prolixity. The dramatist must know what he wants to say, and say it clearly. His characters must subordinate the display of nature to the interplay of personality. They must speak to the spectator as man to man. To the new Sudermann, "Man begins where nature ends."

Developing on these lines, Sudermann produced in 1894 "It was," which is not only his best novel, but the best German novel of the decade. The situation is a genially conceived variation on the old theme of the "unholy trinity." *Leo* has loved and compromised *Felicitas*. His friend *Ulrich*, who plays a kind of Arthur to *Leo's* Lancelot, on being assured by *Leo* of her honor, defends that of his absent friend by marrying the lady, an extremely fascinating but puzzling creature, who sins and repents with delightful mobility, caressing and betraying, shrewd and capricious,—a soulless destroyer of souls. The story opens with *Leo's* return to reap the seed of the falsehood he had sown. Feeling that repentance is weakness, *Leo* would fain let the past bury its dead. Self-respect, friendship, honor demand that he avoid *Ulrich* and his fascinating, though depraved, wife. But a morbid desire for repentance and atonement lures him back under her spell, until he is emancipated at last by learning and telling the truth that sets him and *Ulrich* and even *Felicitas* free at last.

The moral of the story, then, is to look forward and not back, out and not in; to seek not repentance nor penance, but self-control and action. Or, as *Leo* himself puts it, "With you, the motto is, 'Sin, repent, sin again.' With me, 'Sin, repent not, do better.'" Some of the minor characters in "It was" are melodramatic and romantic; others, such as the pastor and his son, the student, are admirable; and the letters of little *Paul* from school are masterpieces of boyish pathos, hardly matched in German literature. *Leo* is Sudermann's first worthy hero. But almost from the outset our interest centres in *Felicitas*, like *Madame Bovary*, the victim of a sentimental education, capable of stirring her shallow nature to tempests of self-pity, her mind fit only to toy with itself, without moral standard or moral stamina, but with almost Satanic shrewdness in pursuing her fancies and her desires; invoking crucifix and altar as her accomplices, and then "licking her lips a little with her red-pointed tongue," in most uncanny fashion. She could grieve for

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her dead *Paul* to the extent of attempting suicide; but she would be careful to take only a slight overdose of chloroform: for "everything, even the will to die, turned in her hands into a lukewarm, lying pretence." In short, she was consciousless sin, "smiling, flattering, wishing no ill, passing in self-centred meditation over corpses on her pleasure's path." Rather than suffer with *Leo*, she would betray him; and the close gives us a glimpse of her, living divorced in Berlin, "rosy and gay as though freed from a nightmare." This *Felicitas* is one of the most curious studies of femininity in modern fiction,—a self-deceived deceiver, always posing, revelling in emotion for emotion's sake, and caring little whether the drama be comedy or tragedy, so that she can be its heroine.

Technically this story is admirable. There is nothing *doctrinaire* in its naturalism. Sudermann is convinced that the novel that does not interest is bad, whatever its theory. In this last important expression of himself in prose fiction, the gross virility of the East Prussian, which some have deplored as a "slag" borrowed from Zola, but which has been native to that soil since the days of the Teutonic knights, is tempered by the urban Prussian pessimism, radical but serene, seeing in the tragedy and pathos of life the best and often the only means of tempering character, always manly, active, looking the present in the face, trusting that good will come at last, if only a man be loyal to conscience in his struggles for material well-being, for social recognition, and against ingrained perversity. He does not look at life through rosy glasses; and yet one closes "It was" with the feeling that Sudermann is growing in his faith in human nature, in self-knowledge, in self-control, and in charity.

Turning now to the drama, we find Sudermann opening his career in 1890 with "Honor," a play filled with a serene earnestness. He seems to have relented of the relentlessness of "The Katzensteg." Yet "Honor" is but the first of a series of dramas all of which are directed against the tyranny of moral or social conventions, to free oneself from which is to grow in character. This is the common theme of "Honor," "Home," "Love in a Groove," and "The Butterflies' War." In each drama a high soul beats its wings against the bars of convention, and without success, save as it finds strength in the combat itself. "Honor" is written to show the relativity, and so the unreality, of this social ideal in a society as effectually dominated by caste as is the Hindu. The value of honor lies only in its accord with duty and virtue. The author brings into most ingenious and effective contrast the moral horizons of

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the laborer, of the man of inherited capital, and of the man of native energy and ambition. The truth that Sudermann would bring home to us here is, that every man is the creator of his own ideal, the guardian of his own honor, and that, if relatives or environment check its development, it is wise to leave it and them behind and to seek, with *Robert* and *Leonore*, the workman's son and the capitalist's daughter, as they join hands at the close, "a new home, a new duty, and a new honor."

"Sodom's End," which followed "Honor" in 1891, marks retrogression rather than progress. Its strength exhibits itself in a painful ugliness. Here Sudermann first attempts Berlin society, and, by means of an artist genius, *Willy*, brings the petty *bourgeois* family of his birth into contrast with a brilliant circle of *nouveaux riches*. The former sacrifices all to his genius; the latter lame his creative power by their flattery and corruption, which he can no more resist than can the Indian the vices of a higher civilization. In real life society does not corrupt genius, as Sudermann here implies, but rather neglects and starves it. Technically, however, this drama is better constructed than "Honor," and rises in a constant *crescendo* to the close. The conversation is naturalistic throughout. Each speaks in his own language and in his usual style, with no effort at sententious rhetoric, yet with a great deal of dramatic virility. But the strongest effects are to be sought less in epigrams than in simple every-day expressions that gain all their force from circumstance, like the famous "Qui te l'a dit" of Racine's *Hermione*. It must be admitted, however, that none of the characters, save possibly the seductive *Adah*,—a sort of preliminary study for *Felicitas*,—have in them sufficient force of will for the highest ends of tragedy; and the sensational success of "Sodom's End" was surely more that of scandal than of any ethical satisfaction. Men felt a troubled admiration. They were sure of Sudermann's power. They were not sure that it had not been abused.

Perhaps no step in Sudermann's career is so long as that which separates "Sodom's End" from "Home," in which latter some may still be disposed to see his greatest maturity of talent and most complete courage of conviction. The play has been called "a gospel of self-respect," more effective in this than "The Katzensteg" or even than "It was." Here, as there, we hear the proud cry of "No repentance," —no brooding backward glance, but the bending of all effort on the full development of the individual. "To grow by sin is better than the purity you preach," says *Magda*. "I am I; and through myself I become that which I am,"—though, doubtless, Sudermann is still of the

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opinion expressed in "Sodom's End," that "vice has the minimum value for culture."

But he who strives for full development of the individual clashes not only with an inner tendency to seek moral peace in penance rather than in acts that indicate the new temper of character, but also with the world's social and moral conventions; and Sudermann takes advantage of this to give a background of realistic satire of German provincial narrowness to the psychic struggle of *Magda's* heart. This heroine, a world-renowned singer, has purchased the full unfolding of her talent and her character at the price of conventional virtue, which she has sacrificed to *Keller*, a smug, hypocritical defender of "Throne and Altar" in society and politics, whom Sudermann puts before us with a contemptuous bitterness that may seem pitiless to those who do not know how common and how nauseating are the German originals from whom the part is studied. A musical festival brings the singer, by an unsought chance, to her native town; and filial instinct leads her to the house of her father, as though it were still possible for all to forgive and forget. But love is not enough for her soldierly father. He demands submission, contrition. Such concession as she can she makes. Her artist's career and fame is not a part of character: that she might surrender. But repent she will not, cannot; and when the suppression of her child is demanded her individuality bursts all bonds. She will sacrifice home, even life, rather than self-respect. And when her father dies, as he is about to sacrifice her life to his outraged sense of honor and morality, she is left condemned by all, but standing alone in conscious rectitude; her heart turning forever from the affection for which it longs to be true to itself and its own righteousness.

To relieve this intense psychic tragedy there are admirable scenes of humor and irony, in which this petty aristocracy is allowed to reveal its base rivalries and low ambitions in ingrained cant and in a delightful disputation on the ideal goods of a nation. And, lest we should think too ill of convention, there are honest *Max* and the pastor's noble resignation to command our esteem. But the sympathy of author and reader is ever with *Magda* in her cry: "I will not, I cannot; for I am I, and dare not lose myself."

With "The Butterflies' War" Sudermann enters on a period of pause. He recurs here, but in gentler vein, to the same theme—that moral compromise is a lie, that character can be built only on truth to self to the uttermost. The humor here is derived from the efforts of a vulgar mother to marry her daughters and to train them for that event. But

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the emancipation of *Rosi* from her ingrained habit of sacrifice and subordination is not made a dramatic necessity. The whole hovers between tragedy and farce. It closes with a question rather than an answer, and suggests an adaptation to the demands of the box-office rather than of art. Its happy ending, like that of "Love in a Groove," which followed, is not natural, but belongs to a conventional "parlor" morality, of which no one is dupe save possibly the Philistine spectator. We prefer pessimism to sceptical irony. There is too much of the *virtuoso*, too little of conviction in these dramas; nor does "Morituri" combine his later technical mastery with the simple truth and sympathy of "Honor" and "Home."

"Love in a Groove" is indeed better than "The Butterflies' War." We are told here of *Elizabeth*, a genial and executive woman, who in pique and desperation had married *Wiedemann*, a schoolmaster hopelessly her inferior, and meets *Röcknitz*, a kindred spirit, now unhappily married, for whom she had formerly cherished a vain love. He, she, and we, too, feel their natural affinity. But at last, after veering toward suicide, *Elizabeth* finds that her husband also needs her forgiveness; and they determine to bear together a burden that time alone can lighten. The play abounds in abnormal extremes. No character in it approaches *Magda*, though *Röcknitz*, coarse as *Squire Western*, is probably the best. *Elizabeth* is ineffectual, *Wiedemann* stagey; and the latter's spirit is as likely to be called Philistine as Christian. There is a dainty pathos in his blind daughter *Helen*, however; and the pompous self-importance and hypocrisy of *Orb* give him a niche in memory, small, but not easily forgotten.

"Love in a Groove" is of 1896; and to that year belong also three single acts under the collective title "Morituri," each considering under a changed aspect the imminent prospect of death. Of these "Das Ewigmännliche" is an enigmatical drama of No-Man's Land in verses which, it may be hoped, will remain unique in the author's work. "Teja," with the last of the Goths for its hero and Vesuvius for its scene, portrays the dawn of love in the shadow of death; but "Fritzchen" redeems the otherwise mediocre volume with a dramatic situation of wonderful strength and concentration,—a sermon on the text from "Sodom's End," that vice has the minimal value for culture or happiness. Still one feels, in regard to all this work since "Home," that it does not ring true. Each scene is good, but the combination is false; and there is a too obvious striving after the extreme antitheses that characterize the dramas of Sardou.

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It remains to speak of "John the Baptist," a drama to which the critics of last year looked forward with an eagerness accentuated by the prohibition of the Prussian censor and by the intervention of the Emperor himself in the dramatist's behalf. The judgment of the critics on this drama has from the outset differed widely. The Emperor had pronounced it "a devoutly sublime work." A prominent American professor confidently hopes that its hero "will be a source of inspiration and delight to our children and our children's children"; for he is "a character worthy of Schiller's genius." A noted French critic, M. Rod, regards it as one of Sudermann's best works, and "in the first rank of the numerous dramas lately borrowed from sacred legend." Others think the drama would be improved by suppressing the hero, that the real interest centres in Herodias and her daughter, that it is merely "a picture-book according to the dramatic rules," most naturally to be compared with Sardou's "Théodora," and less a tragedy than is the Bible narrative on which it is based. In my opinion, the truth lies, as usual, somewhere between. "John the Baptist" suffers, as all historical dramas do nowadays, from the vain pretence of "local color" or "historic truth" in a work of imagination. You cannot mingle figures consecrated by the memory of nineteen centuries with creatures of your fancy, nor snatches from the Gospel narrative with your most rhythmic prose, without jarring on the mind, if not on the heart and conscience, of the hearer. The play suffers also from a straining for spectacular effect, but most of all, perhaps, because the Baptist is here presented as so ineffectual as to provoke impatience.

While John was preaching by the Jordan, he tells us in the first act, his soul was devoured by doubt. The old order was changing,—of that he was sure. But whether the mail-clad Messias would right it with his flaming sword, he was no longer certain; and his agitated soul reflected the nervous expectation about him. Even the success of his own preaching troubled him; and this interior doubt paralyzed his will, although he tells us that at the baptism of Jesus his soul had become calm. In the desert he had preached with fanaticism: before Herod, parading impudently with Herodias, his uplifted arm sinks at the memory of the gospel of love that he has overheard in the mouth of a chance Nazarene. He had been a sombre fanatic, a revolutionary leader, with an ideal too visionary and austere for realization. But the change in his anticipations from the bloody Messias to the Prince of Peace is brought about most undramatically, not by acts, but by tedious palaverings and reflections; and it is the caprice of the poet,

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rather than anything in tragic necessity, that brings John to mental clearness at last.

The spectator is beguiled into following this psychic development by a romantic and sensational linking of the fortunes of the Baptist to those of Herodias and Salome, with which, however, the self-revelation of John's soul is very loosely connected. To Herod, John seems a harmless idealist. Herodias thinks his adhesion would be helpful to her political schemes, and feigns affection for him; while Salome is, much like *Felicitas*, a self-conscious, calculating coquette, thoroughly modern, and seeking in the love of the Baptist the joy of novel sensation.

These two "black-haired beasts," as a German critic ungallantly calls them, are more attractive to Sudermann and to us than they were to the Baptist, whose more than human virtue sets off in effective contrast the moral rottenness of the court, as his rags do the splendor of the palace. There is effective antithesis also between social ranks, as in "Honor," and in the minor characters between the dawning Christian faith and the outworn, wearied scepticism, or, as in the feast and dance at the close, between tragic purification and a swinish hedonism. It is curious and somewhat disquieting, by the way, to compare this dance, even in its details, with that described by Flaubert in his "Herodias." The realism of some of these scenes may be sensational, but it is very effective; though this is, of course, a lower field of art than the psychic drama, and to succeed here is of less significance than to "lead the upward idealistic movement," as some allege that this drama is calculated to do.

In "John the Baptist" as in "Morituri" the interest is transferred from society to the individual. It is no longer a question of personality as against conventions, whether of honor or of propriety. No social problem is discussed. The question is purely a moral one, more universal in its interest, and, thus, far more classic in character and more likely to endure. But, while in details and in individual scenes the technic is admirable, the drama falls far short of the classic standard in its structural unity, and is in this decidedly inferior to "Honor" or to "Home." It should be clear, then, that Sudermann has not yet joined his faculties in their happiest combination, nor given us what it is in him to give. It remains still true, however, to-day, as for the last ten years, that there is no German writer of whom we are justified in entertaining greater expectations.

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